dissent

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The Friedman Inventions

Gus Tyler

". . . one wonders how [Milton and Rose Friedman's] book has managed to become a best seller. Perhaps the clue appears on page 222: 'Perfection is not of this world. There will always be shoddy products, quacks, con artists.'"

Carter's Attack on the Welfare State

H. Brand

Women and American Culture

Catharine R. Stimpson

Anti-Semitism and the French Right

Jean Bloch-Michel

Church and Democracy in Poland

Leszek Kolakowski; Jan Gross

Khrushchev in Retirement

Roy Medvedev

Rawls and His Radical Critics

Robert Amdur

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A Double Dying

Reflections on Holocaust Literature

By Alvin H. Rosenfeld



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

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Allard Lowenstein

(1929-1980)

When I was teaching for a few years at Stanford in the early '60s, that excellent university was as politically dormant as American universities were then supposed to be. Perhaps the first political meeting held on campus in some years was organized after the Birmingham outrages (the killings of several black children by bombers). We organized a protest meeting. The meeting's sponsors, nice inexperienced California boys and girls, were worried—with good reason—whether anyone would show up until one of them said, "Lowenstein will bring his crowd." Who was this Lowenstein? Some sort of assistant dean in, I think, the law school who had gathered about him a group of left-liberal students. The meeting was held, successfully, and Lowenstein "brought his crowd." That was my first encounter with Al, and we soon became friends.

Afterward, over the years, whenever there was a good cause, Lowenstein brought his crowd. Far more often a loser than a winner in his electoral campaigns, he still left his mark. A whole generation of young people swore by him.

In the late '60s Al and I were talking together at a forum at Harvard; opposing us were some New Left people, and the topic of the evening was the tactics advisable for the antiwar movement. Al and I held fast to the principles of nonviolence (I sometimes felt at these occasions that we were the last two believers in democracy . . .). The bulk of the students, their emotions shaken by New Left rhetoric, were hostile to us, not exactly because they believed in violence or knew how or where to apply it if they did, but because they felt irked that anyone should speak clearly against it.

At one point an old friend and former student of mine, Martin Peretz, got up to attack me from (of course) "the left." This was more than I could take, it seemed as if everyone was losing his mind. I replied very sharply, and Marty took it well enough (he had been trained at Brandeis). At the end of the meeting, Al came over and said, "You really shouldn't have been so rough on Marty." But when he saw that I was about to burst out again, either into rage or tears, he quickly added in his utterly charming and lovable way, "Not that he didn't deserve everything you gave him."

Allard Lowenstein lived out what was best in American liberalism. He didn't call himself a socialist, but his hero was Norman Thomas and he agreed with most of what we have been saying in *Dissent*. Once I asked him about joining our editorial board and he answered, "Sure, if it'll help any." What he meant was that he didn't excel as a political writer or theorist, but as a political activist and tactician; and for that, a certain independence was best. He somehow managed to combine loyalty to comrades in a movement with a free-wheeling style that enabled him to start things on his own. He was a wonderfully friendly man. In later years we didn't see much of one another, though I lived a few blocks from his brother's restaurant, which I made into a sort of headquarters for myself. So we'd meet occasionally, exchange notes and gossip, and always there was something exhilarating about his breezy American style, his hurtling into the place with a gang of young people, his sudden exits, his warmth, his steadiness.

Without rhetoric or pomposity, Al embodied that sense of social commitment which is the very opposite of the spirit of the '70s. That he should now, at the age of 51, have been shot down in an utterly insane act; that we should lose him at a time when he is so badly needed; that he should not have lived on, to fulfill himself as public citizen and private man—I find this completely intolerable. It is a loss we share with many others, those with whom we agree and those with whom we do not. And we want to join those Americans who find it hard to imagine a politics, a new effort, a community of the left without Al Lowenstein.

Irving Howe

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In Our Next Issue:

The Last Words of Jean-Paul Sartre

A comprehensive interview with the French writer and thinker, covering a wide range of subjects, from politics to philosophy, to the French Communist party, to the role of Jews in modern society. Here is a brief excerpt:

BENNY LEVY: You said recently that the left no longer exists. . . . What does that statement mean?

JEAN-PAUL SARTRE: First, that although the leftist bloc always votes left, which is to say for leftist parties, it has lost hope. It no longer believes that to vote answers a larger purpose. . . . Leftism itself has disappeared. On the one hand, the election-orientation of leftist parties makes the very idea of a great and total change, the idea of revolution, impossible—for a long time I've thought that the Communist party is the worst enemy of revolution. And on the other hand, the insurrectional aspect of leftism also has disappeared. . . . One can no longer act as people did in '68—going on strike or staging a street demonstration, and so forth: none of that means anything today. . . . In the past, such actions offered the left some satisfaction, and what we have to discuss is whether this was an illusion. . . . All this indicates that the unity of the left—which, starting as early as in 1920, was seriously threatened by the existence of the Communist party—is now wrecked. Before 1914, the left was more of a great mass movement, with a few men who could provide direction at a given moment but who were not yet party bosses. . . . In a word, the left was at once diverse yet united. In other words, it had a principle.

BENNY LEVY: What principle? I don't follow you at all. What did this unity of the left consist of in 1914? Doesn't this backtracking smack a bit of mythologizing?

JEAN-PAUL SARTRE: There was no political unity, but one does feel that throughout the 19th and early 20th century men of the left, in general, put their faith in a political and human principle in terms of which they conceived their ideas and actions. . . . If one really wanted to do something to revive the unfortunate left, which today is dead, one would have to try to articulate this principle, learn the nature of it, learn how it could come to life anew. According to me, the left is dead because the principles it habitually acted by were never recorded on paper or registered in men's minds.

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Emanuel Geltman

The Cuban Exodus — a Taste of Freedom

An exodus is not yet a revolution. In the case of Cuba, it comes as evidence of desperation and geographical convenience. Where the Hungarians and Czechs had to face Russian tanks, the Cuban escapees face Castro's wrath, hazardous waters in less-than-reliable craft, gougers, and a government welcome to these shores that blows hot and cold.

The few of us who were at the small gathering that was addressed by Huber Matos, reported briefly in the last *Dissent*, were deeply impressed. He spoke quietly and gravely about widespread disaffection in Cuba. Matos is hardly the sort to make wild guesses about impending revolution. Yet, he spoke of hundreds of thousands who were fed up with political repression, economic chaos. But "believing is seeing," and in the last few weeks we have been seeing it for real, beyond anything he said.

What began as a small surge to get out has swelled to an immense, almost frantic, mass movement. Castro and his Russian masters had to be dismayed, and then tried to turn it to their advantage by overwhelming the United States with more refugees than it might be willing to take in, maliciously pushing criminals, the mentally ill, and probably some spies into the often leaky boats. But he may now find the joke turned sour. Tens of thousands willing to take any chance, including drowning (and some have)—that doesn't speak very well for the blessings of "Cuban socialism." None of this suggests that his regime is in imminent danger of collapse. But it does bespeak contagion and, unlike soldiers, the infection cannot simply be shipped off to Angola.

Praise where praise is earned. The democratic countries of the world have not been overly generous in welcoming refugees. The small gestures to take 50 here, 300 there hardly add up to much. As for the United Nations, the less said the better. Costa Rica did at least offer to take all the Cuban refugees who could be flown there, if only as a staging area. But the geography, kinship, the glimmer of opportunity really is directed toward one country: ours. And here, as elsewhere, American policy is a shambles, conflicted, this day humane, another day insensitive. President Carter welcomes the newcomers with "open arms" while immigration officials threaten boat owners with massive fines.

The Cuban-American community has behaved admirably. It has responded with help, as have some non-Cuban agencies. Self-help has its virtues, but it is no substitute for a massive federal effort. But the real problems are yet to be met. Not all the refugees have families here. And those who do not will meet the hostility of Americans who feel threatened by a tightened economy. Some indeed are criminals. Elizabeth Holtzman, one of the brightest people in Congress, argues that we must do something to weed them out—negotiate with Castro, keep them interned. Can we really intern people who have not, not yet anyway, committed a crime here? Not an easy problem to solve. But surely, the presence of criminals among the refugees is no excuse to refuse entry to the hordes desperate to risk the journey.

In all this, there is a stab of memory. Back in 1940, the *S. S. St. Louis* set sail from Europe to cross the ocean with a boatload of Jews fleeing Nazi terror. Roosevelt—the great FDR—wouldn't let them land. The boat went on to Cuba (ironic, isn't it?) where it could not unload its human cargo either. The boat sailed back to Florida, where it lay off the coast while taking on supplies, and then returned to Europe. Had the United States been as relatively generous then as it is now, how many

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thousands would have been spared the agony of extermination?

WELL, IT'S BACK TO CUBA, more than 20 years after the revolution. The Battistaists, the rich, have long ago fled or been eliminated. What remains are Cubans who have lived under Castro's rule for a large part of their lives. Surely, the younger of the refugees can have little recollection of pre-Castro life. Many are young, educated in Castro's schools. Yet they come. Some won't make it because Castro won't let them out, and they will suffer severe penalties for their disaffection, especially those who had until now behaved as "loyalists."

Thinking about all this, we can't help wondering whether those American "leftists" still infatuated with totalitarian dictatorship—if only with the "different" or "better" one in Cuba—will now have some second thoughts. Can they ever come to understand that without democracy, all talk of socialism is mere ugly travesty?

But in the meantime, as the thousands flee from Cuba, we say to them: welcome, friends! □

William Kornblum

Closing a Plant — and Bouncing Checks

We are seeing the wanton gutting of the nation's heavy industrial plant. This tragic waste of blue-collar jobs and working-class lives will not cease as long as we allow government to abet the sacrifice of production facilities to the momentary needs of private cash flow. Without greater social control of capital, horror stories like this one from South Chicago will become ever more commonplace.

Some 3,500 steelworkers in South Chicago (Chicago's far South Side) were notified, as they collected their weekly paychecks last March 28, that their mill would close indefinitely that day. They were workers at the Wisconsin Steel Works, one of America's oldest and most successful specialty steel-rolling mills. True, their mill had been sold by the International Harvester Company to an undercapitalized affiliated concern, Envirodyne, Inc., some months earlier. Yes, the long strike at Harvester had cut deeply into orders for bar stock, spring steel, and plowshares, but now the strike was settled. Although in need of some modernization, the mill was sound. Hadn't the federal government guaranteed the operation of Envirodyne's managers with a $90 million loan, much of it still unspent? Why had the workers received no communication whatsoever that the plant might close "indefinitely" and that Envirodyne was filing for bankruptcy?

These were only a few of the questions that stunned workers asked themselves as they filed home to nearby mill neighborhoods that day. Many of the steelworkers from Wisconsin Steel stopped in one or another of the popular taverns that line Torrence Avenue facing the length of the plant. The discussions continued long into the night over drinks bought with beer money from paychecks cashed by tavern owners like Rose Alivojovic, or Tina Guel who owns the Juan and Tina Tavern. Other workers sped home to break the bad news to their families and to prepare for the customary shopping expeditions that night or the next morning. Their checks would be cashed by the supermarket tellers. Or would they?

That night word spread throughout South Chicago: "Wisconsin Steel is closed, the checks won't be honored at the banks." The workers and their families were to discover that their checks were uncashable. Neighborhood tavern owners were left with checks in the thousands of dollars—of worthless paper. Families that had lived from week to week on steelmill earnings now had to hurry for emergency help to family and friends.

This was only the beginning of the disaster. There would be no supplemental unemployment benefits, an immediate cessation of all health insurance, and, of course, no vacation checks for those waiting for hard-earned vacation dollars. Were the pensions safe? Would money be available from the company credit union? Would the mill reopen? These were the anxious questions shouted over and over again at stormy meetings in the weeks following the closure.

THE WORKERS' RESIGNATION and despair is more frightening than their anger at the small groups of left leafleteers or their hatred of the newspapers that dwell on the fact that theirs is an independent steel union, not a local of the United Steelworkers. "These guys with the leaflets are only trying to

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trade on our misery," an old friend from the mill tells me. "And what has the International Union done to keep mills open in Youngstown, or in any of the other towns?" Men approaching the retirement years, like Eli Strenich whose family has worked at Wisconsin Steel since their days of immigration, suddenly have to scrape up hundreds of dollars to pay for medical benefits. Younger men who finally have managed to purchase a house and are struggling to meet mortgage payments now face the loss of all their gains. "Well, you know we were always poor when I was a kid," Ed Hernandez sighs through tight lips. "I guess we go backs to beans and rice now."

The Chase Manhattan Bank holds the notes and has frozen the assets. In South Chicago some 3,500 steelworkers who know that their mill could be managed to thrive again now are waiting for the final word on the fate of their jobs, while in Washington an Administration they feel they have elected fumbles on, saving capital and destroying communities. □

Ruth Jordan

Capital and Communities

In the 1960s, when I was a writer and organizer for the International Union of Electrical Workers, one of my jobs was to travel to communities where plants were closing (sometimes in the aftermath of a strike or other militant union action) and to explain to the community leaders that the union was not to blame for the loss of jobs. The union was always on the defensive. The contract gains, which had built the well-being of the community, were now blamed by the corporation, and believed by the citizens, to be the cause of the shutdown. The corporation almost always escaped the community's wrath.

I saw the impact of plant closings first-hand—the loss of a worker's status and skills, as well as material security. I took pictures of the four-lane highways that led to empty factory buildings—buildings and highways often built by community bond issues for companies that demanded this sacrifice for locating there and providing jobs.

I went to Paducah, Kentucky, to Sandusky, Ohio, to Selma, Alabama—I knew that even though the first of these runaways went from North to South, it could just as well be from Upper South to Deep South, or maybe out of the country altogether.

Now the Progressive Alliance has published an account of the impact that the unrestricted mobility of private capital has had on communities, on the national economy, and on the world economy.* In *Capital and Communities*, Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison challenge capitalists' royal prerogative in the U.S. to move their investments without concern for social consequences or human costs. The authors, both economists, have analyzed virtually all the significant studies in the field, along with data used by the business community, to build a carefully documented case that leads to their ultimate recommendations for reform and action.

The book comes at a time when trade unionists are reeling from losses, not only at the bargaining table but in the halls of government as well. It explains why the "social wage"—those benefits built into the community structure by years of slow gains—is being eroded by pressure from the business community. Those who are baffled by what seems to be a sudden shift in American politics from a liberal to a right-wing ideology can find at least part of the answer in *Capital and Communities*.

Decisions to relocate plants, contend the authors, are not related to such traditional economic issues as transportation costs, proximity to markets, or even the real differences that might exist between energy costs and unit labor costs. They are more likely to depend on what the business community has defined as a "good business climate." That "climate" is one that keeps taxation and regulation of business to an absolute minimum and is enhanced by the presence of a hungry, docile and unorganized, or poorly organized labor force.

Since significant numbers of Americans, both middle-class and workers, believe that unrestricted capital mobility and free management decisions

* Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, *Capital and Communities: The Causes and Consequences of Private Disinvestment* (Washington, D.C.: Progressive Alliance, 1980), 333 pp., $20.00. (Progressive Alliance, 1625 L Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.)

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achieve the most efficient economic development, and that the "best" jobs are in the private sector, most are eager to satisfy the requirements of a "good business climate."

In Washington, D.C., workers got a good demonstration of the principle when Marion Barry, black mayor from a radical civil-rights background, led the fight to gut the workmen's compensation benefits workers had won over the years. Barry and his predominantly minority and liberal City Council used openly repressive tactics to limit the effectiveness of union opposition, even locking workers out of the Council chambers during debate on the bill. They did it all in the name of economic development, convinced by the business community that the cutting of Workmen's Comp was needed to produce that elusive "right business climate."

Bluestone and Harrison ask the American public to add up the devastation that bust towns have suffered and match it against the temporary and insecure glow of boom towns. Their figures show that while New England has suffered the greatest economic losses owing to unrestrained capital movement, the South is as likely to suffer losses as any other section of the country—for with increasing mobility, capital can move out of the country as easily as out of a state.

Capital and Communities devotes more than half of its pages to proving the consequences of economic disinvestment, and it should be credited for its insistence on a humanistic standard in judging economic activity. It is that aspect of the report that will be most useful in public debate.

But the most interesting contribution, and one that socialists will find particularly provocative, is its exposure of the extent to which American capital has disengaged itself from the nation/state and has charted new courses of enterprise, by defining a world market far beyond any previously achieved. This is a market where cash flow and the maximization of profit rule. It is a market where banks are as likely to decide where investments are made as product and marketing specialists. It is a world in which the product is incidental to the industrial process; only capital is the real product. The mobility of capital, and the velocity with which it can be moved from one nation to another and

The Other New York • Comments by Victor Gotbaum, Executive Director,

The old theme notwithstanding, it's not East side-West side that separates New Yorkers.

It's inside and outside. Inside meaning those residents who depend on the city to provide their basic services: health, education, housing, child-care, income, recreation and other special services. The outside population lives in or commutes to the city, earns its income here, enjoys the cultural and other advantages, but can afford to take care of itself. It shops anywhere for options.

The distinction is economic. You don't sit in municipal clinics if you can afford a private doctor. You don't put your kid on a waiting list for a pre-school program in the park if you can enroll the child in a nursery immediately.

We all note New York's remarkable progress toward fiscal health. But the inside population has paid the heaviest price for this progress. Budget cuts have been slicing directly into the quality of their lives for the past five years. They wait longer to see doctors, to fill prescriptions. Their children's class sizes are larger. Support and guidance services that used to help the ambitious poor and the infirm poor have been eliminated, or are overrun by increased demand and decreased staff.

A university system that educated waves of immigrants' children free now charges for tuition.

The standard of living for 800,000 people on welfare goes down monthly as prices outdistance their checks.

The real separation in the city is personal. You're one or the other. A have or a have-not.

It used to be that the poorest, most recently arrived New Yorkers could realistically hope that they or their children would move up. Humble origins were a badge of honor in this town. It's not the same any more. It gets harder and harder for the inside population to move out of their poverty and they know it. Times are more complex. The sweat of your brow is no guarantee any more.

Insiders see little concern and dwindling effort by outsiders to help improve their condition. Their vote is not considered significant. So they see the most popular Mayor we've had in years direct his attention successfully to the outside population. In no agency of this city can one point to improvements generated by this administration. The contrary is true, in fact, as efficiency and quality of service continue to decline. But the Mayor does better and better in the polls as the middle class hears the language it wants to hear from its Mayor. You may or may not believe that the intention here is not to malign the Mayor. He is the city's appropriate symbol and symptom of this time.

The businessmen of the media read and reflect the same environment. They target their product to the suburbs and the comfortable of the city. Restaurant

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from one industry to another, has commanded the invention of complex technologies that sustain its movement. Its technology empowers the managers to control the industrial process far from the site of production. It is a technology that robs workers of their unique skills and the means of using these skills to slow down the industrial process and ameliorate its impact.

The production of Ford's Fiesta model is divided between three different countries in Europe in order to meet the potential impact of a strike in any country. The most complete assembly is left to a plant in Saarlouis, Germany, where immigrant workers, dependent on Ford for permission to stay in Germany, are thought to be most docile and least likely to cause trouble.

The growing concentration of business, which has permitted it to assemble the wealth needed to develop this kind of technology, has also led to the destruction of regional and local differences in products and businesses. The authors point out, for example, that one reason for your getting only nationally advertised beer in most cities of the U.S. is the growing concentration in the malt-brewing industry. This concentration has increased two and one half times between 1947 and 1972, and so has eliminated the many local breweries, some of them more than 100 years old.

The conglomerates have moved into every area of production and since their objective is only money, oil companies buy department stores, banks buy manufacturing enterprises, food processers buy textile firms, insurance companies buy food producers. The conglomerate mode of enfolding this variety of production units within the parent corporation frequently has the effect of making a profitable or stable plant or store seem unprofitable. The business may be productive as an independent operation or a small chain, but once required to meet the profitability standards of the conglomerate, it fails. Bluestone and Harrison describe the "hoops" through which local management must jump once the newly acquired firm becomes part of the "group."

The conglomerates "milk" these cows until they run dry and then they shut them down or sell them to an unlikely successor. This doesn't mean that the vessel that is left is an unworkable enterprise.

District Council 37, A.F.S.C.M.E., AFL-CIO; Representing 115,000 New Yorkers.

reviews, decorating ideas, leisure and luxury displace hard news.

Informing the public has become less important than building a going, doing, spending, buying audience to sell their advertisers.

The pattern has been growing for years. Working journalists will attest that the other New York, the inside population, has become less interesting to their editors, less visible in the media.

New York City cannot go on like this. We're headed for trouble, sooner or later. More than 40 percent of our people are poor and/or minority group members.

For this city to stay healthy, this other New York has to be brought into the mainstream—the middle-class mainstream of status and possessions and hope. With good homes, furnishings, summer camps, ready health care, schools with promise, jobs that are not demeaning and deadening, reasons to believe they can do better soon.

Now 35 percent of black youth are unemployed. When will they get their first jobs? When will they learn how to work and get promoted? What will they become when they're forty?

How many generations have to grow up in the rubble and garbage of burned-out Big Apple slums?

If almost half our students don't finish high school, who's going to supply the workforce for the financial, cultural, and service industries that are supposed to bulwark New York's growth in the next decades? What kind of city will this inexperienced, under-educated generation make in the next 20 or 30 years?

Half this city can't support the other half forever. Half this city can't be left out forever.

The cleavage is growing deeper. There are no signs of change, no plans for improvement, no indication that the establishment takes notice of the disestablished. Except to skirt their neighborhoods.

The desire and potential of the poor are no less today then they ever were. What they lack is their rightful share of the attention, resources, and opportunity this city always offered its poor.

The legacy of a city is more than landmarks, and ambiance. The quality of New York's population in the next decades is a legacy being shaped by decisions we are making today.

Will New York be better because we excused hundreds of millions in taxes due from real estate and hotel developers? Will this be a better city to live in because we attack budget deficits by eliminating teachers, librarians, and caseworkers for abused and neglected children?

One thing we do know: thirteen-year-old gunmen are made, not born. □

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Another entrepreneur, a cooperative, or a community-owned operation might run it as a profitable firm or at least one that provides jobs and stability.

THE AUTHORS endorse plant-closing legislation that would ameliorate the impact of business shutdowns by requiring advance warning, government-sponsored training and transfer policies in order to protect workers' assets and skills as well as to provide disincentives for disinvestment. But Bluestone and Harrison point out that the concerted opposition of the corporate community is as likely to defeat such legislation as it did labor-law reform.

In the end the authors urge American workers to remember that the ultimate power to successfully challenge the corporations will only come from "a new burst of agressive organizing." Of course, they are right. For the best analysis cannot be translated into action by a labor movement divided in principle and determination, apolitical in nature, unorganized and defensive, crippled by the insecurity of unemployment, and embarrassed by the erosion of its past victories. Ultimately, the authors teach, but they do not tell us how. It is up to the working class and its organizations to show the way. □

A Special Correspondent

Prague: Stoking Boilers and the Life of the Mind

In the spring of 1980, the Senior Tutor and the Master of Balliol College, Oxford, both philosophers, and an English schoolboy were expelled from Czechoslovakia, after interrogation, for attending the unofficial philosophy courses of Dr. Julius Tomin. The Oxford dons were the latest in a stream of academic visitors Tomin had received. Had the seminars been permitted to continue by the police who roughly invaded the apartment where they take place, they would have treated the subjects of rationality in science and of Aristotle's *Ethics*, respectively. As it was, they could only leave their philosophical thoughts with the Prague police who, given the amount of energy they devote to interrogating and confiscating papers from intellectuals, must be the best educated cops in the world.

The treatment these Oxford visitors received is mild when compared with that regularly meted out to Dr. Tomin himself and to the participants in his seminars. The authorities of what he calls "The Security State" have frequently interrogated him, denied his elder son an academic education, beaten up his wife (a remarkably sensitive and intelligent person and a leading spokeswoman for Charter 77), threatened him with a psychiatric diagnosis (which, to their great credit, the Czech psychiatrists refused to perform), set policemen to chase him across fields and woods, positioned two of them outside the door of his apartment for five months, and repeatedly tried to get him to leave the country. On one recent occasion, Dr. Tomin was dragged by police down three flights of stairs from his apartment at the time his Wednesday seminar was due to begin, then was forced into a car and taken to the police station—where he refused to answer all questions and even to stand up. After several hours he was bundled out and, because the police did not want a body lying outside their station (he still would not get up) left him some distance away on a pile of coal. He dusted himself off, walked home, and then discussed Aristotle with his waiting students for four hours. The police, however, had made clear their intention to disrupt future meetings of his course, and they have been carrying it out.

TOMIN IS A SPECIALIST in classical philosophy, with a doctorate from Charles University, Prague, who has been denied a university post since 1968. Since then he has worked, among other things, as a turbine operator and as a nightwatchman at the Prague zoo. He is now unemployed. He is fiercely instransigent, fiery, prickly, and brave, and intensely jealous of his right to study and teach philosophy. He lavishes that teaching on a group of 30 or so young people who have been excluded from official higher education, in the case of three of them as a result of attending his course. (The documents of expulsion that these students received accuse them of being members of "an organized group that incited university students in an antisocialist direction" and of engaging in conduct "incompatible with the standards required of students at socialist universities." Such language is significant, not merely because of its echoes of

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the 1950s and its bureaucratic ruthlessness. It shows clearly how academic authorities in Czechoslovakia look upon the intellectual life.) Some of Dr. Tomin's students are the children of well-known signatories of Charter 77. All are constantly exposed to harassment and the danger of prosecution and imprisonment.

Like many thousands of people in Czechoslovakia who have been denied or dismissed for political reasons from the positions appropriate to their qualifications, Tomin's students do menial jobs, like cleaning floors, keeping parks, stoking boilers. They are passionately interested in philosophy and intensely grateful to Dr. Tomin for the lifeline he gives them to intellectual adventure and cultural tradition.

Tomin is not only a superb and exciting teacher. He is also a fine philosopher who spends some ten hours a day studying original texts (modern secondary works are of little interest to him). He is presently studying Aristotle's commentary on Aristotle. The philosophical visitors agree in finding him a stimulating and impressive philosopher. His interpretations are fresh and deep, and his way of teaching is intense and alive. His attitude is that his course is public and open, and that in defending his way of life there must be no compromise with "The Security State," whose authorities know from very long experience that he will resist—by hunger strike, nonviolence and demonstrative letter-writing—all attempts to silence him or negotiate with him.

FOR OVER A YEAR now his course has been regularly visited by a stream of philosophers, following an open letter from him to four universities in the West (Heidelberg, West Berlin, Harvard, and Oxford), to which Oxford philosophers responded. The list of visitors include names of international eminence. Some are from Oxford, some from elsewhere, but they are always known in Prague as "the Oxford visitors." More such visits are planned from various countries, including the United States, though after the recent expulsions there are real fears that they will be systematically disrupted. When they arrive, the visitors are treated at the seminars as colleagues. "We are not," he told me forcefully, "grateful to you for coming. You come here because you wish to discuss philosophy with us!"

The seminars take place in a crowded apartment, with Dr. Tomin translating, at times explosively interjecting his own comments, but in general carefully and patiently pursuing the logic of the argument wherever it leads. He commands total and rapt attention, to which abstraction and complexity is no barrier. One lecture on Kant, dealing with the most difficult and intricate points, lasted for some five hours, and the audience never faltered. There is a constant sense of drama. Questions are insistent and probing, and the answers to them matter. The visiting lecturer, whoever he may be, is treated with respect but not deference. Any retreat from the argument into "professional" academic expertise is noticed and deplored.

Julius Tomin's group is by now well-known outside Czechoslovakia, mainly because of the Czech authorities' ham-fisted treatment of recent visitors. It is sometimes misleadingly called an "underground university" or the "Patočka University" (after Jan Patočka, the great Czech philosopher, who helped inspire the Charter and whose spirit is widely in evidence among Czech intellectuals, especially philosophers). There are, however, many other such groups—in Prague, Brno, and elsewhere—though they meet in a more clandestine manner. Not all agree with Dr. Tomin's public, demonstratively combative stance, and not everyone finds him easy to work with. There is indeed a wide-ranging underground intellectual and cultural life in Czechoslovakia that was stifled but not extinguished by the "normalization" following 1968. It is fueled by the circulating typescripts of the *samizdat* "Padlock Press" and takes the form of courses, discussion groups, and private scholarship, but also of theater groups, poetry readings, and rock music, whose significance is hard to overestimate.

I addressed one such discussion group on the subject of Marxism and Morality in a beautiful apartment in Prague. The participants were philosophers and scientists by training and inclination—though, as always in Czechoslovakia, their current menial occupations give no clue to this. Our host, a gentle ex-professor who has been repeatedly arrested (most recently while he was addressing Tomin's group, speaking on the phenomenology of meaning), is employed as the stoker of the boiler in his own apartment block. The discussion was alive and exciting, but the topic was a real disaster—the problem of course being Marxism, not morality. Marxism is intellectually dead in present-day Czechoslovakia. The humanist Marxism of the 1960s is long and irretrievably gone.

Much of the underground intellectual life is to be found literally underground, in the boiler rooms of

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Prague, where intellectuals commonly stoke the boilers of hospitals, apartment blocks, and factories. We visited one young scholar who decided early not to pursue an academic career after 1968. He has converted the room adjacent to his boiler into his own underground study-cum-seminar room, containing typewriter, books, and papers, and a remarkable collection of bric-a-brac and kitsch, including a picture portraying the apotheoisis of Stalin. Here intellectual work and intense conversations take place.

The other participants in the seminars while we were there included a philosopher, on the point of expulsion from his post and from the Party for associating with Chartists (described in his document of expulsion as "incompetent persons"). Our host disappeared from time to time to stoke the boiler, as the discussion ranged over the linguistic parallels between Nazi and Soviet propaganda, which is his special topic of research. An intense intellectual life—small talk simply does not exist in such circles—is pursued singly and in small groups by the stokers, nightwatchmen, streetcar-drivers, and stockroom-keepers of Prague and other Czech cities.

IT IS COMMOM for the media to call such people "dissidents," but the label is seriously misleading. It suggests that they form a distinct group, a self-defined and politically motivated opposition. Actually, the entire Czech population is "dissident," expressing its alienation in thousands of indirect ways, in sullen rejection of a society saturated with corruption and bureaucratic mismanagement. Moreover, these so-called dissidents are in fact ordinary citizens, with widely varying views and preoccupations, some politically motivated, others not. Some have a heightened degree of courage, some just cannot live otherwise than they do. Some have just selected the wrong parents.

What they have in common is that they have been labeled as subversive by the authorities and so are marginalized, for trying to do what should be normal and natural in any social order that values freedom of thought and the maintenance of cultural traditions. □

To Our Contributors

- When sending manuscripts, please make sure that you do not send your only copy.
- And please also be sure to enclose a stamped, self-addressed envelope.

—The Editors

Bogdan Denitch

After Afghanistan — Round Two

With the following comment we continue the informal discussion among Dissent *editors regarding the changed international situation after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The next issue will carry further comment by other editors.*—EDS.

The parochialism of American liberal intellectuals is nowhere more evident than in the increasingly acrimonious discussions about U.S. foreign policy. The decline in influence by the two superpowers and the increasing difficulty they have in managing their respective alliances is seen by much of the U.S. liberal establishment merely as a decline of U.S. power and consequently an increase in the power of the other partner in this "competitive relationship"—the Soviet Union.

To most Europeans who share democratic and socialist values, the U.S. foreign-policy responses, in the past year especially, appear to be nothing short of hysterical. Sadly, that hysteria is not limited to the hawks but extends to liberal and labor-oriented intellectuals. A whole basket of issues is involved here, and it is difficult to begin to untangle them because they are so interwoven.

There is, to begin with, a state of general malaise that is centering on the issue of the governability of this society. Can the United States have any coherence whatsoever in foreign policy? The demise of the imperial presidency has resulted in a situation where the executive does not, and apparently cannot, offer a coherent policy while the competing interest groups in the Senate, the Congress, the military and foreign-policy lobbies all but cancel each other out. This incoherence is exacerbated by the peculiarly American, sanctimonious tone of this Administration, which is often shared by its critics. Carter's personality accents even more strongly this general feature, producing a near-stalemate in policy-making. Second, there is the sense that the U.S. military power has somehow declined and that the balance has shifted perilously in favor of the Soviet Union. I believe that this feeling—for that is the only way I can describe it—is manufactured, wrong, and based on untenable premises for what can be a proper defense for the West. Third, there has been a

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revival of an absolutist Cold War rhetoric, focused on an analysis of Soviet motives, which all but precludes a discussion of what may be appropriate responses in a world that—if it is to continue—will continue with both superpowers maintaining their relative positions of strength. We are presented with lists of Soviet gains over the past few years, without the balancing list of losses; with Soviet violations of the spirit of detente, whatever that means, without an examination of the U.S. role. There is here an underlying assumption that critics of the present U.S. foreign policy must either be naive about Soviet power and the nature of that totalitarian society, or are victims of a process of "self-Finlandization." Finally, there is an increasing irritability in the tone of the public discourse about the "failure" of U.S. allies to provide proper support for the increasingly erratic responses of the U.S. in foreign-policy matters.

My own view is that a number of the critics have really never been willing to accept a rough equivalence or balance between the two superpowers and are implicitly or explicitly committed to the notion that the U.S. must have an overall military and political superiority over the Soviets. Parallel to this goes the assumption that it is proper and necessary for the U.S. to project its power globally, whereas any moves on the part of the Soviet Union in that direction violate the rules of the game. That, at least, is a consistent view; but it is hardly appropriate for socialists and democrats, especially if one considers the nature of U.S. power in the Third World and the regimes with which this country seems inevitably drawn into alliances.

THE CENTERPIECE of the critiques of the Carter administration is its supposedly inadequate defense policy. I would maintain, on the contrary, that its policy, although inconsistent, has been characterized by bellicosity and increasing reliance on military spending and the development of weapons systems that can only result in a new cycle of the arms race.

The U.S. is *not* militarily weaker than the Soviet Union. On the contrary, the U.S. and its NATO allies, together, not only spend more than the Soviet Union and its weak and unreliable allies, but the West's military establishment is technologically superior to that of the Soviet Union. We have more nuclear weapons, more systems for delivering those nuclear weapons, a greater investment in a blue-water Navy, and far more bases than our Soviet rival has. For whatever historical reasons, the U.S. and its allies have considerable military capacity immediately adjacent to Soviet territory, with no equivalence on the other side, unless one considers Cuba a military threat to the United States. It may be useful to remember that the United States has 14 carriers at its disposal versus 2 small Soviet carriers, a Marine Corps of over 120,000 men and women versus the Soviet Union's naval infantry of 12,000 men, and a greatly superior military technology in antitank weaponry and in aircraft. What the Soviets do have is a larger land army, much of which is tied up on the Chinese frontier, in border guard duty, and in maintaining internal stability within the bloc. In terms of disposable troops, NATO, including the United States, comes close to matching the Soviets in land forces, and greatly overmatches the Soviets in nuclear weaponry and technology.

I cite these facts not to argue that the Soviet totalitarian bureaucracy has suddenly become benevolent or peace-loving, or even that the Soviets are not capable of intervening militarily in an immediately adjacent Afghanistan, but to make the simple point that whatever else the Soviet Union is, it is not now, or in the conceivable immediate future, a military threat to either the United States or its NATO allies. Where the Soviets are capable of "threatening" the West is in their ability to find national liberation movements in need of arms and military support. But that is a *political* and not a military problem; Kissinger, quite properly, identified it as the fact that in the Third World the United States is a stand-pat power, generally opposed to change. Surely, we as socialists do not and cannot support that Western interest.

Further, it is very dubious whether the many African liberation movements that have accepted Soviet arms have by this fact become Soviet satellites. It would be easy to argue from historical precedent that these movements seek nothing so much as national independence and ultimately find themselves hostile to both superpowers. Zimbabwe is an excellent example. After years of bloody civil war, the black-majority regime, led by Mugabe, makes it very clear that even though it got its arms from the Soviets, it wishes the closest possible economic relations with and aid from the West. The Angolan regime, likewise, has been recognized by all NATO powers except the United States, and is doing its damnedest to reduce its links to the Eastern European and Soviet bloc. It is the incapacity of present U.S. policy to relate to these liberation movements that is the problem, rather than Soviet expansion in that area.

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THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSALS about how to deal with what I consider a contrived defense problem are quite simply not supportable and essentially demagogic in nature where they are not dangerous. Whatever one may think about the virtues of universal military training, the proposal to reintroduce draft registration has no *military* justification. The weaknesses in the U.S. military establishment are in shortages of skilled, senior, noncommissioned officers, pilots, and army doctors. None of these problems would be solved by the draft. The President, unlike some of the liberals who support the draft, seems to recognize this and argues for the draft primarily as a "signal" we want to send to the other side. I don't want to send that signal, nor do I think that socialists and liberals should want to. It is a signal in the same sense that stationing missiles of a medium range in Europe was a signal. That is, it signaled an end of detente and an increasingly military response to the foreign-policy challenges that concern primarily the Third World. The unease of the European social democrats with this policy should have been a warning note, but these signals were a part of an incoherent set of responses that, taken together, are truly frightening. What are we to make of the disgraceful episode about the Cuban brigade? How are we to respond to the idea that the miserable colonial adventure of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan is the "worst" threat to world peace since World War II. (The worst? What about Korea, West Berlin, Vietnam?)

Apart from objecting to a fraudulently inspired, renewed mobilization for a second Cold War, we should also ask the question—a critical question—about the impact of such policies on Soviet authoritarianism domestically and on the relationship of the Soviet Union to the East European dependencies. The renewed tensions between the superpowers have had, and will continue to have, a catastrophic impact on the dissidents within the Soviet bloc. The Soviets will roll back the tentative steps toward greater autonomy within Eastern Europe and create an atmosphere of increasingly harsh repression.

STILL, THE LONG-RANGE RESULT of the erratic and dangerous policies the U.S. has followed may in fact be positive. The lesson to our European friends is that they should be less dependent on the U.S. and more concerned with putting their own houses in order. They should be good allies to the United States in the way the U.S. was to Britain and France when they invaded Suez in 1956. They should say clearly that—because they value the Western alliance and because the United States, for good or ill, is a pivotal part of that alliance—it is the act of a loyal friend to say *no* when we in the U.S. pursue a self-destructive strategy that weakens the West as a whole.

At least that much should also be expected from American liberals. This is not a time for a foreign-policy consensus and for a rallying around an Administration that in addition to all its other errors seems doomed to subordinating foreign-policy considerations to the narrow need to reelect Jimmy Carter to the White House. On the contrary, we should argue, that while it is both illegal and immoral to take hostages, there is nothing wrong with asking the United States—yes, even good Christian Jimmy Carter—to apologize for a decade-long policy of supporting a bloody, tyrannical regime in Iran. There is nothing paranoid in the otherwise paranoid politics of Iran when they ask for guarantees against U.S. interference. We should point out that, so long as the United States continues to back tyrannical, despotic minority regimes in the Third World, it will be faced with defeats and, I might add, should be faced with defeats. Finally, we should revive an old and honorable socialist theme, that is, that these U.S. "defeats" are not the defeats of the American people or its legitimate interests, but are the defeats of a policy that is politically and morally wrong and does not serve the legitimate interests of the West.

To respond in this way is not to foster illusions about the Soviet Union. On the contrary, the most useful policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union is one calculated to isolate it within the Third World and to make the West the legitimate focus of the hopes and aspirations of oppressed people everywhere. Therefore, a democratic foreign policy is not only in the immediate interests of those forces within the West with which we identify but is also the most effective counterpolicy to the expansion of influence of Soviet authoritarianism. But to pursue such a policy, we must get rid of some ideological baggage. □

In Our Next Issue:

THE SUNBELT SOCIETY

Articles by George N. Green, Armando Gutierrez, Richard Murray, Alfred J. Watkins.

Edited by Harrell Rodgers.

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H. Brand

A Blow to the Welfare State

Carter's Policies and the "Political Business Cycle"

The Carter administration, with the support of key congressional committees, has deliberately fostered recession and unemployment, and has steadily curtailed expenditures for human services. Thereby the pattern of "political business cycles," previously associated with Republican administrations, continues. While the circumstances of the present cycle differ, in some respects radically, from earlier ones, what is new about the economic policy is mainly a difference in political coloration. The leading actors who formulate economic policy—the secretary of the Treasury, the chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, the head of the Office of Management and Budget—have in all Democratic administrations since 1960 been of the same stamp as their Republican confreres.

The Joint Economic Committee of Congress, with its perennial Democratic majority, has so decisively moved toward supporting the interest of capital—disguised as "supply economics"—that its Republican minority found it unnecessary, for the first time in some 20 years, to file a minority report in 1979 and 1980. Pressure to balance the budget manifests a "fundamental realignment," a "major political shift," the liberals having "become a very small minority" in the House of Representatives (*New York Times*, March 25, 1980). But the "realignment" or "shift" is not as fundamental as it seems. For the political business cycle has been a steady reality of the postwar American economy, mirroring the virtually unchanging social and economic forces that have shaped the welfare state.

What is the meaning of the "political business cycle"? The term was first used by Michal Kalecki in the early 1940s. The political business cycle results from the use—or deliberate nonuse—of stabilization policy in moderating fluctuations in production, income, employment, and investment. This means that political decisions determine the extent to which the instruments of stabilization are applied at a given phase of the cycle. The cycle itself could not be eliminated by those instruments, since business would oppose the degree of expansion of government intervention necessary for it.

Kalecki, however, viewed the dilemma of stabilization policy more narrowly. He saw it in terms of the resistance put up by business to full employment. Although full employment might be transiently attained due to boom or war, business would not tolerate its being *maintained* by government. For maintenance of full employment could not be achieved merely through budgetary deficits—it would require both public investments and the subsidizing of mass consumption. Business would fear the intrusion of public investment into hitherto private sectors, the reduced incentives to work from subsidized mass consumption, and, more generally, the slackened work discipline full employment might spell. Even short of such changes, business would insist on "sound finance." Hence, Kalecki wrote, "The assumption that a government will maintain full employment in a capitalist economy if it only knows how to do it is fallacious."

American business has been profoundly averse to large-scale government intervention in labor markets. Witness its opposition to all but the final and watered-down versions of the Employment Act of 1946 and the Humphrey-Hawkins Act of 1978. Government intervention in the U.S., if frequently bureaucratic, also is the result of popular pressures. Partly because of these pressures, but also because it has a stake in preventing extreme economic instability, business has supported relatively mild stabilization measures. But it has always rejected the larger role for government that, along with Kalecki, such prominent economists as Alvin Hansen envisioned.

The production and economic planning achievements of the war years, which followed upon the trauma of the depression years, rekindled the self-confidence of business leaders. The theory, developed by the business-oriented Committee for Economic Development, of balancing

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the Federal Budget over the span of the business cycle rather than annually—together with the enormous expansion of income taxation, and the fiscal-policy leverage afforded by withholding taxes—all suggested possibilities of managing the economy according to Keynesian principles while not directly interfering with investment or labor markets. Budget deficits generated by the shortfall of taxes during slumps, together with such income supports as unemployment compensation and social security, were the "automatic stabilizers" that would keep "politics" out of the management of the economy. The apparently self-regulating character of the "automatic stabilizers" has always appealed to business, since it would constrain direct government intervention.

However, once financial flows between public and private sectors are used in attempts to control cyclical fluctuations, the business cycle is of necessity politicized. Decisions to cut or raise taxes or public expenditures are political by definition. The historical separation between the two sectors lessens. The private sector becomes more dependent upon "public policy"—while public policy is held hostage to the forces that underlie the business cycle. This has been true throughout the past 40 years, i.e., since a budgetary deficit was first deliberately fostered in 1938 to prevent a recession from deepening.

"INFLATION . . . remains the Nation's number one problem," stated the President in his *Economic Report* of January 1980, outlining a program designed to combat it. This program (I shall say more about it further on) is bound greatly to aggravate another problem, barely alluded to by the President—unemployment. In 1979, the unemployment for *experienced* wage and salary workers was, to be sure, lower than during the recession and recovery years of the mid-'70s—but also higher than in 1973 or 1974, years cyclically comparable with 1979, and *much* higher than in 1964-70. I emphasize the word *experienced*, since the unemployment problem has usually been belittled by being defined chiefly in terms of youths and women newly entering the labor force.

The unemployment rate for black *adult* workers, now more than 8 percent for men and 10 for women, while also smaller than the levels of the mid-70s, continued to run twice as high as for white adult workers in 1979. Furthermore, the Council of Economic Advisers forecast a sharp rise in unemployment for 1980 as a result of a recession "likely to be mild and brief." Despite this forecast—probably wrong as to depth and duration of recession—the Council opposed any easing of fiscal or monetary policy since such moves would "heighten expectations of inflation and reduce our prospects of making progress toward price stability." *These statements do not reflect any shift in the Carter administration's basic policy.* It had been instrumental in emasculating the Humphrey-Hawkins legislation in 1978, by introducing clauses stressing anti-inflationary provisions and virtually nullifying employment-creating features. The annual economic documents issued since then simply confirm that high employment has ceased to be a priority of economic policy. They also imply the willingness of a Democratic administration to permit a recession to occur—*if not to foster one*—so as to restrain inflation.

Permitting the initial phases of recession to run their course so as to curb inflation is a bankrupt policy. Arthur Okun, former chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, commenting upon the 1974-75 slump, showed that

> when the government pushed the economy into deep recession and prolonged slack, each dollar trimmed from GNP meant a loss of roughly 90 cents of output, and a saving of about 10 cents on the price level. Any anti-inflationary proposal that relies solely on balancing the budget and tightening money is, in reality, a proposal for an encore of that experience

—that is, 90 percent production losses, and only about 10 percent inflation saving.

True, recessions have not been merely the result of deliberate policy; they are latent in the structure of American capitalism. They cannot be prevented by conventional Keynesian prescriptions, because of the insensitivity of prices and wages to cyclical downturns and because most capital investment remains beyond the guidance of government. Since 1954 or 1958, inflation has been intertwined with recession, although rates of inflation were then lower than they are now. The argument that inflation would be mild or absent now but for the steep increases in food and fuel prices over the past few years does not wash, as the figures in the following table show.

In view of the pattern of inflationary price increases—a pattern that can be shown to have antedated the energy crisis—Okun and others have insisted that "we have been experiencing primarily wage-price spiral inflation—not food, fuel or other special-factor inflation." They have therefore proposed administered price-wage controls.

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Percent changes in the Consumer Price Index and Components, 1974-79

Total	47%
All items less food and energy	46%
All items less energy	45%
All items less food	48%
Household fuels*	78%
Food and beverages	63%

*Includes gas and electric utilities. Based on Table B 51, 1980 *Economic Report*, p. 262.

Since the demise of the wage-price controls initiated by President Nixon in 1971, both the Ford and the Carter administrations focused on the Federal Budget and manipulation of interest rates as the arena of anti-inflationary policy. Prices and wages have received subordinate attention. It is through the budget and lower taxes that "supply economics" seeks to reduce consumption and increase savings, thus redistributing resources to capital. The expected greater "supply" of productive capital would restrain prices and wages. But there is no historical evidence supporting such claims whatever. Let us briefly review the reasons for which wage-price controls were instituted, then abandoned by the Nixon administration, for they represented an important attempt to deal with inflation without inducing recession.

The three-month wage-price freeze mandated in August 1971 and the control apparatus put in place following the freeze were mainly designed to restrain wage boosts. The 1970 recession had generated high unemployment without moderating collective bargaining settlements—proof that worker militancy is not in any mechanical sense deterred by unemployment. Yet, although committed to combatting inflation, the Nixon administration, with its reelection in 1972 at stake, also desired low unemployment. Controls were advocated by Arthur Burns, then chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, as well as by the Business Council, a group of top executives of large corporations. The administration of the control program has at times been faulted—yet it did succeed in curbing *wage* rate increases. The failure of the program was rooted more deeply in administrative laxness. To be effective, the program could operate only under one of two conditions: either under full employment, in which case direct allocation of material resources, as during World War II, would have been required, or else under conditions of economic slack. The program was in fact begun at a time of slack, but gradually failed as a boom developed.

The failure can be traced entirely to the absence of allocative planning (which was precluded by political considerations). For example, goods and materials were in short supply because costs could not be passed on, often compelling the use of more ample, higher priced supplies, or encouraging exports; production also shifted frequently to higher-margin goods; farm prices had to be exempted altogether. In time, the program fell apart, compelling Arthur Burns to retreat from his earlier position, and again urging "the sound management of aggregate demand."

IT MIGHT BE ARGUED that the current deepening recession is an auspicious time for a more successful version of the administered wage-price control program. Perhaps so. Recall, however, that the 1971 wage-price freeze was accompanied by a stiff import surcharge that helped protect the markets of domestic manufacturers. The import surcharge was also used as a bargaining lever to compel foreign acceptance of dollar devaluation again favorable to domestic firms. Similar measures to protect home markets would surely be extracted as a condition for effective wage-price controls now. But it is unlikely that allocative planning would be accepted by American business, except in wartime. The pricing power of business would thus scarcely be compromised.

The reason business might agree to wage-price controls would likely be the same as in 1971 to restrain wage claims. But wage claims have been fairly moderate in recent years. Compensation per hour in the nonfarm business sector rose 38 percent between 1975 and 1979; consumer prices rose 35 percent. By contrast, these two variables rose 30 and 21 percent in the four years ending in 1971. In 1979 the number of work stoppages was at a 12-year low; in 1969-71 it ran at postwar highs. The "National Accord" signed last September between the Carter administration and the AFL-CIO leadership gives promise of continued "moderation" of wage claims, if not abdication of militancy in pressing them. Thus, business is not strongly motivated to accept controls—aside from its usual reluctance to contemplate incomes policy in general. Instead, business and its academic spokespeople have marshaled forces to pare consumption outlays funneled through the Federal

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Budget, and to design tax cuts favorable to capital investment, spelling *a redistribution of resources from the public to the private sector*—all billed as increasing "supply," and thereby curbing inflation. The Carter administration, the Joint Economic Committee, and the House Budget Committee all have echoed these demands.

There is, to begin with, the growing pressure to halt and reverse the supposedly rising share of federal expenditures in the national income. This pressure is not only exerted by conservative forces, it also arises from a provision in the Humphrey-Hawkins Act, cited by the Joint Economic Committee in its 1980 Report, stating that "the President's Economic Report includes interim numerical goals for reducing the share of the Nation's GNP accounted for by federal outlays to 21 percent or less by 1981, and to 20 percent or less by 1983. . . ." These limits would not pose much of a threat to human-service funding if the GNP continued to rise in real terms or if the share of defense expenditures in the budget were contracting. In fact, neither is now the case, or will likely be in the years ahead. Therefore, they represent in effect an assault on the adequate funding of human services and income supports.

Moreover, the figures mentioned can mislead one into believing that they reflect resources absorbed by the federal government. Nothing could be further from the truth. The federal government's purchases of goods and services has actually declined, from 11 and 10 percent of the GNP in 1959-61 and 1969-71 to an estimated 7 percent in 1979-81. The share of nondefense purchases has risen slightly from around 2 percent in the two earlier periods to just below 3 percent in the later period. It is transfer payments—mostly social security—and grants-in-aid to state and local governments that have expanded relative to GNP—to an estimated 12.5 percent in 1979-81. Social security payments—which *after* the cost-of-living adjustment due this July will average $6,756 annually for an elderly couple, and $8,736 for a disabled worker with wife and children (modest sums indeed)—is almost entirely financed from taxes on consumption, and cannot be regarded as inflationary. As to grants-in-aid to the states and localities, nearly three quarters of them consist of investment-type outlays—that is, education and training, health, natural resource development, and community and regional development.

In fact, civil investment-type programs undertaken or funded by the federal government accounted for nearly three fifths of the sum of nondefense expenditures for goods and services and grants-in-aid in 1979. However, these expenditures only partly represent public "infrastructure" outlays that are indispensable to the functioning of the economy. They also compensate for costs shifted by business to society at large; to the extent that this is true, they do not differ in character from other compensatory outlays, such as antirecession aid to the states, or occupational health and safety measures. This is a topic we cannot go into here. Suffice it to say that in seeking to accommodate pressures to reduce the share of the federal budget in the GNP, and in its futile effort to balance the budget as an earnest of its anti-inflationary convictions, the Carter administration has severely cut not only strictly human-service funds but also civil investment-type outlays. The relatively small current-dollar cutbacks in the 1981 Budget, which often still leave increases over 1979 and 1980 levels, mask substantial reductions once the administration's own assumption of a 9-percent rise in price levels is taken into account.

More important than the Budget's details is the political intent. The intent is to halt and reverse the reach of the welfare state and its human services. This is implicit, first, in the "strategy of restraint" that in 1981 continues from earlier Carter budgets. "Restraint" means that while military expenditures rise sharply, in both current and constant dollars, nondefense purchases of goods and services and grants in aid to the states and localities decline. Second, it is implicit in the restrictive monetary policy of the Federal Reserve. The mutually reinforcing anti-inflationary thrust of budgetary and monetary policies is openly recognized in the official texts. A likely result of these policies, also openly recognized, is an expected unemployment rate of 7 percent of the labor force this year, and 7.4 percent in the next. But the core idea of the welfare state is full employment, spelling a frictional unemployment rate of perhaps 3 percent in this country. Policies that generate the unemployment rates postulated in the budget erode the gains of, if they do not contribute to dismantling, the welfare state.

No less important than the Carter administration's effort to reverse welfare-state gains has been that of the House Committee on the Budget. Although the Committee's economic assumptions for this year and next are similar to the Carter administration's, it has proposed drastically to reduce the budget submitted last January. Cuts totaling $16.5 billion would center on health, employment, income security, and

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environmental protection programs. The true impact of the proposed reductions is understated because of the magnitude of the inflation rate.

If the aim of cutting the budget is to curb inflation, the official reports offer no relevant rationale. Let us probe the question a little. It may be that deficits are inflationary, inasmuch as they are largely financed by banks that purchase Treasury obligations. These obligations can easily be resold to raise funds for loans. This may be inflationary, but of course the Federal Reserve has the option of neutralizing this effect of federal deficits. Alternatively, federal deficits free funds that would otherwise be absorbed as taxes, and they thus add to purchasing power. This might not be inflationary in times of slack, except that it sustains the administered pricing system of corporate business. There are a number of other reasons that might be adduced why deficits are inflationary, particularly at a time when private debt also is rising rapidly. Yet, seen in perspective, the outstanding federal debt is not overwhelmingly large—19 percent of total outstanding debt, with nonfinancial business accounting for 32 percent, and households for 41 percent.

THE LEFT SHOULD NOT MINIMIZE the significance of federal deficits. They bespeak a lack of social solidarity, an unwillingness adequately to fund public needs, an undue preoccupation with private consumption. Their inflationary impact is slight, however, compared to private debt. At any rate, it is not political morality that moved the House Committee to urge a balanced budget, but the fact that as of last March 30 state legislatures had passed resolutions in support of a constitutional amendment to require a balanced federal budget.

One aim of balancing the budget is tax relief. But tax relief is among the worst enemies of adequately funded human services. Tax relief, especially the kind that is presently being mulled, is likely to be regressive and of benefit mainly to capital and rentier elements (e.g., increased exclusion of dividend income from the income-tax base). An alternative to the Budget Committee's proposed cutbacks would have been to eliminate such tax privileges as the investment tax credit, which in 1979 cost the Treasury $13.9 billion; or the deductibility of mortgage interest on owner-occupied housing, valued at $10.2 billion.

But the Committee left no doubt of its commitment to the goal of tax relief, once the budget would be in balance. It would do this in ways that would leave the existing pattern of taxation undisturbed, except to accelerate depreciation writeoffs so as to create "incentives" for more capital investment. It would also offset the payroll-tax increase scheduled for next January, presumably by income-tax cuts. Both kinds of tax relief, however, would further weaken a fiscal system that has been chronically in deficit in "good" years as well as bad; and, even if it should come to pass that it will be in balance, it will become progressively less able to fund human-service needs and civil investments.

Very few liberal-minded persons have taken exception to the Committee's stand or the Carter administration's economic policies. I do wish to mention two representatives, both from New York City, who have strongly dissented—Mr. Solarz and Ms. Holtzman. They are not the only ones, but they have been particularly articulate. Yet, theirs seem voices in the wilderness. The attack on the welfare state is undoubtedly gathering force. It is bluntly summarized in the following passage from an editorial in the March 3, 1980 issue of *Business Week*, demanding that—

> This year's scheduled 13 percent increase in social security . . . be scrapped and the system's linkage to inflation [be] severed entirely. The 25-cent increase in the minimum wage should be eliminated. General revenue sharing for states and cities should be eliminated. . . . A cutback in government spending would produce substantial budgetary savings that would free labor and capital for growth and productivity improvement. . . . Incentives should be created for business to step up new capital investment.

The moral obtuseness of this equals only the lack of economic logic. We have already indicated the modesty of scheduled social security payments. The refusal to adjust for inflation—let alone for changing standards of need—has pushed families dependent upon public welfare more deeply into poverty. The current recession will compel more persons and families to go on welfare. In New York City, the present grant for a family of four was set in 1974 on the basis of 1972 prices and amounts to $374 a month, compared with the actual cost of $586 for items that the grant is supposed to pay. Rent supplements are extra, but inadequate for at least one third of recipients (*New York Times*, March 23, 1980). The states have become less able to maintain decent welfare standards because their tax systems have been increasingly linked to sources fluctuating with the economy (that is, income and retail sales). They must therefore rely more and more on the federal government, whose grant-in-aid policies, however, are coming under

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pressure from business and other affluent taxpayer groups.

It is implicit in the *Business Week* editorial and similar statements that the welfare state lies at the root of inflation. It is noteworthy that rising wages are generally no longer mentioned as prime sources of inflation; all opposition has been focusing on the human-service and civil-investment institutions of the welfare state. It is indeed from these institutions that major new cost pressures arose during the '70s. Pollution abatement costs, for example—defined as the difference between what business would have laid out on its own and what it had to lay out to conform with federal law—have been estimated at $9.5 billion in 1975, roughly one percent of the GNP at the time; safety and health costs at $4.1 billion.

If inflation reflects a struggle over the distribution of resources, not only between workers and employers, but also between the poorer and more affluent strata of society, as well as between the state (seeking to compel business to internalize costs) and business, seeking to shift costs to the public (i.e., to externalize them)—then the truth of the implication in such statements as the *Business Week* editorial must be conceded. The welfare state, once it has reached a certain scale, is inherently inflationary. But inflation does not resolve underlying conflicts. The growing inability of business to externalize costs forecloses important sources of capital gain. Yet, there are limits to compensating for this loss by raising prices or relocating in countries more tolerant of externalities (including substandard working conditions). Hence, the pressure to "balance" the budget while also cutting it, so as to afford tax reductions and "incentives to invest."

These pressures, exerted also by the White House in combination with newly found allies among the heads of corporations (see *Business Week*, May 19, 1980) and key congressional committees, may indeed turn out to be more effective than ever before. This spells a new development in the political business cycle. Some thinkers on the left believe that national planning will in time supersede the cycle, but national planning in a basically democratic society could make matters worse for business than the welfare state, whose reach in fact it would likely enlarge. There is no prospect of national planning being accepted here in the foreseeable future. The political business cycle will therefore recur.

So tolerance for high unemployment will rise by more than just another notch; a 7- or 8-percent rate will become the "normal" rate, a 12-percent rate at the nadir of recessions will not be unusual. Unemployment will once again become the price of efficiency and higher productivity. Measures to relieve it will be sparse, lending greater potency to the threat of job loss. The welfare state as we have come to know it is entering upon a phase of contraction. How long this phase will last and where it will leave the welfare state is largely dependent upon the outcome of political struggles. In the light of history, it would be rash to assume that American labor and other affected groups will permanently acquiesce in cutbacks of hard-won gains. □

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Gus Tyler

The Friedman Inventions

In a persuasive tract, *Free to Choose* (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979), Milton and Rose Friedman propound an economic system that does not exist, never has existed, and is unlikely ever to exist except in the fantasies of authors who perceive its present reality in Hong Kong, its past in the golden age between Waterloo and World War I, and its future in a world conforming to the Friedman formula. The formula is an economy that runs itself without governmental intervention in a society that separates politics from economics. Such a social order will not only bring greater material gains but also the underpinnings for lasting democracy and peace—they say.

The diagram of this laissez-faire Elysium is drawn so cleverly that a man from Mars would find it almost faultless. The Friedman schema is internally logical. Its sole weakness is its inconsistency with the external, the real, world.

This fatal flaw is most apparent when the Friedmans depart from their smooth syllogisms to refer to the world as it is—to Hong Kong today, free trade in the 19th century, and the Meiji Restoration in Japan—as evidence of how well their formula works in practice. Let's consider each of these.

Hong Kong is the Friedmans' proof positive that an urban industrial society does not require governmental guidance. "It is often maintained," they write, "that while a let-alone, limited government policy was feasible in sparsely settled 19th-century America, government must play a far larger, indeed dominant, role in a modern urbanized and industrial society. One hour in Hong Kong will dispose of that view." As they see it, "Hong Kong, a Crown colony," is "the modern exemplar of free markets and limited government."

Now a few facts. In 1977, in the May 1 issue, the *Manchester Guardian* ran a set of first-hand reports on conditions in exemplary Hong Kong. The lead story reads:

> Many young workers in Hong Kong, especially those employed in the smaller factories that dominate every local industry, work in cramped, unhygienic and dangerous conditions that would not have surprised Shaftesbury or Dickens. In the three years to 1975, 142 workers aged 14 or 15 were injured in the manufacture of plastic products and more than 500 aged 16 to 17. There are no comprehensive figures for injured illegal child workers—those aged 13 or under. However, one hospital alone handled 12 cases last year of children as young as 11 who had suffered industrial injuries. . . .Although modestly better employers than local companies, foreign firms in Hong Kong are there to take advantage of the colony's chief assets: hard work, cheap labor, and few restrictive laws. . . .Children and teenagers are driven into factory life by the four forces that shape the lives of most of Hong Kong's 4,400,000 people—poverty, limited and expensive educational opportunities, minimal social welfare provisions, and overcrowded slum housing.

The workers so described are, however, a kind of "aristocracy of the proletariat" in Hong Kong. As another story in the same issue puts it:

> If the workers in the factories are poorly protected, even less protected are the thousands of home workers on whom both foreign and local companies rely for sewing dolls' clothes and assembling or painting small toys like

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soldiers or rubber animals. In any Hong Kong resettlement (housing) estate from early morning to late at night whole families, from children of 5 to grandparents of 70, can be seen sewing, shipping, assembling and painting. . . .This army is totally outside even Hong Kong's labour laws. . . .One widow says simply: "If I don't work we will starve."

Miserable as the circumstance of these home workers is, they are a kind of "middle class" below whom are the true lumpen, described by the *Wall Street Journal* on March 25, 1980.

[Within the city is the] Walled City, a virtually ungoverned town of 30,000 people crammed into 2½ acres of squalor. . . .Criminal organizations rule the twisting alleys. Hong Kong police merely make cursory passes through the area. . . .There aren't any building inspectors, regular municipal garbage collections, or city water and sewage services."

This is the Friedmans' "exemplar," Hong Kong today, a haunting echo of the slums and sweatshops of New York's old East Side at the turn of the century. Once more, the same sad story of penniless people in the grip of merciless exploiters, a throwback to primitive capitalism in all its savagery. To the Friedmans, however, this is the way things should be: capital pours in from all the great nations to employ Hong Kong labor; the economy expands; employment grows. And if the workers are doing poorly, it's their own damn fault for not making a better bargain in an economy where they are free to choose.

Hong Kong, however, is not the Friedmans' first love. At best, it is a nostalgic recall of the time they adore most, the century from 1815 to 1914, when free trade linked the world in a benign peace: "The century from Waterloo to the First World War offers a striking example of the beneficial effects of free trade in the relations among nations." That century, wrote the Friedmans, "was one of the most peaceful in human history among Western nations, marred only by some minor wars—the Crimean war and the Franco-Prussian war are the most memorable—and, of course, a major civil war within the United States."

There are two thoughts here: first, that the period under discussion was one of peace; second, that the peace was founded on free trade. What are the facts?

In a sense, the Friedmans are right about the "peaceful" character of their chosen century as contrasted with the previous 100 years that culminated in the Napoleonic wars, and the subsequent period that included World War I and World War II. But if there were no major clashes among the great powers in the years 1815-1914, it was primarily due not to free trade (that, as we shall see, hardly existed) but to the decision of the Powers—Austria, Russia, Prussia, and France, with the blessing of England—to close ranks in a war, armed war, against freedom, a principle that the Friedmans allege to value highly.

1815—the year of Waterloo—was also the year of the Congress of Vienna, Metternich's mechanism to make certain that Europe would never again be plagued by a Napoleon, the bastard child of the French Revolution. The agreement was that the monarchs of the world would unite, lending their troops to one another, to make sure that the peasants and proletarians down below would remain down below forever. They entered a gentlemen's agreement that freedom should not flourish anywhere in Europe. Castlereagh, Britain's foremost spokesman at the Congress of Vienna, put it bluntly: "The existing Concert [of the Powers] is their only perfect security against the revolutionary embers more or less existing in every state of Europe; and . . . true wisdom is to keep down the petty contentions of ordinary times, and to stand together in support of the established principles of social order."

But since people do love freedom, as the Friedmans should know, the century following Waterloo was a continuum of wars: the Powers engaged in battles against peasants, workers, democrats, lesser peoples seeking self-determination, and against "backward" natives resisting imperial conquest. The Friedmans' favorite century was one of

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domestic repression and colonial oppression, spawning cocky conquerors who—in their insatiable pursuit of markets, materials, and political prowess—finally clashed in World War I.

In 1820, liberal uprisings in Spain and Naples were put down by France and Austria. In 1831, Russia entered Warsaw to deny Polish independence. Metternich crushed revolutions in the Italian states of Romagna, the Duchies, and Bologna.

In 1848, just about all Europe broke out in a rash of revolutions: France, Germany, Hungary, Croatia, Galicia, Transylvania, Naples, Tuscany, Piedmont, Sardinia, and Bohemia—to list a few. The Powers closed ranks to carry through their counterrevolutions.

There also were wars of nation against nation, despite the original hope at Vienna that the Powers would try to avoid any discord that might unleash revolution. In addition to the Crimean War and the Franco-Prussian War that the Friedmans mention, there were the Opium War (1842), the Italian-Austrian War (1859), the Prussian-Danish War (1864), the Seven-Week War between Prussia and Austria (1866), the Bulgarian-Serbian War (1885), the Japanese-Chinese War (1895), the Greek-Turkish War (1897), the Boxer Rebellion (1900), the Boer War (1902), the Russo-Japanese War (1905)—to name a few. In these and other "minor" wars, small powers, like Prussia, were becoming big powers. They were testing their strength and plotting their spheres of influence. They were forming all kinds of alliances: Holy, Triple, Quadruple, and so forth. They were getting ready for the big event of 1914.

By 1914, the Powers were empires: British, French, German, Dutch, Belgian, Russian, Italian. In most cases, the subjugation of lesser peoples required no "major" war because the victims were too weak to resist rape. The colonialization of China, Africa, India, Indochina, the Near East were all treated as "minor" matters—although the process involved the enslavement of hundreds of millions of people. The United States was a party to the process, taking half of Mexico by force in 1848, and elevating itself to a world power in the war against Spain in the last decade of the 19th century.

The period from 1871 to 1914 is generally tagged as "The Age of Imperialism." Its essence was not to grant freedom but to deny liberty—even and especially to peoples who before the arrival of the imperial conqueror were somewhat "free to choose."

A scrutiny of the Friedman century of peace would probably disclose that there was not a single year without war: revolution or counterrevolution, nationalist upheaval or imperial suppression, colonial conquest, or just plain-old war between countries.

The notion that the post-Waterloo century was "peaceful" is a Friedman fiction. But even more so is their claim that the century was characterized by "free trade."

For a while, the British did favor free trade, not because they were so persuaded by Adam Smith but because the policy suited the rising capitalist class. They wanted cheap food for cheap labor and cheap raw materials for their mills and factories. So they repealed the Corn Laws (1846) to bring in foodstuffs at low prices from overseas. Since Britain's prosperity in the 19th century, like that of Japan in the 20th, also depended heavily on exports, England called upon all other countries to open their markets. Most of them complied, not because they liked Adam Smith (who had written a hundred years earlier), or had even heard of him, but because they were dependent on Britain for manufactured products and, especially, for machinery for capital goods to underpin their own nascent capitalism.

So long as Britain was the "workshop of the world," this system worked. But as E. J. Hobsbawm notes in *Industry and Empire* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1968), "once a local economy was on its feet, its need of Britain diminished rapidly," and the once dependent nation now began to protect its infant industries against British competition. The Friedmans' "free trade" was England's peculiar form of 19th-century mercantilism imposed on the other "advanced" countries of Europe. But, as Hobsbawm continues,

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> . . . after 1873 the situation of the "advanced" world was one of rivalry between developed countries; and what is more, countries of whom only Britain had a built-in interest in total freedom of trade. . . .The free flow of goods was the first to be inhibited by the tariff barriers and other discriminatory measures which were erected with increasing frequency and height after 1880.

In short, this alleged century of free trade that the Friedmans invent lasted, at best, for about 25 years, or about one generation, when transient circumstances served the purposes of Britain and its momentarily dependent clients.

The inclusion of the United States in the framework of this "century" of free trade borders on the comic. As early as 1828—about a dozen years after Waterloo—the United States enacted a tariff so high that the South called it the "tariff of abominations" and John Calhoun invoked the doctrine of nullification. The war over the tariff became the continuing bone of contention between North (proprotectionist) and the South (antiprotectionist). To check the power of the South, which had managed to push through lower tariffs in 1842 and 1846, the North resolved to block the "admission of any more slave states" (in John Blum, et al, *The National Experience;* Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968). This issue—far more than slavery—brought on the Civil War.

That war was won by the North, not the South. In the tariff of 1869, rates were raised on copper, steel rails, marble, nickel. "In deference to the pending election and to farmer sentiment, Congress lowered most duties by 10 percent in 1872, but even then many rates, which in the time of Henry Clay had stood at about 25 percent, had climbed to 500 percent, and industrialists were not yet satisfied" (Blum, p. 387). The McKinley Tariff of 1890 "raised an already scandalously high tariff scale even higher. . . .Its purpose was not merely to be protective but to be prohibitive; not merely to discourage foreign competition but to eliminate it." The McKinley Tariff was followed by the Dingley Tariff (1897) and by the Taft Tariff (1909) that "was a triumph for the protectionists" (Blum, p. 566).

Despite this open record of America as a protectionist nation from 1828 to 1914, the Friedmans write simply that when Britain called for free trade "other nations . . . including the United States, adopted a similar policy, if in somewhat diluted form." That last saving phrase suggests that, to make a case, the Friedmans are prepared to describe white as a "somewhat diluted form" of black.

Although the Friedmans refer to British life in the 19th century as a "golden age," the gold of the Empire did not drip down generously to Britain's working classes. Horrified by what he saw in Manchester, de Tocqueville (much admired by the Friedmans) wrote: "Civilization works its miracles and civilized man is turned back almost into a savage." In 1845, the American observer Coleman wrote of Manchester: "Wretched, defrauded, oppressed, crushed human nature lying in bleeding fragments all over the face of society. Every day that I live I thank God that I am not a poor man with a family in England." In the next 50 years, there was little improvement. Social surveys taken by Booth and Rowntree at the end of the 1800s showed some 40 percent of the working class living below the "poverty" level.

Although the Friedmans make no reference to these conditions, they are obviously aware of the miseries of the masses as detailed in the writings of Charles Dickens. To make their case, they bury Dickens in a smoothly lined coffin: "The standard of living of the ordinary citizen improved dramatically," aver the Friedmans, "making all the more visible the remaining areas of poverty and misery portrayed so movingly by Dickens and other contemporary novelists." Pretty clever, eh?

The Friedmans' violence to verity in depicting Hong Kong today or the Western world in the past century is trivial, however, alongside their incredible inversion of the truth about the Meiji Restoration in Japan. According to the Friedmans, Japan at the time of the Meiji Restoration (1867) was a

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perfect example of how a free-enterprise economy can expand, provided the government keeps hands off. With great dramatic facility, the authors contrast Japan with India, the former a success because politics did not intervene in economics, and the latter a failure because of interference by the state. "Japan," they write, "relied primarily on voluntary cooperation and free markets—on the model of the Britain of its time. India relied on central economic planning—on the model of the Britain of its time."

Now a few facts on the Meiji Restoration. In 1867, the Shogunate (the military dictatorship) that was the real power in the land, based on the feudal Daimyos and using the emperor as a puppet, was deposed by the lower Samurai, ambitious members of the warrior class who were not part of the establishment. Behind the revolution (Restoration) were the Chonin, the wealthy merchants and financiers of Osaka (where 70 percent of Japan's wealth was concentrated) who bankrolled the Restoration. The new regime set about modernizing Japan: namely, industrializing the society. Who undertook this mission?

Here is the finding by E. Herbert Norman, widely recognized as a student of early and modern Japan: "The instrument in all this," he writes of the Restoration, "was a state which was autocratic but never so inflexible as to be in danger of cracking. . . .The machinery for the epochal changes . . . was a government formed from the ablest, most self-sacrificing of clan bureaucrats." (In *Origins of the Modern Japanese State: Selected Writings of E. H. Norman*, John W. Dower, ed.; Pantheon, 1975.)

The first thing these autocratic bureaucrats did was to industrialize Japan by entering the economy as entrepreneur and owner of the decisive sectors of industry. "Although a wide field for industrial investment lay fallow," writes Norman, "the merchant princes were reluctant to become pioneers working this field; so the government with the aid at first of *goyokin* (loans) from these same magnates, and together with its limited revenues, chief[ly] . . . land tax, had itself to develop industry."

Please note: the first industrialization was not undertaken by private enterprise but by government; the government immediately went into debt by borrowing from its bankers, and then raised further capital by taxing the cruelly overtaxed peasantry.

This put the lenders of money in a superb position.

> Banking capital [notes Norman] while growing out of all proportion to industrial capital, by the end of the 19th century gave a striking example of concentration, in this way continuously strengthening the position of the financial oligarchy or Zaibatsu. In Japan the concentration of capital . . . was accumulated by the government policy of subsidy and artificial encouragement.

The unique feature of Japanese industrialization, as differentiated from just about every state in Western Europe, was the "monopolistic and state control of strategic industries—strategic whether because of their connection with naval and military defense or because of their importance in export industries intended to compete against foreign products and hence requiring subsidy and protection." As a consequence, the government was the chief entrepreneur in mining and heavy industrial production; it confiscated the shipyards in 1881; it ran all railroads except the narrow gauge up to 1906; it rejected an 1872 petition to allow private telegraph lines and made the business a government operation; it did the same with telephone lines in 1890.

At a later point, the government decided to divest itself of certain enterprises: primarily those that were not most immediately defense-connected. The result of this divestiture was to transfer a public monopoly to a private oligopoly. As Edwin O. Reischauer put it: this sale of the government-owned companies led to "the concentration of Japan's nascent industrial resources in the hands of the few persons able to buy them from the government. . . .In terms of the prices paid, they were bargains" (In *Japan: The Story of a Nation;* Alfred A. Knopf, 1970).

The ultimate beneficiaries were a "relatively

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small group of businessmen, some of whom were later to develop into the great financial magnates the Japanese call the Zaibatsu, 'the financial clique.' "

The Zaibatsu, need it be noted, were close—by class and even family ties—to those running the government.

The sale of some industries to private entrepreneurs, points out Norman:

> [did not divide] Japanese industry into two sharply defined groupings, the one related to the armament industries where government control was maintained, and the other embracing all the remaining non-strategic industries which were suddenly to be exposed to the vicissitudes of pure laissez faire. The distinction to be made is rather in the different forms of paternalism adopted by the government after 1880; that is to say that the government retained paternalism as before, both in the military and non-military enterprises after the sale of government factories, but in a form appropriate to each of these two sectors of industry.

So here is the truth about Japan in the years immediately following the Meiji Restoration: the government was the entrepreneur and owner of all major industry; a select clique of financiers was subsidized and encouraged by the same government; the government sold off some of the enterprises to its Zaibatsu intimates at bargain prices to foster private monopolies; but the government made certain that the entire economy—defense and non-defense—remained under paternal control.

And this is the economy that the Friedmans cite as the dramatic example of "free markets."

The three great "examples" concocted by the Friedmans to prove that their system works are but a few samplings of the many fables they fabricate to make their case. Their fundamental fiction is that under laissez faire all the parties in the economy are free to make their own bargain and hence must be mutually benefited. Invoking the name of their master, the Friedmans state on page one: "Adam Smith's key insight was that both parties to an exchange can benefit and that so long as cooperation is strictly voluntary, no exchange will take place unless both parties do benefit."

In this Friedmanesque formulation, "cooperation" refers to the competition in the marketplace of seller versus buyer, employer versus employee, and one company versus another. "Voluntary" means no governmental compulsion.

But does the absence of state interference really mean that parties are "free" to enter "voluntary" contracts? The answer was given by the United States Supreme Court many years ago when it declared that "necessitous" men are not "free" men, for such sad souls—like that woman in Hong Kong—must either submit or starve. And so long as people are as self-seeking as the Friedmans insist they are (and should be).those who can will try to put their economic adversaries in a "necessitous" posture. An employer who "intends only his own gain" (Adam Smith's phrase) will not simply open a plant anywhere and wait for workers to appear; he will locate in a community of "necessitous" men and women; he will import labor from "necessitous" regions; he will gather with like employers to hold down or beat down wages; and, if his "hands" organize to balance the bargaining process—to make it a bit more "voluntary"—he will appeal to the government to outlaw such a conspiracy of the "necessitous." Indeed, the employer (or seller) who would put himself at the mercy of the whimsical market when he knows he can manipulate that market would hardly be the self-seeking person whom the Friedmans envision and extol as the *sine qua non* of a free-enterprise economy.

Adam Smith—the Friedmans' guru—never was able to resolve the dilemma of the need for an open market, on the one hand, and the inherent compulsion of the employer-seller to close the market, on the other hand. Early in *The Wealth of Nations*, Smith rails against the eternal efforts of the "masters" to conspire against both employees and consumers and, in searing passages that the Friedmans do not quote, Smith exposes the slick ways in which the masters gave the impression that their victims were the truly guilty parties.

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In his discussion "Of the Wages of Labour" (chap. 8) Smith describes, as clearly as Marx, the inevitable class struggle and the unfair advantage capitalists have over their workers:

> What are the common wages of labor depends everywhere upon the contract usually made between these two parties, whose interests are by no means the same. The workmen desire to get as much, the masters to give as little as possible. The former are disposed to combine in order to raise, the latter in order to lower the wages of labor.

Smith then goes on to tell why the masters can "force" their workmen into bad bargains:

> It is not, however, difficult, to foresee which of the two parties must, upon all ordinary occasions, have the advantage in the dispute, and force the other into a compliance with their terms. The masters, being fewer in number, can combine much more easily; and the law, besides, authorizes, or at least does not prohibit the combinations, while it prohibits those of workmen. We have no acts of parliament against combining to lower the price of work; but many against combining to raise it. In all such disputes, the masters can hold out longer. A landlord, a farmer, a manufacturer, or merchant, though they did not employ a single workman, could generally live a year or two upon the stocks which they have already acquired. Many workmen could not subsist a week, few could subsist a month, and scarce any a year without employment. In the long-run, the workman may be as necessary to the master as the master is to him, but the necessity is not so immediate.

Although the masters are generally the tyrants and their workers the tyrannized, the public somehow gets a contrary impression. Smith tells why.

> We rarely hear of the combinations of masters though frequently of those of workmen. But, whoever imagines, upon this account, that masters rarely combine is as ignorant of the world as of th. subject. Masters are always and everywhere in a sort of tacit, but constant and uniform combination, not to raise the wages above their natural level. . . .We seldom hear of this combination because it is the usual, and one may say, the natural state of things which nobody even hears of. Masters too sometimes enter into particular combinations to sink the wages of labor even below this rate. These are always conducted with the utmost silence and secrecy, till the moment of execution, and when the workmen yield, as they sometimes do, without resistance, though severely felt by them, they are never heard of by other people.

Workers are not the only victims of this system; so are consumers. In chapter 10 on "Inequalities of Wages and Profits," Smith writes: "People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices."

Not content to wield their market power, masters enlist government on their side as well. "Whenever the legislature attempts to regulate the differences between masters and their workmen," writes Smith, "its counsellors are always the masters."

In chapter 11 of Book One, in a section Smith marks "Conclusion," he warns against the generally antisocial political proposals of those "who live by profit." Noting that "the interest of the proprietors of land is inseparably connected with the general interest of the society" and that "so also is that of those who live by wages," he then concludes, "but the interest of those who live by profit has not the same connection with the general interest of the society." He explains why:

> The interest of the dealers in any particular branch of trade or manufacture is always in some respects different from, and even opposite to, that of the public. To widen the market and to narrow the competition is always the interest of the dealers. To widen the market may frequently be agreeable enough to the interest of the public; but to narrow the competition must always be against it, and can serve only to enable the dealers, by raising their profits above what they naturally would be, to levy, for their own benefit, an absurd tax upon the rest of their fellow citizens. The proposal of any new law or regulation of commerce which comes from this order ought always to be listened to with great precaution, and ought never to be adopted till after having been long and carefully examined, not only with the most scrupulous, but with the most suspicious attention. It comes from an

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> order of men, whose interest is never exactly the same with that of the public, who have generally an interest to deceive and even to oppress the public, and who accordingly have, upon many occasions, both deceived and oppressed it.

For Adam Smith, the compulsion of the capitalists to "conspire" was in the very nature of those "who live by profit." Although the Friedmans are aware of widespread monopoly in the United States and inveigh against it at great length, they do not note the connection between these "conspiracies" and the innate tendency of the capitalist to "conspire."

How would the Friedmans keep capitalists from behaving like capitalists? By raising a breed of "barking cats," to use their very own phrase. "Barking Cats" is a charming concept the Friedmans propound, in which they assert that social institutions, like biological species, do not violate their nature. The phrase comes from a piece that the Friedmans wrote for *Newsweek* a few years ago, in which the authors ridiculed the notion that you could change the behavior of the Food and Drug Administration by putting "well-meaning" people in charge." Ridiculous, argue the Friedmans. "What would you think of someone who said, 'I would like to have a cat provided it barked.'. . .The biological laws that specify the character of cats are no more rigid than the political laws that specify the behavior of governmental agencies. . . .You can not demand that cats bark or that water burn."

Yet, if the Friedmans envision a capitalist system in which capitalists will NOT behave as Adam Smith said they would, then the Friedmans must also expect that cats will bark. For capitalists "conspire" just as naturally as cats meow. And, if that is so, then the whole Friedman formula of laissez faire is a fabulous fraud—a magic show in which water burns.

Because capitalists are not kittens but beasts of prey, progressive movements have sought to tame the tiger, through such efforts as antitrust laws, whose use you might expect the Friedmans to encourage to promote "free" enterprise.

But that is not the Friedman remedy. "The most effective way to counter it [the danger of monopoly] is not through a bigger antitrust division at the Department of Justice or a larger budget for the Federal Trade Commission, but through removing existing barriers to international trade," recommend the Friedmans.

Let us put this prescription to the reality test, starting with those sectors of our economy where inflation hits consumers hardest: fuel, food, housing, health care—in all of which monopoly is a factor.

Will we bring down the price of fuel by opening our doors to imports? Hardly. We are in our present squeeze in large part because we did open our doors to oil imports to the point where we became dependent on the Persian Gulf states who, through their worldwide monopoly (oligopoly), in the form of OPEC, are presently strangling us.

Will we bring down the price of food by opening our doors to foreign imports? Maybe a bit here and there. But agricultural imports can have little impact on an America that is the food basket of the world. To crack food prices here, we have to break that oligopoly called agribusiness, whose tentacles run from "seed to store," underpaying farmers and overcharging consumers.

Can we import housing? That's silly, of course. It's doubly nonsensical when we note that the chief inflationary factors in the cost of private housing are financing (more than doubled as a percentage of final cost in the last couple of decades) and land (more than tripled). Wages, as a percentage of cost, have been cut in half. What shall we import: land from abroad or cheaper mortgages? How would opening our doors bring down the high interest rates that were imposed on the nation by monetarists, like Friedman, who sought to restrict the money supply?

Will the cost of medical care come down if we open our doors? As Friedman points out, when America was flooded by "highly trained refugees from Austria and Germany" in the 1930s the number of foreign doctors admitted to practice medicine did not rise, thanks to the AMA, which the Friedmans regard as a union-monopoly.

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Consider other factors in the world of reality. Utility bills: can we "import" gas, electric, and phone services? Transportation: can we "import" railroad, bus, subway service?

Just about the only sector of the economy where "imports" might have an impact on prices in the United States would be the area of manufactured commodities. But, again, in the world of reality, the "free trade" dream turns into a nightmare.

Multinational manufacturing corporations in the United States use "free trade" to establish monopolies. These global companies do their manufacturing in other lands—through wholly owned subsidiaries, contractors, joint ventures, and so forth. Taking advantage of cheap labor and tax favors in other lands, they bring their commodities into the United States to undersell and to destroy their American competition. With their newly found monopoly position, they then proceed to raise the price as any monopolist would.

When we open our doors to a legitimate foreign competitor (not an American attacking his American competitors from a foreign base) we can not expect that such a rival, whether a Japanese carmaker or a European steelmaker, will respect the rules of "free trade." More often than not, such producers will get government subsidies (or they will sell in their own closed market at inflation prices) so they can "dump" profitably on the American market.

Such "dumping" doesn't bother the Friedmans; indeed, they hail it. "To pay for the subsidies, the foreign government must tax its citizens. They are the ones who pay for the subsidies. U.S. consumers benefit. They get cheap TV sets or automobiles or whatever it is that is subsidized. Should we complain about such a program of reverse foreign aid?"

By this Friedman formulation, the Japanese, for instance, are a foolish people who tax their citizens in order to provide us with cheaper goods. They lose; we gain.

Why then do the Japanese do this seemingly idiotic thing unless, being Asians, they are exempt from Adam Smith's dictum about economic self-interest? The Japanese do it because this is their way of exporting not only goods but also unemployment. Their subsidies promote their exports, keep their factories running at about 100 percent of capacity, thereby increasing productivity and, also, cutting down on such social costs as unemployment insurance and welfare. But as their steel and auto hit our shores, the hidden export (unemployment) pours across our land. Sooner or later, in defense, we learn to do as the Japanese do—for that is far cheaper than growing unemployment, costly unemployment insurance, lengthening relief rolls, loss of income, rise of disease, crime, death. Ironically, today the United States (not England) stands almost alone as an island of "free trade" in an ocean of global "protection." For the Friedmans to propose with a straight face that the United States now open its doors even more widely so we shall become the dumping ground of the world is about as realistic as expecting dogs to meow.

In sum, the Friedman formula for dealing with monopoly is, at best, a feeble flourish of an outmoded phrase and, at worst, a cop-out before the challenge of corporate "conspiracy."

The Friedmans do have a second weapon in their arsenal against monopolies, in particular those that derive from government agencies that set prices and control admissions to the trade. The authors propose widespread decontrol—from the licensing of doctors to the regulation of transportation rates.

Regulatory agencies are created, say the Friedmans, to satisfy the demands of "sincere high-minded reformers" (like farmers) who ask for a commission (like the Interstate Commerce Commission) to protect them from predators (the railroads). That's the way it starts. But then the "interested parties" (like the railroads) "go to work to make sure that the power is used for their benefit."

Here the Friedmans are, of course, just echoing the arguments of American socialists who have long held that, in a capitalist

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society, public agencies set up to regulate the capitalists will often end up being run by the capitalists. The Marxist conclusion: do away with the capitalists. The Friedman solution: do away with the commissions.

The Friedman formula is, of course, an extension of their laissez-faire dogma; hence, it is no surprise that they would get rid not only of such agencies as the ICC (rate setters and admission controllers) but also of the Safety Products Commission, the Food and Drug Administration, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency, social security, minimum wages, and public schools. They simply want "government" out of the act, so that those "who live by profit" may go their uninhibited way.

To protect the consumer in this jungle, the Friedmans do propose two strategies: an effluent tax and law suits.

"Instead of requiring firms to erect specific kinds of waste disposal plants or to achieve a specified level of water quality in water discharged into a lake or river, impose a tax of a specified amount per unit of effluent discharged." This proposal is not altogether without merit, albeit quite inconsistent with the essence of laissez faire, since its enforcement would require close government inspection and the imposition of a punitive tax to direct social policy. But, even with these positive "socialistic" traits, the proposal calls for closer scrutiny.

First, if Friedman is right about "barking cats," won't the "interested parties" (companies) infiltrate the agency that determines the level of poison and the proper tax? If that is what the Friedmans call "the natural history of government intervention," then their medicine is no medicine at all.

Second, many companies, especially those in a monopoly position, may simply decide to continue polluting full force and to pass on the cost to the consumer. In which case the public will have to pay for being poisoned.

The Friedmans' other remedy is to sue the offending company. "After all, the manufacturers of thalidomide ended by paying many tens of millions of dollars in damages—surely a strong incentive to avoid any similar episode."

So let those "who live by profit" go their way. If ten years after exposure you develop cancer, and if you can afford a lawyer, and if you can prove direct cause and effect, you will get some money on your death bed—if the company is still in existence. You must also assume that the stupid company did not anticipate some such future cost and did not tack that item on to the original price of the poison it was peddling. You must also assume that the original investors in the product have not sold the company for a handsome capital gain and have not moved their money into the manufacture of new menaces for sale to some patsy.

The Friedman formula—sue 'em—is hardly their invention: American courts are flooded with "malpractice" cases against companies, schools, cities, doctors, lawyers, accountants, even parents. The bench is being drowned under the onrush in many states. Exposed parties cry for insurance; insurance companies raise rates, doctors and others tack the rate on to the bill; the consumer ultimately pays for it all. End result: once more the people pay for their own poisoning.

Although the Friedmans advance a theory about the "natural history of government intervention" that suggests that federal agencies are all alike (cats don't bark), their ire against government, one suspects, would not be quite as wrathful as it is, if every agency really fell into their "natural" mold. While it may be true that the ICC has fallen into the hands of the railroads and the truckers, it is not true that FTC has fallen into the hands of the funeral directors and insurance companies; that OSHA is run by industrialists; that EPA is run by Hooker Chemical; that EEOC is run by General Electric; that FDA is run by the pharmaceutical houses; or that the National Labor Relations Board is run by that highly "interested party," the unions.

The truth is that government agencies—like government itself, including the Executive, the Legislature, and the Courts—are not just cats and dogs that meow or bark. They are animals whose character depends on who

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inhabits their skin. Yesterday's barking dog can become tomorrow's meowing cat, if we throw out Hoover and put in Roosevelt. If that is not so, then democracy is a sham and our "freedom to choose" our government is no freedom at all.

In a democratic society it is a prime purpose of government to protect the worker and the consumer against those conspiratorial predators whom Adam Smith understood so well and who, given the chance, will try to monopolize both economic and political power to "deceive" and "oppress" the people. People turn to their elected officials to protect the public interest because the people have no other instrument of equal might to counterbalance the built-in power of those "who live by profit."

The historic turning point in the people's use of government for economic salvation was, of course, the 1930s: depression and recovery. "In the realm of ideas," write the Friedmans, "the depression persuaded the public that capitalism was an unstable system destined to suffer ever more crises." In a chapter entitled "The Anatomy of Crisis," the Friedmans try to prove that laissez faire was—and is—basically sound, that the New Deal response was unnecessary, and that the sooner we rid ourselves of its heritage the better.

The New Deal program was based on a simple assumption; namely, that in a "market" economy, the machine will grind to a halt unless there is a "market." That *sine qua non* of capitalist society—the Friedmans' beloved market—was weak and getting weaker. What had happened was that those "who live by profit" had amassed a disproportionate portion of the nation's money in their hands through methods that Adam Smith described so clearly. As a consequence, the "deceived" and "oppressed" workers and consumers (two terms alluding to the same persons) lacked the purchasing power to buy what the economy could produce. And since no entrepreneur who "intends only his own gain" will continue to turn out products for which there is no foreseeable market, production slowed and halted—to bring on recession and depression. To get the economy back on its feet, Roosevelt used the taxing and borrowing power of government to put people on public payrolls, to encourage higher wages, to provide unemployment insurance and social security, to invest in needed programs that the private sector shunned—to "expand aggregate demand." That demand spurred supply and that, in turn, spurred demand to get us back on the road to recovery.

The Friedmans reject the Rooseveltian way; they propose another remedy for recessions: *leave it to the bankers*. Here's their view:

In 1907, a depression hit America. In March 1908, a run on the bank forced the Knickerbocker Trust to close its doors. Within a week, "banks throughout the country reacted to the 'panic' by 'restriction of payments,' i.e., they announced that they would no longer pay out currency on demand to depositors who wanted to withdraw their deposits." The remedy worked. It did, of course, impose "serious inconveniences on business." And it did turn the "recession into one of the most severe that the United States had experienced to that time." But at the end of 13 months, "economic recovery began."

To prevent the recurrence of such suffering, a Federal Reserve Act was passed in 1913, empowering the Feds to issue Treasury notes—just printed money—to supply banks with cash to appease customers "on the run." When the Great Depression came in 1929, however, the Feds failed to do what they should have done because—according to the Friedmans—there was a power struggle between the Washington and New York branches of the system. So banks collapsed in three great avalanches in 1930, 1931, and 1933—as the Feds stood "idly by."

"Had the Federal Reserve System never been established," say the Friedmans, "there is little doubt that the same measures would have been taken as in 1907—a restriction of payments. . . . Economic recovery would very likely have begun in early 1931, just as it

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had in early 1908. The existence of the Reserve System prevented this drastic therapeutic measure."

That's the Friedman story about the bitter but better medicine they uncovered in the annals of 1907.

The facts are, however, that the bankers did not do it on their own in 1907-08. The federal government played a major role—with public funds and with special dispensation to the House of Morgan to trustify iron and steel.

"[Theodore] Roosevelt acted forcefully [in 1907]," records John A. Garraty *(The American Nation;* Harper & Row, 1966) —

> sending Secretary of the Treasury George C. Cortelyou to New York and allowing him to deposit huge amounts of government cash in New York banks. Roosevelt also informally authorized the acquisition of the Tennessee Coal and Iron Company by U.S. Steel when the bankers told him that the purchase was necessary to prevent an extension of the panic.

So, the panic of 1907 was not overcome simply by the banks' refusals to honor the demands of their depositors. The crisis was overcome by direct federal aid and by formation of a monopoly—measures apparently so abhorrent to the Friedmans that they simply refuse to mention them. Once more we encounter a new fable, the Friedman fiction about 1907.

The Friedmans' omission of governmental intervention in 1907, however, is only a minor error compared with their omission of all references as to just what brought on the crises of 1907 and 1929 in the first place. After all, the bank failures were not the cause of the crisis but the result of a downward turn in the business cycle.

In 1907, "productive facilities had expanded beyond the country's immediate capacity to consume," records one history (Blum, p. 554). The same happened in 1929—but on a much more massive scale. But all we get from the Friedmans on this subject is a piece of a paragraph that reads:

> The stock market crash was important, but it was not the beginning of the depression. Business activity reached its peak in August 1929, two months before the stock market crashed, and had already fallen appreciably by then. The crash reflected the growing economic difficulties plus the puncturing of an unsustainable speculative bubble.

Just what those "growing economic difficulties" were the Friedmans never say, for to explain what happened—to reveal the way in which those "who live by profit" have repeatedly unbalanced the economy by amassing too much at the top while withholding too much from those below—would totally shatter the many myths that the Friedmans manufacture about laissez faire.

Finally, one wonders how this book has managed to become a best seller. Perhaps the clue appears on page 222: "Perfection is not of this world. There will always be shoddy products, quacks, con artists." □

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Jean Bloch-Michel

Anti-Semitism and the French "New Right"

Paris

On November 4, 1978, with the best intentions in the world, the weekly *L'Express* published an interview with Darquier de Pellepoix, former Commissioner General for Jewish Affairs in the Pétain government. Readers may remember that Darquier was appointed to this post as successor to another professional anti-Semite, Xavier Vallat, whom the Occupation authorities had found insufficiently effective. Subsequently, Darquier was sentenced to death, in absentia; he tranquilly whiled away some 20 years in Madrid, where he was protected by the Franco regime and, according to his own statement, enjoyed amicable relations with the French Embassy. Although a commentary accompanied his remarks in *L'Express*, many people questioned the usefulness of their being published at all. One distinguished contributor to the magazine, Raymond Aron, had been away when the interview appeared, and upon his return stated that he would not have favored its publication.

Darquier's anti-Semitic remarks contained a degree of violence that over the years had almost been forgotten. Their impact has been considerable, in that they have reinforced the anti-Semitic current that is manifest in French society; also, because of their violence, they came as something of a surprise.

No one should entertain any illusions: French anti-Semitism has never died, any more than have other forms of racism—directed against blacks or Arabs, for example. However, in the postwar years it was difficult for anti-Semites to vent their feelings freely. Any excesses were looked on with disfavor even by anti-Semites, who did not want to be associated with memories of the atrocious racial crimes committed during the war. But years have passed, indignation has had time to subside, and today one has the impression that somehow anti-Semites have been waiting for a sign to resume their activities—overtly, that is. So, as soon as they observed that they could speak openly—though at the price of some protest—and even could congratulate themselves on what had been done to Jews during the Occupation and that it was possible with impunity to comment that in Auschwitz "they killed nothing but lice," they realized that a page had been turned, that the time had come—or, rather, returned—when they could again speak out.

Laws now in effect in France do not, of course, permit publication of material such as one used to find in the anti-Semitic sheets of the prewar and Occupation years. Today, "incitement to racial hatred" is a crime punishable by law. Accordingly, anti-Semitism has reemerged primarily in terms of attitudes, in talk rather than in writing (unless clandestine). One notably significant instance occurred recently on the medical faculty of the University of Paris. In a speech, the dean of the faculty, Professor Maurer, interjected totally extraneous remarks in which he recalled having been a member of the S.S. He had not abandoned the S.S. ideal, he added, and he still favored a social organization based on elites. Thus it became public knowledge that a medical college had put an erstwhile collaborator at its head, whose past activities were known to those

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who appointed him since he had been officially pardoned and released.

Professor Milliez, who played an outstanding part in the Resistance, has indicated that, in 1945, together with his colleague Valéry-Radot, he had taken steps to win freedom for their former student, Maurer, who had never denounced them during their Resistance activities. Milliez said, further, that they had the young man's promise that he would never try to obtain a university post. In his statement, which he released to the press, Professor Milliez added: "Of the people who acted to assure [Maurer's] career, some adduced as their reasons the young surgeon's gifts and his pardon; others were not shocked by his past, and even admired his Iron Cross with its diamond stars." Fortified by such support and borne up by current anti-Semitism, Maurer judged that, even with his post at forfeit, he could finally glory in his past.

An incident such as this seems more serious than all the attacks that have been made since 1977—against *Le Monde*, which is charged with being in Jewish hands, and against synagogues and cemeteries—with perhaps, the exception of the damage done the Jewish student hostel in the Latin Quarter, for which a group calling itself the League of French Fighters Against the Jewish Occupation claimed credit. In this incident, a bomb exploded at dinner time and wounded several people. Since the P.L.O. knew that suspicion would immediately fall on it, its Paris representative promptly and unequivocally condemned the attack. There are no grounds for thinking that the P.L.O. was in any way responsible for it.

Signs of a recrudescence of anti-Semitism are sporadic, yes, but disturbing. Disturbing not because they point to the existence of fascist groups in France—that has long been known—but because now these groups are moving into action more readily and more often. There are also indications that groups may be forming in which criminals find a haven. Clandestine movements—one calling itself Commando Delta and another known as Police Honor (this was the name of a group of Parisian Resistance police during the Occupation)—have claimed responsibility for two murders: of Henri Curiel, an Egyptian Jew long associated with the Egyptian Communist party, whom a newsman had clumsily and falsely accused of being the pivot of terrorism in Europe; and of Lucien Goldmann, a former anarchist, whom an assize court had acquitted of the crime with which he had been charged. Henri Curiel was murdered in his own apartment in full daylight; Lucien Goldmann in full daylight in the street. These killings are going unpunished to this day, and the French police have not greatly exerted themselves to find the killers.

Can one then speak of a renaissance of anti-Semitism in France? As I have said, it is not a matter of a renaissance but of a continuation. Apart from the two crimes just mentioned, it is a question of incidents that are more premonitory than intrinsically grave, more foreboding than frequent. They are significant and troubling because they offer evidence not only that anti-Semites are recovering their courage but also that anti-Semitism is rediscovering what one could term its traditional partisans. It is a fact that, for a number of years and increasingly since 1968, anti-Semitism has become the business of small groups on the far left. Using anti-Zionism as a pretext, certain political groups, such as the Maoists, and certain publications, such as *Témoignage chrétien*, have waged such a sustained, blind, and violent campaign against Israel that most of the time it has been impossible to distinguish between attacks against Israel and those against Jews. One may, indeed must, qualify them as "blind" since even in a paper whose "leftism" is as rational and generous as that of *Libération*, the Entebbe operation was held to be unwarrantable interference in the affairs of a sovereign nation.

What with time doing its work, then, and with young generations being less sensitive to these matters, French anti-Semites are recovering their courage. One cannot say that at this point they constitute a real danger.

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Today, however, you *can* meet people who call themselves anti-Semites—something that would have been impossible for the last 35 years.

Other people refer to themselves as rightists. Since the right was more openly compromised with Vichy than the left, people used to hesitate to claim kinship with it. The right used to call itself "center right" or "center," or even "left center," so that the right now identifying itself as such has promptly been dubbed the "new right." But it is not all that new.

The leftist press began writing about a new right in 1978; however, the champions of this new right were correct in saying that it had been in existence for some ten years. Because its activities were confined to restricted circles it was little known, and not until some of its more prominent leading spirits began to appear in a paper as widely read as *Le Figaro* was public attention drawn to it.

Everything leads one to believe that the man who owns *Le Figaro*, together with numerous other papers, did not engage such collaborators by chance. Robert Hersant, who has put together a press empire closely resembling Axel Springer's in West Germany, was a militant anti-Semite in his youth and, as such, put himself at the service of the Nazi occupiers and went so far as even to wear their uniform. Opportunism and business acumen led him to put distance between himself and his compromising friends quite quickly, and some time after the Liberation one found him heading a specialized paper, *L'Auto-Journal*, which rapidly proved profitable. He then got himself elected deputy from Seine et Oise, and had to defend himself publicly in the Chamber against a move to invalidate his election; in the course of these proceedings he was reminded, in detail, of his activities during the Occupation. Hersant was seated nonetheless and, serving under the tag of "reformer," came to hold what is probably a record for absenteeism and silence in the Assembly. When the 1978 elections came around, with the—erroneously—expected surge from the left, he realized that his election from Seine et Oise was threatened, and he decided to run in the middle-class, conservative district of Neuilly. Neuilly was represented by a Gaullist deputy, Mme. Florence d'Harcourt, who, in deference to her democratic mandate, does not use the title of duchess to which she is entitled. Jacques Chirac, in his capacity as the Gaullist party leader, tried to persuade Florence d'Harcourt to withdraw in favor of Robert Hersant—which, given the "Gaullism" of the one and the past of the other, was cause for some surprise. But M. Chirac argued that his Gaullist party must keep the good will of a "press lord" who, having acquired some ten provincial papers, had just become boss of *Le Figaro* and taken over *L'Aurore* and *France-Soir*—which is to say, the most important "information" organs in Paris, apart from *Le Monde*, and among the most important nationwide. Not only did Jacques Chirac ask Florence d'Harcourt to step aside but, when she refused, he withdrew the Gaullist party's endorsement from her and gave it to Robert Hersant. Alas, poor Gaullism!

Florence d'Harcourt's political past is irreproachable. She was undaunted, and proceeded to run as an "independent Gaullist" against Robert Hersant, who proceeded to use against her tactics that can readily be imagined. But Mme. d'Harcourt, whose campaign consisted mainly of informing her constituents about her opponent's past, was elected in the first round of voting by a comfortable majority.

Was Hersant's next move motivated by a spirit of revenge? Or did he simply feel that from then on precautions were pointless? The fact is that, one year later, Hersant enlarged the staff of *Figaro-Magazine* (the weekly supplement of the daily paper) with a group of writers headed by Louis Pauwels, Alain de Benoit, and Michel Marmin. Their joining the Hersant paper marked, for supporters of the "new right," a passing from semiclandestine—or, rather, nonpublic—to public action.

Alain de Benoit now divides his energies between the "cultural" editorship of *Figaro-Magazine* and his activities at GRECE

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(Research and Study Group for European Civilization) and the publishing house Editions Copernic. It is worth recalling the circumstances in which GRECE was founded. After the developments of 1968, the small groups that had always shared a nostalgia for Vichy or fascism could see that, set up as they then were, they had lost any chance of exerting even minimal influence. During the Events of May, they had been pushed aside, even forgotten. What's more, the subsequent election, which assured the success of the "center" (which means, in the main, the traditional right), had relegated them definitively to the sidelines. Some stuck by their old positions—for example, the Parti des Forces Nouvelles or what was left of the former (royalist) Action Française—but a handful of militants from a neo-Nazi organization called Europe Action decided to modernize their activities and to take on a new field of operations. To this end, in 1969 they founded GRECE, supplied it with one bulletin for members, *Elements*, and one lavishly produced magazine for general distribution, *Nouvelle Ecole*, of which Alain de Benoit, who was one of those who had moved over from Europe Action, became editor. Shortly thereafter, Editions Copernic was formed; its editorial board was made up of the same people who headed GRECE—notably, Alain de Benoit and Michel Marmin. Two other organizations soon rounded out this ensemble: the Club de l'Horloge, which was supposed to muster government officials; and a club called Nation-Armée, which was supposed to infiltrate military circles.

GRECE passes itself off as a "think tank." Indeed, its "thinking" is reflected in its various publications, which must now be considered to include *Figaro-Magazine*. If one refers to Alain de Benoit's "Vu de droite" and to articles that appear in *Elements* (the GRECE house organ), *Nouvelle Ecole*, and now *Figaro-Magazine*, one can summarize its thinking thus: GRECE is opposed to the "Judeo-Christian" ideology (and everyone knows what *that* means); it urges the need for a return to Celtic and "Indo-European" sources (Louis Pauwels hammers on this constantly). The term "Aryan" is generally eschewed for reasons that need not be stressed. What the people who believe in the GRECE doctrine expound and defend is a "scientific" racism, not to be confused with Hitler's "romantic" racism. As Alain de Benoit puts it, "An 'intelligent' racism that takes cognizance of ethnic diversity is less harmful than an intemperate, leveling, assimilative antiracism."

GRECE's racism claims a scientific foundation, especially in biology. It purports to be based on American studies in sociobiology and on IQ research carried out in the United States by Aubrey M. Shuey [author of *The Testing of Negro Intelligence*, cited by Arthur Jensen as a source for his assertions] and in France by Debray-Ritzen. From his studies of children's IQs, Professor Debray-Ritzen draws these conclusions: children of working-class parents have lower IQs than do children of middle-class parentage; if the former perform less well in their studies than do the latter, the reason is that they are born of parents with lower IQs, which they have inherited. Intellectual inferiority is thus considered an innate characteristic that is virtually impossible to modify, and it warrants the division of society into classes—a "hierarchical" organization of society—according to an order established by the intellectual capacities of the respective groups. It should be noted in this connection that the Nobel Prize winner in biology, François Jacob, has commented on the view that assigns the totality of mental aptitudes to heredity, saying that the position is based on "measuring the IQ, a procedural method that utterly amazes the biologist, for he has not managed even to *define* the intelligence that others seek to measure and quantify."

The hierarchy and order "needed" by society have led some new-right theoreticians to concern themselves with eugenics. In this area, one can find nothing to admire except their skillful use of litotes. J. J. Moureau published an article entitled "Historical Overview" in *Nouvelle Ecole* (January-February 1971) in which he listed and gave

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some account of the various works that have dealt with eugenics from the time of Plato to the present; however, one finds that whereas the practical measures adopted by Solon and Lycurgus are cited, no mention is made of those practiced by the Hitler regime.

The theories of the new right—based on "the most recent genetic discoveries," as Louis Pauwels reiterates—have been set forth in books published, for the most part, by Editions Copernic (which shares its top management with GRECE). Outstanding among them is "L'Inégalité de l'homme," by Hans J. Eysenk, which is the source of Debray-Ritzen's work on IQ, as well as of "Race et intelligence," published anonymously by "two French geneticists who are known for their scientific work but do not wish to compromise their careers by putting their signatures to scientific truths they profess."

As to the scientific value of the new right's theories, which propose that the differences among men as defined in biological terms prove their inequality, let us listen to some specialists as well.

François Jacob gave his opinion (*Le Monde*, July 19, 1979) of "La politique du vivant" (published by the Club de l'Horloge): if, in order to combat an "egalitarian utopia," the new right claims to base its views on science, nowhere does it indicate what "the scientifically controlled elements" are to which it refers. "Here the biological argument is merely the mask for an authoritarian thesis," Jacob wrote. Science does teach us that men are different; ergo, some will be superior, others inferior. Jews are different from Aryans; "therefore, they must be eliminated. . . . The abiding error," Jacob wrote, "is to connect a difference in ability and a difference in nature."

With regard to sociobiology, to which the new right is constantly referring, Professor Jean-Paul Escande writes:

> What do sociobiologists do? They start out as real scientists, and then they inflate their extrapolations to compensate for the absence of hard evidence. The pope of sociobiology is Edward O. Wilson, who when he is studying the social behavior of ants or termites or chimpanzees is a scientist of high caliber; when he extrapolates his findings about animals and applies them to human beings—to their sexuality, their feelings of altruism, or their religion—Wilson becomes imaginative, not scientific; he moves over into the realm of science fiction when he claims to relate all that to genes.

The long articles by Alain de Benoit and the peremptory statements by Louis Pauwels boil down to one simple idea: biology teaches that human beings are different, therefore unequal. In his article, "Différents, mais inégaux" (*Elements*, 1978), Alain de Benoit justifies the new right's theories on "scientific racism" by calling to their rescue not only Darwin but also Sir Andrew Huxley, genetics as well as psychometrics—and, of course, "house" theoreticians of the ilk of H. J. Eysenk. Like everything that Alain de Benoit writes, this article is merely a series of statements that rely on the authority of "scientists" whose specific works on the subject are rarely cited, and to offer a precis of it would be pointless. So, to come quickly to his conclusions: "Not all differences, of course, determine hierarchy, but most do. As soon as diversity is *lived*—is perceived in daily life and is not merely imagined—it entails classifications, hierarchies, inequalities." Of course, he adds, "a plumber is not 'superior' to a carpenter, but a 'good' plumber is superior to a 'bad' plumber." One readily sees the kind of confusion in such thinking, which takes off from genetics only to arrive at such a commonplace. But one must also be mindful—and this is precisely the point—that a "bad" plumber is, on certain levels, perfectly equal, as far as his rights are concerned, to a "good" plumber.

It is apparent that while the new right's notions about order, hierarchy, and elitism are no more "scientifically founded" than all earlier racist ideas, they are generally presented in more measured terms. "We must be prudent in our use of language," declared

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Jacques Bruyas, the founder of GRECE. Prudence may go by the boards, however, when these thinkers are among themselves. Two examples will suffice:

From remarks by Yvan Blot, president of the Club de l'Horloge, during a 1972 Club discussion of "Nietzsche and History":

> Slaves are needed if a new aristocracy is to arise. . . . It will be necessary to mount large enterprises, large collective experiments in discipline and selection if one wishes to put an end to that frightful domination of the absurd and the fortuitous, which has, until now, borne the name of history.

And again Yvan Blot. On May 2, 1974, in drawing up a balance sheet for the labors of the secretariat of GRECE's Research and Study Group Blot wrote:

> Ethnic identity and training are the two components of a superior humanity—which is to say, of the highest known form of life. Ethnic identity is the factor that establishes preferential differentiations on the scale of biological potentials. Training on an appropriate racial basis is the source of all civilization. . . . To safeguard and promote the specificity of ethnic identity is . . . the foundation of a profoundly humanist and superhumanist action. Social egalitarianism cannot, then, *from a scientific point of view* [italics added], be anything but regression. The more evolved a society is, the more it is hierarchically ordered. The very existence of the human species is bound to racial differentiation.

This quotation is a good résumé of the new right's attitude, of its "scientific" assertions, and of its racism. It also shows that, on the scientific level—if that term can be used—one is confronting a kind of Lysenkoism in reverse: innate—ergo, "genetic"—characteristics take the place that acquired—ergo, "social"—characteristics occupied in the theories of the notorious Soviet agronomist.

The quotations also show clearly what the political applications of this ideology must be. If I may, for the moment, adopt the language of the publications in which this ideology is set forth, they call on supporters to fight against egalitarianism, which, it is claimed, conflicts with the findings of science; to affirm each ethnic group's "right to its difference" and to define a hierarchy among these groups and among individuals; to support an elitism that does not consist, as in democratic societies, in forming elites but rather in promoting those that already exist—which is to say, those that would be so identified by a "scientific" racism—those, indeed, that if given the opportunity are ready and willing to define themselves as such; to destroy the "Nazarene mentality"; to fight Marxism, which is nothing more than "laicized theodicy"—all this supporters are to do in order to rediscover the wellsprings of "Celtic and Indo-European culture." Finally, the new right's political action must aim at creating an "organic" society in contradistinction to the "trade-oriented" society that *Elements* (March, 1978) charged with having "continually besieged the three functions of Indo-European societies: the productive function . . . the military function . . . and the function of governance."

The men of the new right are employing a tactic in the service of this ideology for which some extreme-left movements in France once coined the term "*entrisme*." One must "enter" into society, do everything possible to insinuate oneself and to be admitted into it—hence their circumspect language—and, in particular, aim at securing positions in which one can exert influence. No more cudgels, helmets, punitive raids against leftist students, or demonstrations such as the extreme right has traditionally staged. The former neo-Nazis of Europe Action have been recycled. They now are well-bred people. They are found today not only on the staffs of the Hersant publications—where, indeed, they entirely belong—but also in the government. As an editorial in *Nouvelle Ecole* (No. 9) put it: "What we need is to have influential men placed in the decision-making spheres of today and, even more, of tomorrow." With the Club de l'Horloge, the new right is attempting to raise the issue of "metapolitics," which is to say, the issue of "the place and the role of ideology." The club's president, Yvan Blot, is a member of the Inspection Générale

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and, as such, an official of high rank. In the past he served on the departmental staff of two Ministers of the Interior (Poniatowski and Bonnet), and has held the post of assistant first secretary to Alain Devaquet when the latter was secretary-general of the Gaullist R.P.R.

The Club de l'Horloge, although founded by members of GRECE, attempts to conceal both its origins and the ties it has maintained with organizations from which its founders have come. It would like to be the "doctrinal laboratory" of the current majority, and in relation to the Giscard people it seeks to play the role the Club Jean Moulin once played for the left. Most likely this was its objective in inspiring—if, indeed, it did not entirely prepare—a number of books published by prominent persons on the official right, notably *L'Avenir n'est nulle part*, by former Minister of the Interior Michel Poniatowsky, who is still a carefully heeded Elysées adviser; *La révolution libérale*, by Phillippe Malaud, former Secretary of State for Information and one of the few men on the right with the courage of his convictions; and *Le terreau de la liberté*, by Jacques Médecin, erstwhile Secretary of Tourism, deputy, and mayor of Nice.

When Poniatowski's book came out, the press, with respectful astonishment, noted the author's broad knowledge of biology and sociobiology. This was not a competence necessarily to be expected of Inspectors of Finances, of whose highly respectable corps Michel Poniatowski was once a member, as was, indeed, the President of the Republic. Astonishment of a different sort was sparked later by the realization that Philippe Malaud and Jean Médecin were dipping into the same sources, and that all three were referring to the books of Konrad Lorenz and Georges Dumézil—so misinterpreting them that, in the case of Dumézil, Claude Lévi-Strauss had to make mention of the fact in his speech on the occasion of Dumézil's election to the French Academy.

In addition to the Club de l'Horloge, which is intended to enable the new right to penetrate the upper administrative and policy-making echelons of the government, GRECE has founded the Club Nation-Armée. This organization publishes an expensive monthly magazine as a part of its officially self-assigned purpose of "ensuring better liaison and greater understanding between the nation and those responsible for its defense." In its area, the Club Nation-Armée is supposed to play the same role as the Club de l'Horloge—i.e., gain access to certain milieux, place trusted men "in the decision-making spheres." The Club Nation-Armée maintains close contact with reserve officer and NCO organizations, except, of course, those of leftist persuasions.

Such are the tenets and strategy of a right about which, patently, nothing is "new" apart from its name. The Comte de Gobineau and Houston Chamberlain would feel quite at home with this neoracism; it can seem new only to people who have forgotten or have never known about events in the '30s. The one difference between the old and the new right is tactical in nature. It is quite safe to say that the old French right was, of them all, the most stupid. But this is not true of the GRECE dogmatists: they are intelligent, well connected, well placed, and they give no indication that they can be pushed to the sidelines, as used to happen with French fascists and royalists. They may reject our "Judeo-Christian" culture, but they are sufficiently steeped in it to be able to talk and write well about it. They also are skillful enough to adopt watchwords that can mislead people. For example, they are against all forms of totalitarianism, they say. Upon examination, you discover that for them the most totalitarian society is the egalitarian, leveling democracy we live in; they demand, of course, in the name of an antitotalitarianism of this brand that the privileges of an elite be confirmed.

In electoral terms, the leaders of the new right amount to nothing, and they do not seek to be anything. As for the influence they can exert in the areas of "culture," government,

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politics, and the military, everything suggests that they will never convert anyone to their views who does not already share them. For 35 years, whatever else the French extreme right may or may not have done, it has maintained itself at a constant level while experiencing a kind of molecular agitation, its particles in perpetual motion yet always the same (changes of name notwithstanding), its members always jockeying for position. It is obvious that the only chance for these extremist movements lies in their being given an assist from outside (but Franco and Salazar are dead, and the Greek colonels have lost power) or in a profound political crisis that would suddenly push them to the fore.

The new right is not dallying with any such eventualities; it is launched on a long-term effort. Its sole chance for success, which will never be complete but which could be significant, lies in whatever influence it will be able to exert on the traditional—the Gaullist and Giscardian—right. And now that the left is divided, it is plausible to expect that the traditional right will remain in power in France for a long time to come.

Translated by ADRIENNE FOULKE □

Have You Written to Us and Not Gotten an Answer?

• A number of incidents involving tampering with *Dissent* mail (including First Class and Second Class mail) during the months of March and April of this year force us to call this to our readers' attention. These incidents include opening of envelopes and packages, emptying them of their contents, etc. The aim does not appear to be theft, since checks and money orders made out to *Dissent* cannot be cashed, but harassment and sabotage. We have reported these incidents to the postal authorities who are investigating.

• In addition, we have taken various measures to make it more difficult, if not impossible, for such acts to take place in the future. We are determined to protect our right to circulate our magazine legally and without harassment.

• Any reader or subscriber who has not received a response to a letter or request and who wrote in March or April of this year should write to us again and explain the request. We will take care of the matter immediately. Be sure to put a clear return address, and do not send cash under any circumstances. We regret the inconvenience and count upon your cooperation and understanding.

—THE EDITORS

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Catharine R. Stimpson

Neither Dominant Nor Subordinate

The Women's Movement and Contemporary American Culture

To ask about the new feminism and contemporary American culture, I must begin with *Le Deuxieme Sexe*, which Simone de Beauvoir published in France 31 years ago. Joyless but monumental, that book articulated a concept of woman that American feminists, some 15 years later, were to accept as both accurate and appalling: a reality to recognize and repel. The text, a cultural feat, did not create the women's movement, a social and political force. The massive changes in the lives of modern Western woman generated both. But after World War II, in the West, de Beauvoir named "woman." She shaped our collective consciousness of a huge subject. So doing, she helped to incite a cultural force inseparable from feminism. As it grew, it differed from its origins and provoked the attention of an initially negligent larger culture. That development, which few early readers of de Beauvoir might have predicted or desired, is my subject now.

No stranger to dialectical argument, de Beauvoir dismissed some common ways of regarding women: the psychoanalytic, which, at its most pompous, construed the female as a maimed male; the Marxist, which, at its most crass, analyzed women as people whose wrongs would be righted when they entered productive spheres; and the naturalistic, which, at its most vulgar, presumed that biology decreed women to be maternal beings. Ironically, de Beauvoir's thought was partially compatible with habitual assumptions that women were less than men. Her title, *The Second Sex*, projected women as a group universally subordinate to men. They were bodies that had both abandoned their freedom and had it stripped from them. They were the "Other" in an existential struggle for identity between "subjects," who seek the certainties of a stable self and control, and "others," who gratify such longings through submission. Finally, women had not constructed culture. Quiet, quiescent, they were instead the constructs of culture, a collage of contradictory images that reflected man's need to create woman for the sake of creating himself. Later feminist criticism, such as Mary Ellmann's *Thinking About Women* (1968) and Kate Millett's *Sexual Politics* (1970), was to codify those images even more resolutely.

De Beauvoir refused to demean culture or to mock its potent powers. Rather, she assailed man's use of culture as a weapon against women and the painful deprivations and losses this had entailed for them. She barely mentioned Mary Wollstonecraft or Virginia Woolf, whom feminists were later to revere. However, de Beauvoir elaborated on their ideas. Simultaneously, she served as a public precursor for such figures as Tillie Olsen, and Adrienne Rich who was to become perhaps the most accomplished and daring feminist writer. In 1978, Olsen called her collection of prose about women and culture *Silences*; the next year, Rich titled hers *On Lies, Secrets, and Silence*. In general, de Beauvoir dramatized the reign of men over women as the most persistent of hegemonies, that "complex interlocking of political, social, and cultural force. . . ."[1] Depressing though

[1] Raymond Williams, *Marxism and Literature* (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 108.

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her theories of domination were, de Beauvoir was no fatalist. Her Sartrean ethics alone would forbid such a bleak oversimplification. She asserted that women could become free, responsible, reciprocal, and creative subjects. but first they had to become conscious of their condition. If they did not, they would remain mired in the swamps of secondariness. Thinking about women seriously, de Beauvoir insisted that other women do so, too. In 1949, this was unusual.

In the early 1960s, de Beauvoir's concerns, her sense of women as problematical, became a discernible element of American public consciousness. In 1961 John F. Kennedy appointed a presidential commission on the status of women. In 1963 its report documented sexual inequalities and labeled them discriminatory. In that same year Betty Friedan published *The Feminine Mystique.* Though Friedan only referred to de Beauvoir once, though her language was far more journalistic and snappily accessible, she adapted, reductively, *The Second Sex* to American middle-class life. She described a distasteful commingling of the ideological imperatives of modern femininity, which told women to be attractively domestic, and the demands of a consumer society, which urged women to be competent purchasing agents for their families. Like de Beauvoir, she presented women as manipulable. They were unhappy victims, whose miseries either went unnoticed or were noticed meanly. Nevertheless, they were victims. Later academic studies of women—which sought to explain their low self-esteem, status, and income—called on the concept of socialization, which, far more flagrantly, presumed women to be passive, malleable, receptive to influence, Galateas to battalions of Pygmalions.

In 1963, Mary McCarthy published *The Group* and Sylvia Plath, using the pseudonym of Victoria Lucas, *The Bell Jar.* In 1962, Doris Lessing's *The Golden Notebook* appeared. Together, these books are a cultural reference point. None of their authors was a "total American." Though born in Boston, Plath had a European father. She lived much of her brief adult life in England and died there. McCarthy had traveled widely. A Rhodesian, Lessing had exiled herself to England. Each was evidence for the theory that our best observers participate in more than one culture. In *The Group*, *The Bell Jar*, and *The Golden Notebook*, each observes the new New Women. Both historical reality and cultural emblem, the New Woman, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, assumed that she would have a profession, an education, some autonomy. Grafting the Flapper to her, the new New Woman had social and sexual aspirations as well. However, like her antecedents, the new New Woman finds herself ahead of the society that has produced her, at once attached to and severed from it. Men still have prior claim to the powerful professions; the prestigious educations; a culturally sanctioned, even celebrated, autonomy; and guilt-free sexuality, unless they choose to write about it guiltily.

In such a context, women may go mad. In *The Group*, Kay Petersen finds herself incarcerated in Payne Whitney. In *The Bell Jar*, the suicidal Esther Greenwood is institutionalized, in bad hospitals and good. In *The Golden Notebook*, Anna Wulf has a serious breakdown. They prefigure the feminist accusation that the demands of femininity, which modern psychiatry and medicine enforce, drive women crazy. Harald Petersen, Kay's husband, a man of the theater, a lecherous and sadistic fool, also anticipates the radical feminist conviction that an idiot masculinity and brutality are inseparably bound together. Given such pressures, for the new New Woman to survive at all, let alone honorably, is itself a value.

McCarthy, Plath, and Lessing were frank about female sexuality. They brought to the Anglo-American tradition a French candor, which Colette had lyricized and de Beauvoir had intellectualized. Both dry and impassioned, distrustful of and compelled by the flesh, *The Second Sex* had approved of such quasi-tabooed carnalities as lesbianism and adultery. *The Group* described the purchase of a diaphragm; *The Bell Jar* a bloody loss of virginity; *The Golden Notebook* the insertion of a tampon. Ironically, the discussion of

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female sexuality was to become far more pervasively open in America than in France. Feminists were to talk publicly about the bodies with which they were so intimate, and yet from which they often felt so alienated. They were, however, to dislike pornography. Many were to interpret it as a lewd exploitation of women that arouses as much thanatos as eros, as much aggression as lust. They were also to suspect the sexual revolution as a self-congratulatory substitution of physical release for social change.

The Group and *The Bell Jar* were also stringently antiromantic. Esther's first glimpse of her boy friend's genitals is neither an initiation into terror, nor an introduction to the awesome glamour of the phallus, nor the match for a blaze of passionate love. She sees "turkey neck and turkey gizzards" and gets "very depressed." McCarthy did give one figure a romantic gloss: Elinor Eastlake, a beautiful, intelligent, politically wise lesbian. Her praise of Lakey helped to transvalue the figure of the stigmatized, sorrowful female homosexual. Shocking though it was to some, it has proved less controversial than Lessing's treatment of heterosexuality in *The Golden Notebook*. In a famous scene, Anna Wulf broods about the difference between her clitoral and her vaginal orgasms, which she prefers. Anna's meditations were disturbing because this new New Woman seemed to endorse both psychoanalytical notions of femininity and older beliefs that female sexuality obeys the laws of nature, not the influence of history. Complex enough in itself, the quarrel about the origins of female sexuality has been only one aspect of the still vital argument about the causes, the extent, and the permanence of the differences between female and male, feminine and masculine. Do they reflect the rule of nature, and thereby partake of the immutable, or do they reflect the law of culture, and thereby partake of the mutable? In brief, to discuss sexual differentiation is to query the very power of culture.

Paradoxically, the novels that lit up subjects that had been hidden in the shadows of discourse were formally conventional. To be sure, Lessing did complex experiments with fragmented narrative techniques, but she, like McCarthy and Plath, was also a realist.[2] Though a "fictional" rather than a "real" autobiography, *The Bell Jar* was also written in the first person. The mingling of realistic and first-person narratives, common in the 1960s and 1970s, was an immense popular success in Marilyn French's novel, *The Women's Room* (1977). Such techniques were logical strategies for women who assumed that things as they were, publicly and privately, collectively and individually, had never been accurately described. To tell about them now was necessary, but difficult. For the artist must silence internal censors; must nurture indifference to the charge that competence extends only to narrow, trivial "women's issues." Such tasks can absorb energies that might otherwise be allocated to formal innovation.

The legatees of de Beauvoir also believe that things as they are are not things as they ought to be. As a result, moral judgments and utopian dreams often frame the documentation of the world as it is. So Marge Piercy, in *Small Changes* (1973), a severe and serious novel, both tells of Cambridge radicals and offers patterns of heroism for radicals to follow. Without becoming a prisoner of a dogmatic program for the vanguard artist, Marge Piercy also wants art to be of use, to ". . . strain in the mud and the muck to move things forward . . . ."[3] That impulse to reach out toward an audience, to offer it judgments and dreams, helps to create an accessible, at least partially familiar, cultural landscape.

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[2] Realism in writing has a parallel in simplicity in dress. Such costumes as pants or T-shirts, which have also been witty sources of slogans, are functional, i.e, they are cheap, comfortable, easy to care for. They also signify a commitment to the straightforward, a desire to abolish discrepancies between the real person and the mask of contrived appearance, and a rebellion against the ideology of the feminine that values woman primarily as beautiful object.

[3] Marge Piercy, "To Be of Use," in *To Be of Use: Poems* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1973), p. 49. To be accurate, Piercy's poem is about life in general as well as culture.

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However, women have not regressively abandoned the avant-garde. The novels of Monique Wittig and Bertha Harris, the prose of Hélène Cixous (insufficiently translated), the plays of Maria Irene Fornes, the poems of Adrienne Rich are sufficient proof of that. In the late 1970s, the most original feminist artists tend to investigate female experience; to wonder, at least, about the possibility of the female style that Virginia Woolf tentatively predicted in *A Room of One's Own*; and to have a sense of cultural history sophisticated enough to permit them to judge what is new, what only spuriously so. They also seem freer from, less anxious about, the destructive pressures of cultural history upon women than a Virginia Woolf or a de Beauvoir, perhaps because Woolf and de Beauvoir, among others, so exhaustively exposed such forces.

During the first Nixon presidency, but particularly between 1970 and 1972, the cultural element that McCarthy, Plath, and Lessing represent became a cultural movement. The sympathy of national administrations is obviously not a necessary condition for creativity. People began to teach and collect the syllabi of college courses about women. Demonstrators organized to protest the exclusion of women artists from museum shows. The first American edition of *The Bell Jar* was issued. Ti-Grace Atkinson, Phyllis Chesler, Mary Daly, Susan Griffin, Elizabeth Janeway, Juliet Mitchell, Linda Nochlin, Sheila Rowbotham published their first, major, explicitly feminist books or papers. Shulamith Firestone dedicated the *Dialectic of Sex: The Case for Feminist Revolution* (1970) to Simone de Beauvoir, "who endured." Among the influential anthologies were Robin Morgan's *Sisterhood is Powerful* (1970) and Toni Cade's *The Black Woman* (1970).[4]

[4] I have deliberately listed writers and texts without distinguishing among them. Doing so would demand another essay. It would also call for more precise measurements of influence than we now have. For example, Mary Daly's work, particularly in the late 1970s, angers many, who find it unscholarly or hostile. However, it inspires or stimulates others. Exactly who finds it useful, and why, is not really known.

The explosion of consciousness was reflected most often in print, then in the visual and performing arts, and most reluctantly in the mass media. American feminists had ideas about language, especially empirical ones about the relationship between social structure and its use. However, unlike several French feminists later in the decade, they wrote less out of a theoretical commitment to language as the primary force in the design and revelation of human beings and more out of a pragmatic sense of language's flexibility. It was available for ideological, rhetorical, analytical, scholarly, confessional, poetic, and imaginative enterprises. In addition, publishers were more receptive to feminism than gallery owners, national networks, and powerful film producers. Not only were there a significant number of women in publishing, as there are in nearly all institutions sympathetic to women's projects, but feminist texts were not an overwhelming commercial risk. That one's own press is cheaper to run than one's own television studio was also partially responsible for the growth of the women's presses, such as the influential Feminist Press, which became alternatives to established trade houses.

Among the causes for the growth of the new consciousness was the fact that American women, of all races and classes, were sufficiently literate and educated to use public culture to express the changing circumstances of their productive, familial, and private lives. In addition, the political and cultural fervor of the 1960s created, often inadvertently, skepticism about their roles among women, and, more advertently, a climate of opinion that rendered skepticism itself commonplace. Finally, in the 1960s, the American women's movement was reorganized, providing a political skeleton and an audience for cultural activities about women in general and feminism in particular.

In theory and practice, the new feminism consists of several linked movements: radical feminism, which sees man's oppression of women as a central historical event; bourgeois

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feminism, which seeks to eliminate sexual discrimination and sex roles; cultural feminism, which hopes to embody a special, enhancing female sensibility; Marxist feminism, which integrates a class and feminist analysis; black feminism, which organizes the women who must endure both sexism and the racism that white women too often act out; lesbian feminism, which finds central bonds between women.[5] However, they share a special balancing of politics and culture. To varying degrees, each is within a central political tradition. That is, each calls for a redistribution of public power so profound that the structures of power themselves will alter. At the same time, each has a nontraditional interest in the domestic, the psychological, and the cultural, in its most inclusive sense. Each reasons correctly that the domestic, the psychological, and the cultural have harnessed and reined women in. To care about them becomes a political necessity.

Predictably, then, attacks on feminists take cultural forms. Conservatives accuse them of destroying values. They say feminists encourage filthy language, sap family morality, blaspheme God, mock the righteous power of the instincts. Liberals wonder if feminists are intellectually up to snuff. They say feminists ignore history, indulge in polemics, argue illogically, respond primly to an analysis of sex, lack respect for academic excellence. Culture, broadly defined, became as great a battlefield as politics, narrowly defined, for a second reason as well. Feminists or not, women have had more cultural than political prestige and power; more cultural than political presence; more cultural than political history. Any change, any growth in their lives would perhaps register more quickly in culture than in politics.

Amidst all this, de Beauvoir's demand that women become actively conscious of their condition has persisted. In America two terms, two metaphors, came to represent such a process. The first, "awakening," arose from Protestantism; a version of Sleeping Beauty in which the Prince is absent; Ibsen's *When We Dead Awaken*; and Kate Chopin's now-rediscovered novel, *The Awakening*, which she first published in 1899, a year before Ibsen's play. In 1971, in a famous lecture, Adrienne Rich said:

> . . .This awakening of dead or sleeping consciousness has already affected the lives of millions of women, even those who don't know it yet. It is also affecting the lives of men. . . .
>
> Re-vision --the act of looking back, of seeing with fresh eyes, of entering an old text from a new critical direction --is for women more than a chapter in cultural history; it is an act of survival.[6]

The "awakening" is the first stage of the "quest" or "journey" or "voyage" toward a new life. However, the end of the quest, its fulfillment, has differed. For some, psychic autonomy and moral sensitivity suffice. In a recent play, for example, its script taken from a number of diaries, letters, and journals, the final chorus begins:

> (Alternating) We must make the voyage of life alone.
> It matters not whether the solitary voyager be a man or a woman.
> We come into the world alone, unlike all who have gone before us:
> we leave it alone under circumstances peculiar to ourselves.[7]

For others, the questor must also try to reground the self within a just community. For both groups, Martha Quest, the protagonist of Doris Lessing's five-volume

[5] Fuller accounts of the new feminism are Judith Hole and Ellen Levine, *The Rebirth of Feminism* (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1971); Gayle Graham Yates, *What Women Want: The Ideas of the Movement* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975).

[6] Adrienne Rich, "When We Dead Awaken: Writing as Re-vision (1971)," in *On Lies, Secrets, and Silence: Selected Prose 1966-1978* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1979), pp. 34, 35.

[7] *Out of Our Father's House*, arranged for the stage by Eve Merriam, Paula Wagner, and Jack Hofsiss, in *The New Women's Theatre: Ten Plays by Contemporary American Women*, ed. and Introduction by Honor Moore (New York: Random House, Vintage Books, 1977), p. 537. The title is one of several references to the act of leaving home, as Ibsen's Nora did, both for its own sake and as a symbol of rebellion against women's role. "Out of" then becomes a pun, referring to sources and to sites that are abandoned.

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series *The Children of Violence*, which Lessing started issuing in the 1950s, had become a symbolic figure. Because Martha alters drastically during the novels, from a confused adolescent, to a wartime radical in a colonial country, to an explorer of "universal mind," to a member of a remnant community in a postapocalyptic world, various aspects of her appeal to dissimilar groups: feminist existentialists; political radicals; theologians engaged upon spiritual, even occult, quests.

However, de Beauvoir's theories were also diluted or transformed. The increasing self-confidence of feminists alone would have made this inevitable. In 1971, a paperback publisher reissued Mary Beard's *Woman as Force in History*, which symbolized the development of another body of theory. Beard argued against:

> . . . a "myth" of female subjection in history . . . against feminists who have adopted and propagated the myth . . . against historians—mostly male—who have contributed to the myth . . . . [8]

Simultaneously, scholars, excavating women's history, were replacing the dimness that de Beauvoir saw in the past with a rich record of achievement and endurance. They found, re-found, and reinterpreted women's literature and art. Among the writers they praised were Charlotte Perkins Gilman, a feminist theoretician also badly treated for mental illness; Zora Neale Hurston, a black; Anzia Yezierska, a Jewish immigrant; Agnes Smedley, a radical of working-class origins; Gertrude Stein, a lesbian. Without always being credited, other postmodern forces were congenial to the reassessment of cultural traditions. They include American studies and the new social history, which call for scrupulous attention to ordinary life; and the reevaluation of and challenge to received notions of what a work of art is, which expands indefinitely the catalogue of possible art objects. Such movements, with the fresh interest of women in the works of other women, have led to the exploration of domestic artifacts: quilts, letters, diaries, lullabyes, gardens. They have stimulated, too, the study of women's contributions to mass culture, particularly the popular novel.

Several questions haunt such inquiries. Does a separate women's culture exist? If so, did women create it for themselves, for others, or for both? How dependent has it been upon the dominant culture? How influential? What are its special characteristics? How might they relate to women's privileged, but cursed, biological identity? How might women's culture mediate between individuals and the subordinate status they so often had to accept? To take a particular case, how might a reader, female or male, interpret the Mary Wilkins Freeman story, "The Revolt of 'Mother' "? In this story, Sarah is married for 40 years to a flinty farmer. He has consistently refused to build her the house she needs. While he is away, she occupies a new barn he has put up and claims it as her home. Defeated, he accepts her rebellious act of will, while she, "overcome by her own triumph," buries her face in her apron.[9] Is Freeman calling upon long-suffering wives to become guerrilla warriors? Describing a frequent domestic revolt? Offering a cathartic story about a woman who refuses to go along with a man who has gone too far?

For some, the process of reclaiming history has been inseparable from the conscious or unconscious production of myth. Because of its openness, prehistory has been an ample field in which to erect altars of legend. With the aid of 19th-century anthropology, some assert that matriarchies once existed, but the

[8] Berenice A. Carroll, "Mary Beard's *Woman as Force in History*: A Critique," in *Woman: An Issue*, Lee R. Edwards, Mary Heath, and Lisa Baskin, eds. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972), p. 127.

[9] In *American Voices, American Women*, ed. and Introduction by Lee R. Edwards and Arlyn Diamond (New York: Avon, 1973), p. 180. The collection is dedicated to Tillie Olsen. Another cultural event of the early 1960s was the publication of Olsen's *Tell Me a Riddle*, an interwoven collection of four stories that lyrically articulated the experience of working-class women and their families (in 1971, it came out in paperback, too). Olsen was also instrumental in having works by and about working-class women recovered, reprinted, and taught.

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development of patriarchal structures and private property banished them. For others, matriarchies were centers for worship of a goddess who was hideously hurt, but whom radical feminists might now resurrect. A visionary polymath, Mary Daly writes of:

> . . . the murder/dismemberment of the Goddess—that is, the self-affirming be-ing of women . . . . Our refusal to collaborate in this killing and dismembering of our own Selves is the beginning of re-membering the Goddess—the deep source of creative integrity in women.[10]

Still others, who may not accept the reality of prehistoric matriarchies, also search for spiritual domains in which one can apprehend the goddess or goddesses, animating female beings who sustain women. Such mysticism, especially when it construes divinities as maternal, floats toward Jungian beliefs, which implore materialistic Westerners to recall the psychic anima, a female principle that both women and men supposedly possess, and to call on The Feminine, the exalted Great Mother.

The larger process of which these religious impulses are a part is an intensifying concern for women's worlds. Men may be absent from them, peripheral to them, or harmless within them. This approving interest—generally absent in de Beauvoir, carefully or ironically treated in McCarthy, Plath, and Lessing—is robustly present in the women's culture of the 1970s. In psychology, it appears in the new fascination with mother-daughter bonds; in criticism, in the search for a woman's language or imagery or style; in history, in the study of women's institutions and rituals; in sexuality, in the increasing admission and approbation of lesbianism. However, it must coexist with the desire for a world in which gender distinctions between "feminine" and "masculine" have disappeared, in which sex distinctions between "female" and "male" are minimal, but in which men and women are together. A clear extension of the American ideological commitment to equality, this longing expresses itself in the promises of less radical feminists; in the idealization of the figure of the androgyne; and in the science fiction of such writers as Ursula LeGuin. In *The Left Hand of Darkness* (1969), for example, she dramatizes a planet of "ambisexuals," creatures capable of being both male and female, of impregnating or of bearing children.

The adherents of both sorts of worlds have insisted upon finding value in "feminine" characteristics the dominant culture had labeled as liabilities. On Halloween 1968, demonstrators cheerfully claimed to be witches who hexed the patriarchs. With raucous irony, a later writer exhorted her readers:

> . . . join ugly lib. Give uglies a chance. Demand that your school hire at least 65 percent ugly teachers . . . . Demand ugly stewardesses, ugly waitresses, ugly bartenders, ugly movie stars . . . .[11]

To applaud what women have feared serves the liberating psychic purpose that the discharge of any taboo does. Done collectively during the past several years, it has become both an event and a symptom—of modern women's growing freedom from economic dependence on men and on certain systems of control; of the evolution of cultural patterns that feminists have primarily fabricated.

In the 1950s and 1960s, despite the attention received by individual books such as *The Feminine Mystique*, commentators tended to ignore or ridicule those patterns. As they became more prominent, between 1968 and 1972, they excited far more notice, largely but not only among women. Culturally, as well as politically, feminism assumed suf-

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[10] *Gyn/Ecology: The Metaethics of Radical Feminism* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1978), p. 109. Daly is a spirited example of the use of and change of de Beauvoir. She accepts the image of woman as victim of man, though she is more sardonic and angry than de Beauvoir. She also transvalues the received image of the female. She calls on "Hags," "Spinsters," and "Crone" to "spin," a traditional women's activity, and to undergo a processional journey through patriarchal murder and sadism to a new female time/space.

[11] Barbara Stanford, "Ugly Lib," in *On Being Female*, Barbara Stanford, ed. (New York: Washington Square Press, Pocket Books, 1974), p. 39.

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ficient weight and sensitivity to compel people to take a stand on it. Some declared that they were feminists whose feminism influenced their work; others that they were feminists who separated their politics and their work. Still others expressed inconsistent, even erratic and eccentric responses to feminism, but they granted the subject of women a fresh respect and gravity. Still others said they were *people*, to whom femaleness, femininity, and feminism were of little relevance. Still others announced that femininity was a boon; feminism—in politics, in culture—abysmal.

During the 1970s, the first three groups were to grow in number, the fourth to diminish, and the fifth to nurture patterns of resistance that lack the blank simplicity of a stone wall. Some of this seems pathological, the sign of a gynephobia that seeks to erase women, or, failing that, to belittle them. Some, like the advice manuals to total women, is either blatantly allied to conservative causes, or commercially exploitative, or an effort to reconcile less threatening aspects of change with conventional domesticity. Some, from people with reputations for sophistication, claim the didactic privilege of exposing feminist error. In 1971, in *The Prisoner of Sex*, Norman Mailer fulsomely begged women not "to quit the womb." He had once reviewed *The Group*, and found it cowardly. In 1972, in *The New Chastity and Other Arguments Against Women's Liberation*, Midge Decter performed a traditional role: that of the woman who scolds other women. She accused feminists of being infantile, fretful life-deniers. Simultaneously, in the *New York Times Book Review*, Joan Didion more or less concurred. Her fastidious disdain symbolized a rough, ideological asymmetry between women who wrote about women and the feminists who did so. Ironically, feminists had assisted in the canonization of Didion's novel *Play it As It Lays* (1970) as an impeccable anatomy of the diceyness of modern woman's free-wheeling existence.

A common theme of such protests to feminism and its works, despite their incompatabilities, is the fear that women might abandon their "femaleness," a biological condition granted a dark, inherent, unyielding power that immerses woman in the coils of the erotic, the fecund, and the maternal. Figures like Decter are sadly thin and predictable. Because their ideas about sex and gender are ill-formed, or stale, they must feed for novelty upon the texts they distrust and despise. They pass off a publicity-fond parasitism as critical theory, a grumpily hysterical conservatism as sober wisdom. However, a more complex relationship between the culture of feminism and the dominant culture has also emerged. It both accepts and diffuses the de Beauvoir tradition. In multiple ways, it balances sympathy and skepticism, affirmation of the new and deference to the old. In *Fear of Flying* (1973), for example, Erica Jong offered passages of sharp feminist criticism and flights of ebullient heterosexuality that a reader who might recoil from de Beauvoir would devour. Isadora Wing was like a female Tom Jones who had been in a consciousness-raising group. In the media, pictures of an "attractive" Gloria Steinem in her aviator glasses now flash against those of a "disruptive" Kate Millett in her dark-rimmed glasses, one a spectacular icon of legitimate protest, the other of deviancy.

A textbook example of the expropriation of the culture de Beauvoir abetted and its integration into the culture-at-large is *The World According to Garp* (1978). In part, its critical and commercial success is due to the capital craftiness with which John Irving took enough from feminism to meet some needs, and rejected enough to satisfy others. Within the novel, his filter is that quotidian figure from the traditional novel of growing up: a son. Garp has a feminist mother, whom the son loves. However, Jenny Fields is an "accidental" feminist who remains a compellingly sturdy mother for her family and friends. Garp happily takes care of his home while his wife works. He is also a wonderfully benign and anxious father. As feminists have demanded that the ambiguities of motherhood be a public question, men, and some women, have answered that the

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poignancies of fatherhood must be studied, too. Paternity has called for equal time. Garp encourages women to write. Yet, his voice gives birth to theirs within the text. Garp approves of much of the feminist analysis and recoils from the vicious excesses of male sexuality. He also permits difference. One of his good friends is a transsexual. However, Garp loathes what he thinks to be the vicious excesses of feminists. Indeed, a crazy feminist assassinates him. Finally, Garp's vision sees people as "terminal cases." Irving manipulates 20th-century absurdism, the metaphor of existence as a disease, and black humor, the laughter that lacerates as it ceases to amuse. They all scour the promises of any politics, totalitarian or anarchist, patriarchal or feminist.

Simone de Beauvoir is now an old woman. She speaks fondly of *Le Deuxième Sexe*. She should. It has been revised, but it retains its integrity and power and the massiveness that inspires revisions. Clearly, in its aftermath, cultural tasks remain. We need a narrative about a woman, living alone with her children, who works for a large corporation, as a clerk, or on an assembly line, who then sues that company because she has been insulted or deprived. If the modernization of women persists, and if women continue to name their own experience, such acts of imaginative representation will occur. The dominant culture—more John Irvings—will absorb the more comfortable, manageable, and stylish features of such writings, but it will balk stubbornly at visions of pleasant, female worlds, culture's equivalent of the political inability to legalize sexual equality in the Constitution. However, an audience adequate enough to underwrite these visions will continue to sustain them. To assume that my prophecy is plausible one must also assume, as de Beauvoir does, that women can be generative; that they have the brains, courage, and imagination to serve as a matrix of culture, not simply as its captives and imitators. It is a sad sign of women's subordination, even in America, that such an assumption cannot today claim an easy dominance. □

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Roy Medvedev

Khrushchev in Retirement

On October 2, 1964, shortly after his meeting with Sukarno, Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev flew south for a holiday, which he spent in his newly built *daçha* not far from Sochi. The *daçha* was a real palace: its indoor swimming pools were inlaid with marble brought from Italy. A high concrete wall, almost 2 km long, hid this most costly of all government *daçhas* from the vulgar gaze of ordinary vacationers.

Khrushchev, however, did not feel the slightest bit ill or tired. He was full of energy and a thirst for work. Even on holiday he carried on receiving many government officials from West and East who were visiting the U.S.S.R., in particular parliamentary delegations from Japan and Pakistan. Also present at these meetings was the chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, A. I. Mikoyan, who was also on holiday near Sochi at the time. October 12 was a particularly intensive day. The first three cosmonauts in history took off from earth in their space ship. The flight controllers were in constant telephone communication with Khrushchev, informing him of what was happening at the cosmodrome. When the space ship completed its third orbit, Khrushchev and Mikoyan linked up with the cosmonauts by radiotelephone and congratulated them on their success. In his jubilation and excitement Khrushchev did not notice that all the other telephones in his residence had stopped working and that all his links with the outside world had been cut off. That day in the Kremlin a session of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU had begun, in which Suslov and Shelyepin proposed the immediate removal of Khrushchev from all his posts.

On the evening of October 12 Khrushchev entertained French Minister of State A. Palevsky in his *daçha*. France was getting ready for its presidential elections, and everyone was asking whether de Gaulle would stand for a new term, and Khrushchev asked the French Minister, whom he considered to be a close friend of de Gaulle. Palevsky gave an evasive answer, but Khrushchev interrupted him, saying he was firmly convinced that de Gaulle was bound to stand. "A real politician," he said, "always fights for his power to the very end."

Khrushchev invited Palevsky to visit him on the following morning. However, the next day this meeting was suddenly canceled without any explanation. The three Soviet cosmonauts, who had just landed in the Kazakh steppe on the morning of October 13, were also at a loss to understand what had happened. They telephoned Khrushchev, but no one came to the phone. The flight controllers were baffled. For a long time they could not even get through to the Kremlin. All the government phones in Moscow were disconnected. Only a few hours later were the cosmonauts called to the telephone and hastily congratulated on the successful completion of their flight by Leonid Brezhnev. When asked about Khrushchev, Brezhnev at first did not answer, but then, after a moment's silence, he said: "Krushchev is up in the air." This was quite true. At that very moment, after coarse and harsh altercations with Brezhnev and Malinovsky, Khrushchev

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flew off to Moscow to take part in the session of the Presidium and Plenum of the Central Committee, which for the first time in ten years had been called without his knowledge and consent.

The Kremlin was completely cut off, and only A. I. Mikoyan drove out to the government airport for a short time to meet President O. Dortikos of Cuba, who was on a visit to Moscow. However, by October 14 many people began to guess that something important was going on. So, for example, early that morning, all the printing presses in the Soviet Union were stopped. Thousands of censors and editors went carefully through the papers, journals, and books, striking out of all manuscripts and proofs any reference to the "great Leninist" and "fighter for peace," N. S. Khrushchev. Thousands of tons of printed books and journals were held back in warehouses and then sent off to be pulped. On the morning of October 15 all the Moscow papers came out without a single reference to Khrushchev, whose name had previously cropped up dozens of times in almost every issue of any Soviet newspaper.

The reason for this silence became clear only toward the evening of October15, when the editors of all newspapers received a short official communique about the Plenum of the Central Committee that had taken place in the Kremlin. The communique said that the Plenum had acceded to the request of N. S. Khrushchev to be relieved of his duties as First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. "owing to his advancing years and deteriorating state of health." And so, completely unexpectedly, both for the Soviet people and for political observers all over the world, the most powerful of all Soviet leaders was sent into retirement—the man whose power by the autumn of 1964 was as limitless as only Stalin's had been in the past.

At the session of the Presidium of the Central Committee, Khrushchev fought his accusers with fury and crudity. But in the plenary session of the Central Committee he kept his silence, not replying to Suslov's speech or to the many hostile comments from the floor. Immediately after the meeting he went to his residential *dacha* on the outskirts of Moscow, where almost all his closest relatives had gathered.

In 1953, when he had settled down in Moscow, Nikita Sergeevich moved into a big comfortable house in Usovo, which had at one time been a landowner's estate. But this house was not to his liking. To begin with, he had the superb friezes stripped from the ceiling. Then after Molotov's fall from power, he moved into the *daçha* that had belonged to the Molotov family—a large, but extremely tastelessly designed house. Khrushchev also had a small private residence near Metrostroyevsky Street, but later he and his family occupied one of the private houses in the region of Michurinsky Avenue. This was a whole neighborhood of private government houses, surrounded by a high wall, which Muscovites ironically called "the collective farm" or "The Road to Communism."

In the first weeks of his retirement Khrushchev was in a state of nervous shock. In spite of his 70 years, he was a man of vast energy and an iron constitution, and he had never worked so hard as in the years 1953-64. As a rule, his workday had 14-16 hours. He visited almost all the countries of the world, and made several tours of the entire Soviet Union. He concerned himself not only with questions of foreign policy, industry, and agriculture, but also with literature, art, science; the military; construction; party affairs; questions of the people's education; space flights; trade; and state security. Full of innumerable plans, he wanted to see everything, and hardly a week passed when Khrushchev did not undertake some routine reform or reorganization. The failure of these hasty and ill-considered reforms exasperated him. Gradually he grew more and more harsh and uncouth and, in time, any argument would provoke him to outbursts of ungovernable rage. The sensation of limitless power prevented him from understanding things as they really were and from taking the right

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decisions. And suddenly, like a horseman or, I should say, like a tank that is racing forward full throttle, he had been stopped short and thrown out of political life by his very own aides and subordinates, who recently had been so subservient to him.

Khrushchev was lost and did not conceal it. The man who not so long ago had been an almighty dictator now sat for hours immobile in his chair. He could not hold back the tears. When a teacher in one of the Moscow schools where Khrushchev's grandson studied asked, "What does Nikita Sergeevich do now?" the boy answered, "Grandfather is always crying."

However, Khrushchev was too strong a personality to remain inactive for long. Gradually he became more like his old self again. He began reading the newspapers and asking his children and grandchildren about the changes that had taken place in the wake of his retirement. Most of these he viewed with morbid hostility. In November 1964, the Plenum of the Central Committee reversed one of Khrushchev's most clumsy reforms, which had divided almost all the *oblast* committees in the country into agricultural or industrial ones and had destroyed the rural district committees—the most important link of party control. Khrushchev tried to prove, if only to his family, that he had been right. He reacted much more calmly to the fall of Lysenko's clique, but here he could not count on his family's sympathy. Khrushchev's daughter, Rada, who had for a long time worked as deputy editor-in-chief of the popular journal *Sçiençe and Life*, had tried several times at the end of the '50s to change her father's attitude both to classical genetics and to Lysenko. But Khrushchev, who loved his daughter deeply and respected her learning, was unyielding. When an article appeared in her journal criticizing some of the inept dogmas of the Lysenko school, he was incensed. He called Rada Nikitichna foul names and very nearly drove her from the house. Lysenko had some hypnotic sway over him and remained for him an indisputable authority. Khrushchev would see him any time, take all the members of the Presidium to see him in the Lenin Hills, and fulfill his every request. Only now, after his retirement, did suspicion set in, although Khrushchev avoided talking about Lysenko and concealed his disappointment with him.

In the first months no one except his family visited Khrushchev. His fall was greeted with surprising calm, you could even say, with some relief. Everyone was tired of the endless reorganization. However, in many countries in the West and in several Communist parties Khrushchev continued to be a popular figure. Some of the government officials and leaders of Communist parties who came to Moscow expressed their desire to meet him. They were usually told that he was ill, but this could not be repeated endlessly. Somehow the question of a lasting arrangement for the retired Premier had to be resolved. It was decided to give Khrushchev and his family one of the "remote" *daçhas* that had previously belonged to Stalin. He was assigned a personal pension of 1,200 roubles, a series of privileges, and a perpetual security guard. Brezhnev telephoned him and invited him to the Central Committee of the CPSU to discuss the question of his "everyday living arrangements," but Khrushchev was still in a state of excessive excitement and did not want to speak with any of the new leaders. For this reason he categorically refused to go to Moscow. As a result, the preliminary decision about N. S. Khrushchev's living arrangements was changed. Early in 1965 it was suggested that he vacate Molotov's house, and not far from the village of Petrovo-Dal'nyeye . . . a more modest *daçha* was set aside for him. Of course, this fell far short of Khrushchev's previous residences, but it had an important advantage for Nikita Sergeevich: a large plot of land.

The entire *daçha* section of Petrovo-Dal'nyeye was surrounded by a high fence, but the entrance gate was usually guarded by elderly attendants, who could be evaded without much difficulty. For this reason Khrushchev's new living quarters were surrounded by yet another high fence. A small subdivision of MVD-KGB troops were detailed to guard the ex-Premier. A few

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people kept a round-the-clock watch on his house and also accompanied him in walks.

However, these people did not interfere in his life. It was rather a tedious job for them. Khrushchev was assigned a personal pension of 400 roubles a month, which is not much, considering his recent position in the government—the manager of a medium-sized firm or the head of a laboratory in a scientific institute would get approximately the same. Khrushchev reserved the right to use the medical services of the Kremlin hospital and draw special rations. Apart from the *daçha*, N. S. Khrushchev and his wife, Nina Petrovna, were allocated a flat in Moscow. A lover of long walks, Khrushchev requested that he be given a flat in the new blocks on the Lenin Hills. However, they gave him a flat in one of the quarters of old Moscow. Khrushchev did not like this flat. He sometimes came to Moscow on business, but over a period of years he never once spent the night in his town apartment.

Khrushchev no longer contemplated a return to power. However, he continued to bemoan the power he had lost, indignant with the people who had recently been his allies, many of whom had been promoted to leading positions thanks to him alone. As he vented his indignation at Shelyepin, Khrushchev deeply regretted that he had personally removed the former Chairman of the KGB, I. Serov, from his job and sent him to Kazakhstan. Of course the man was implicated in many of the criminal acts of the Stalinist period. It was Serov, for example, who had organized the resettlement of many of the peoples of the Northern Caucasus. And in 1945 he had taken a large number of valuables out of conquered Germany for his own use. But who was not implicated in all these crimes to some degree or another? Had not Khrushchev himself played a part in the repressions in the Ukraine and in Moscow? But in a personal sense Serov had been completely devoted to Khrushchev and was prepared to follow his every instruction and order. Was it not Serov, and Zhukov, who had saved Khrushchev and made his power secure during the alarming days of the June Plenum of the Central Committee in 1957? With Serov there, Khrushchev's power had been unshakable. But he, Nikita Sergeevich, had listened to the other members of the Presidium of the Central Committee and replaced Serov with the leader of the Communist Youth Organization, A. Shelyepin, who, as it turned out, had his own dreams of taking Khrushchev's place.

Khrushchev also regretted many of the other things he had done, or had not done—many of which already seemed to be in a different world. He regretted, for example, that he had not completed the rehabilitation of Party members. Of course, he could not remember such remote events as the trials of 1928-31, but very often he thought about the trials of 1936-38. Like many young Communists at the end of the '20s, he had greatly liked N. I. Bukharin and respected A. Rykov. A Special Commission of the Central Committee of the CPSU had long ago told him how all these trials were conducted in Stalin's time: how coercion, threats, and torture would extract clumsy and miraculous "confessions" from the accused. And he had been prepared to rehabilitate almost all of those accused, despite the objections of certain members of the Party leadership. But then Maurice Thorez and Harry Pollit had hurried to Moscow, and begged him to put it off for a while. "After Hungary and the 20th Congress," Thorez said, "our Party lost almost half its members. If Bukharin and Zinoviev are rehabilitated, it will lose the half that's left." Of course, Thorez was not afraid for the party so much as for his own position in it. But Khrushchev listened to him, and sent the detailed conclusions of the Central Committee to the archives.

Khrushchev felt extraordinary regret for the notorious ideological campaigns of 1962-63, which had mostly been directed against a large group of artists and sculptors, and which greatly harmed his reputation, both among the Soviet intelligentsia and abroad. He himself understood very little about the fine arts, and was not interested in paintings or

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sculpture. He had never in his life been to the Tretyakov Gallery, let alone the Russian Museum in Leningrad, or the Pushkin Museum in Moscow. He never visited museums even on his trips abroad. Of course, he knew a few of the most famous paintings, like Repin's *Ivan the Terrible Murders His Son*—but only as reproductions. Now Khrushchev blamed Leonid Ilich, who had been his chief "ideologist" at the start of the '60s, for everything. It was *he* who had persuaded Khrushchev to visit the Manezh during the artists' exhibition. It was *he* who had set him against the group of young artists. "He [Ilich] needed a passport into the Presidium of the Central Committee," Khrushchev said. These regrets troubled Khrushchev so much that he asked his family to invite to the *dacha* some of the artists he had harangued so foully at the Manezh and at later notorious meetings in the Central Committee. And he was greatly touched when Ernst Neizvestny sent him a copy of Dostoyevsky's *Crime and Punishment* with his own original illustrations. It was no coincidence that Khrushchev's son, Sergei, who became a friend of the outstanding sculptor, later asked Neizvestny to make a memorial for his father's grave.

The first two years of life in retirement were the most difficult for Khrushchev, but later he got used to his status as a pensioner and became more and more gregarious. He started going to Moscow more often, sometimes strolling round the streets with his wife (accompanied by a bodyguard of course). He started going to theaters and concerts. This was how he saw M. Shatrov's play *The Bolsheviks*—which was very successful at the end of the '60s—at the Sovremennik Theater. He liked the play and expressed a desire to talk with its author, and with the director of the theater, Efremov. The conversation took place in the director's office. Khrushchev made only one observation—that the meeting of the Sovnarkom (Soviet of People's Commissars) in the play takes place without people like Kamenev and Bukharin. "I wanted to rehabilitate them," Khrushchev said, "but Thorez interfered." Nina Petrovna, Khrushchev's wife, who was once a teacher of political economy and, unlike her husband, not noted for her unorthodox views, began pleading with him to go home.

sHaving a lot of spare time at his disposal, Khrushchev began to read widely. He had a huge personal library, as in the past he used to receive copies of almost all the books that were published in our country. He sometimes used to complain when he met writers that he only had the reports of his ministers and their deputies to read, and messages from foreign heads of state—and even these documents were usually read for him by aides, who marked the salient points. Now he could read for himself. Sometimes Khrushchev watched television. To his family's surprise he started listening to foreign broadcasts in Russian. Almost every evening he would listen to the Voice of America, the BBC, and the *Deutsche Welle*. It was from these broadcasts that he learned about many of the events that were taking place both in our country and abroad, and he would discuss them with his family.

Attempts to rehabilitate Stalin roused his sincere indignation. And he disapproved of the trials of Sinyavsky and Daniel, and followed with sympathy the first signs of the dissident movement, which in its early stages developed largely as a protest against the partial rehabilitation of Stalin, undertaken before the 23rd Congress of the CPSU. Khrushchev spoke fondly of Academician Sakharov, frequently recalling his meetings with him and regretting their sharp conflict in 1964, over Lysenko. His attitude to Solzhenitsyn was different. Only now did Khrushchev read the manuscript of *The First Circle*. He did not like it and said that he would never have allowed it to be published. This was a boundary line that Khrushchev was incapable of crossing. He had become more tolerant, but even now there was no way he could be made into a supporter of pluralism, in political or intellectual life. Yet even now he did not regret having helped the publication of *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* a few years previously. "Perhaps I am abnormal, perhaps we are all abnormal," Khrushchev said, "but Tvardovsky was not

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abnormal. And he told me more than once that this story was a great work of art and that Solzhenitsyn is a great writer." Khrushchev spoke about Tvardovsky a lot, and with great respect; he would read through all the issues of *Novy Mir* with their stories and novels by F. Abramov, V. Tendryakov, C. Aitmatov, and B. Mozhaev. He loved Tvardovsky's poetry—he could understand it. Pasternak he could never understand or accept. He bitterly regretted the savage political campaign that had been waged against Pasternak during the years 1959-60, and yet if on occasion he flicked through Pasternak's verses, he always threw the book down: such poetry was alien to him.

When his relatives told him about the flight of Stalin's daughter Svetlana to the West, Khrushchev could not believe it. He had known Svetlana Alliluyeva for a long time and met her often. For Khrushchev it was very important that, unlike Stalin's son, Vasilii, Svetlana had publicly supported the resolutions of the 20th and 22nd Party Congress and had even spoken on their content herself at one of the Party meetings. "She could not flee the Soviet Union," Khrushchev said. "You have no idea how devoted to Communism she is. This is some sort of provocation." He was very upset, even rude. However, after he had heard the details of Alliluyeva's escape the next day on the Voice of America, he was deeply wounded and shaken. For a few days he could not speak with his family. For him it was a great personal tragedy, and even afterward he did not want to talk about Alliluyeva.

Khrushchev greatly disapproved of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. "They could have done it some other way," he said, "it was a very grave mistake. "When people reminded him of Hungary, Nikita Sergeevich grew annoyed and tried to prove that Hungary was a completely different case; that Hungary had been an enemy of the U.S.S.R. in the war; and that Soviet troops had already been posted there earlier. "And what's more." he added, "in Hungary they really wanted to throw the Communists out of power, while in Czechoslovakia the Communists were firmly in control." The question of whether the Communist party should have its mandate to rule a country renewed by popular will did not arise for him. Khrushchev was very proud of János Kádár and frequently praised him, reflecting that it was he, Khrushchev, who had approved Kádár's rise to power. It must be said, too, that Kádár was the only leader of a Communist country who regularly remembered Khrushchev and sent him greetings on all Soviet holidays.

Khrushchev followed the military conflicts on the Soviet-Chinese border during the years 1969-70 with the greatest unease. He did not trust the Chinese leadership and spoke about it with hostility. He welcomed the first steps toward detente taken in 1969-70. In the past, Khrushchev's foreign policy had not been very consistent, but he was a most sincere supporter of peace—although it was he who had ordered the installation of rockets in Cuba and the building of the Berlin wall. . . .

In the first years of his retirement Khrushchev suffered greatly from loneliness: only his very closest relatives visited him at Petrovo-Dal'nyeye. Gradually, however, the circle of people he met began to widen. Twice he was visited by the poet Yevgeny Yevtushenko. In the years 1961-63 he had had several sharp polemical clashes with Yevtushenko, but Nikita Sergeevich was a forgiving man by nature and he willingly chatted with his guest at some length. The dramatist Shatrov also spent a few hours with him, and Khrushchev talked to him in particular about his desire to write his memoirs. Shatrov was surprised, on the one hand, at Khrushchev's simplicity and common sense and, on the other, at his ignorance of some of the most basic facts of our history and social life.

When he was bored, Khrushchev often started long conversations with his security men. He would mostly tell them about the tragic events of Stalinist times. They were a willing audience. . . .

Khrushchev's family frequently visited the *dacha* at Petrovo Dal'nyeye with their friends,

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and Nikita Sergeevich was glad to talk with them. Once he even had a visit from the popular artist Vladimir Vysotsky. But in all the years of his retirement, however, not one Party or government official could bring himself to visit him. . . .

During the elections to the Supreme Soviet or to local Soviets, Khrushchev went to Moscow. He always voted in the elections of the place where he had a permanent residence permit. The district where Khrushchev was registered as a voter was well known to foreign reporters and, of course, many would go there on election day to ask the ex-Premier some questions. However, he was extremely guarded in his answers and never spoke out in criticism of the people who had removed him from the helm of power. He also avoided this subject in conversations with his rare visitors, and even kept off it in his memoirs. . . .

With the years, Khrushchev became more critical both of himself and of his work. He would admit many of his past mistakes, to himself and to those closest to him. Of course, here too there was a limit. Many criticisms he answered firmly by saying that a Communist was bound to act the way he had acted and that he would die a Communist. But some criticisms were abnormally painful to him. Thus he always got very upset when he heard or read that he, Khrushchev, was anti-Semitic. He tried to prove that he had never been anti-Semitic, and would point to his friendships with some of the Jews who had worked in his Administration. Though, as with much else, Khrushchev involuntarily embroidered upon his own role, it is true that he did wipe out many of the crimes of Stalin's racist policies during his years of power.

You could call the '60s the decade of the memoir in the history of our country. Almost every military or government figure who was no longer in office—and even some who still were—was writing his memoirs. Prominent figures from Stalinist times were also engaged in that task: Molotov, Kaganovich, Poskrebyshev, Zverev. The desire to leave his memoirs to his contemporaries and descendants increasingly obsessed Nikita Sergeevich too. He had never liked writing anything down himself: you can find a lot of spelling mistakes even in the resolutions he entered in important state documents. But he was a fairly experienced orator and conversationalist—he was not one of those politicians who cannot give even a small speech without notes and the help of a whole staff of speech writers. Khrushchev sent a request to the Central Committee to give him a secretary-cum-typist. The request was considered and turned down. But he was not one to back down in circumstances like these. The time has not yet come to describe just how his book of memoirs was written, but the appearance of the first volume was not only a sensation in the West, it also came as a great surprise to the Soviet Politburo. It was a surprise for Krushchev, too.

Khrushchev's book was quickly declared a "forgery" by our press, but, for the first time since 1964, the Soviet people saw a reference to his name in the papers. He was summoned to the Central Committee of the CPSU, made to come, and invited to talk with Chairman of the Committee of Party Control and member of the Politburo Arvid Pel'she. The conversation was fairly direct. Khrushchev there and then wrote a short statement that was published the following day in the papers. He utterly denied handing over his memoirs to any foreign publishing house and condemned their publication. But he did not deny that they existed. He refused to accede to Pel'she's request and call his memoirs "forgeries." Pel'she was the most senior member of the Politburo in age. He owed his rise in the Party hierarchy more to M. Suslov than to Khrushchev, and as early as 1941 Pel'she had become the secretary of the Central Committee of Latvia. Nikita Sergeevich was upset by his conversation with him, and eye witnesses told me that he came out of Pel'she's office clutching his chest. However, he was driven to absolute fury by his talk with Secretary of the Central Committee and member of the Politburo Andrei Kirillenko. Once the secretary of one of the *oblast* Party committees in the Ukraine, Kirillenko owed

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his position to Khrushchev. In 1938, when Khrushchev became leader of the Central Committee of the Ukraine and quickly started moving new people into Party work, the 30-year-old Kirillenko, who had just graduated from an institute and was working as an ordinary engineer, was drawn into responsible Party work. At that time he had also grown close to Brezhnev, particularly during their joint work on the Zaporozhskii *oblast* committee, though Brezhnev's influence at that time was still not too significant. When Khrushchev had insisted on a change of leadership in the Sverdlovsk *oblast* Party Committee, incensed by what he saw there during his first major tour of the country, he had recommended Kirillenko for the post of First Secretary. On Khrushchev's nomination, Kirillenko was soon elected a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU. And now it was this selfsame Kirillenko who was raining torrents of the foulest abuse on him. True, he got as good as he gave: "You still live too well," Kirillenko said. "Right," said Khrushchev, "you can take away the *daçha* and my pension. I could go round the country with outstretched hands and they would give me something. But they wouldn't give *you* anything if you ever stuck your hand out."

The day after this meeting Khrushchev had his first heart attack, and spent several months in the hospital. He came out in the autumn of 1970, but his health was undermined and soon he had to go back to the hospital. He himself began to realize that the end was near. On the afternoon of September 11, 1971, Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev died.

Rumors of his sudden demise had begun to spread during the years when he was in office—at the peak of his popularity and power. Once a report of his death was even published in the foreign press. The next day Khrushchev invited newsmen to come and see him and said jokingly: "When I am going to die, I will tell you at a press conference." But even his wife and children could not tell their friends straightaway about his death. Foreign reporters heard about it from Victor Louis, the journalist with the reputation of being closest to the authorities, who has frequently carried out extremely "delicate," or extremely dubious, tasks. However, the Soviet people knew nothing of Khrushchev's death on the evening of September 11. Only on the morning of September 13, the day of his funeral, did a brief announcement appear in *Pravda* of the death, at 78 years of age, of "the former First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and holder of a personal pension, N. S. Khrushchev." The time and place of his funeral were not reported.

As we know, Khrushchev's funeral took place on September 13, 1971 in Novodevichy cemetery in the presence of his nearest relatives and a small circle of friends. A wreath from the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. was laid on his grave, but none of the leaders of the Party or of the government was present at the hasty ceremony. The whole area round Novodevichy cemetery was cordoned off and no one was allowed in that day. An exception was made only for a few diplomats and foreign journalists.

Nikita Sergeevich lost his popularity while still in office, and during the years of his enforced retirement there was not one group in the country that would have wished to see him back in power. During this period he essentially ceased to be a politically significant presence. But in the last ten years interest in his personality and politics has been growing continually. There is also a growing awareness of the significance of that radical turnabout in the policies of the Soviet Union and the world Communist movement, which is still connected with Khrushchev's name. He was an unusual man. He truly was a rough diamond, in whom native wit combined with dire lack of education, goodness with cruelty, simplicity with cunning. Khrushchev was a man with exceptional strength of will and courage, he was noted for his independent outlook, he was not afraid of taking bold or risky decisions. Yet with all this he very often fell under the influence of unscrupulous, self-seeking people—and when he fired a bad civil servant or bureaucrat he would very often replace him with a far worse one.

Translated by MARJORIE FARQUHARSON □

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Church and Democracy in Poland: Two Views

I. Leszek Kolakowski

For a number of historical reasons, religious and national identity in Poland have over a long period become almost indistinguishable; nowhere else has the convergence been so strong (with the possible exception of Ireland). Since the definitive triumph of the Counter-Reformation in the 17th century, the Roman Church has enjoyed a virtually monopolistic position among ethnic Poles; the Lutheran and Calvinist communities have been reduced to tiny minorities (in the 16th century, Calvinism was well-established among the nobility); sectarian movements have not achieved any significant size; and Judaism has not become a spiritual rival to the Church as its influence was felt in a different social milieu. There were, of course, sceptics, atheists, anticlericals, freemasons and freethinkers, chiefly among the educated classes, and they grew in number. Yet until the second half of the 19th century Polish culture was emphatically Catholic. To be sure, some of the outstanding writers who in the 19th century contributed decisively to shaping the "Polish spirit" could not—by any standards—be counted among ultramontanist bigots: some were philosophically highly unorthodox, and anti-Roman or anticlerical views were by no means exceptional in their writings. Yet the profoundly Christian inspiration of their thought was undeniable and their work hardly affected the Catholic loyalty and fidelity of the faithful.

An erosion of faith was slowly taking place, however, among the Polish intelligentsia in the last decades of the 19th century, supported and stimulated by the social and intellectual forces that were operating all over Europe in the wake of growing urbanization and industrialization. The general spirit of the Enlightenment, positivism, and enthusiasm for science, combined with the idea of social progress and the secularization of morals inspired attacks on the Church for its obscurantism, parochialism, and enmity to human advancement. These attacks were part of the well-known patterns of conflict that were then tearing at the traditions in the Christian parts of the world. However, radical movements, socialist and agrarian, although often strongly anticlerical, could hardly be called anti-Christian, and the mordant militant atheism that did exist was but a marginal phenomenon in cultural life. At the outset of the 20th century Catholic modernism was not absent, but its influence was very weak compared with a country like France.

The split between loyal Catholics and the others grew sharper once Poland—after well over a century— regained its dreamed of, and fought for, independence in 1918. Though the Church, in cultural terms, kept its sway over the overwhelming mass of the population, its domination over the intelligentsia was not only challenged but suffered serious harm. What was creative and new in literature, philosophy, and the social sciences originated mostly (it would be unfair to say entirely) outside the Catholic sphere of influence, in those milieux that were either indifferent to religion or, in part, positively antireligious. The Church in Poland gained a reputation of particular rigidity and conservatism, both in social and intellectual terms. Its defenders argued that it was the strength of the religious continuity and unity that had preserved Polish cultural identity through the trial of partition, and had enabled the nation, under the worst of conditions, to successfully resist its powerful enemies.

There was a good deal of truth in the contentions of both sides. It is indeed arguable that it was the very rigidity of Polish Catholic culture, from the 17th century onward, that gave the country its power of resistance; if the Polish Catholic spirit had been torn by doubts, more open to self-questioning, more responsive to novelty, it would probably not have produced the strength that eventually helped Poland survive its ordeal. On the other hand, if Polish culture had not been able to resist the Church's claim to domination, if it had

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failed to produce a science, literature, and an art independent of a self-confident bigotry, it would have doomed itself to sterility and stagnation. In brief, there was no unequivocal distribution of rights and wrongs in this dramatic history; both opposing forces contributed to our survival. This could not have been seen at the time of the struggle between them, but only *ex post facto*, once the old cultural patterns had practically disappeared. Why this clash between secular and religious cultural expression became anachronistic and irrelevant to Polish life is one of the most curious phenomena in the contemporary Christian world.

It ought to be noted, in spite of what has already been said, that the stubborn rigidity of Polish Catholicism in the 20th century was not really exceptional by the standards then prevailing. In social doctrine the Polish Church moved in a rut similar to the rest of the Catholic world, apart from very few exceptions. In philosophy it continued to maintain the tenets of a closed, traditional Thomism, as did the overwhelming majority of Catholic philosophers and theologians everywhere. One must also remember that insofar as there were new trends in Catholic philosophy and social thought open and sensitive to the political and spiritual anxieties of the 20th century, these were limited before the Second World War to tiny groups that hardly shaped the general character of Catholic life. The importance of these groups was to become manifest only later, in the entirely different order that emerged after the war. In fact, somewhat similar currents did appear in Poland just before the war and were also confined to small groups of Catholic intellectuals.

Confrontation

DESPITE ALL THE LOSSES it suffered, along with the entire population, in the persecution and massacres of the occupation, the Church emerged as spiritually influential as it had been before the war. It was the confrontation with the Communist power that brought about formidable changes in all aspects of Catholic life. If the Polish process of totalitarianism on the Soviet model never reached the level of other socialist countries, this is largely due to the popular resistance that the Church itself symbolized. The extent to which it was subject to harassment and repression varied, depending on many internal and external political factors; yet all attempts to split the Church from within failed. The ruling party supported and organized—often using police methods—various pseudo-Catholic "progressive" groups intended to break down the unity of the Church, but despite the enormous effort invested by the state, the outcome was meager indeed.

Throughout the postwar years the Church has been subjected to various forms of pressure, but it has remained the only powerful form of organized cultural activity that has escaped nationalization, and has managed to preserve its independence from the state. Not surprisingly, it provided an outlet for all sorts of social and political discontent, and though it never encouraged any violent expression of opposition, it naturally absorbed—by the sheer fact of not being state-owned—both the feelings of national humiliation that resulted from the forcible incorporation of Poland into the Soviet empire, and the people's passive resistance toward so oppressive and mendacious a power system.

It cannot be denied that neither in the Stalinist period nor later, when a shaky *modus vivendi* between the Church and state had been reached (systematically infringed upon by the state though it was), the repressive measures intended to disable religion and the Church in Poland never reached the degree of brutality characteristic of the Soviet state. The forms they took were of a different order: chicaneries to prevent children from receiving religious instruction in proper centers outside the schools (religion is forbidden in the state education system, of course); restrictions imposed on the Catholic press, including a particularly devastating and vicious censorship; numerous interdictions and limitations on the building of places of worship; persistent violation of the Church's autonomy to appoint bishops; systematic discrimination against avowed Catholics in all areas of social life.

The point is that no Communist nor, for that matter, any ideological state can afford the separation of church from state because separation implies that the state is indifferent to citizens' religious views and that their social positions and careers are unaffected by allegiances to a particular denomination. A state that is ruled by a single party professing a particular *Weltanschauung* with all-embracing pretensions—even if no one takes its doctrine seriously any more—is unable, in principle, to treat its citizens as equals, irrespective of their faith. It cannot be a lay state in the true sense, nor can it give up the goal, hopeless as it may be, of converting its citizens to its creed. Those who openly profess a different belief are bound to remain second-class subjects even if they are not directly punished by law. Thus, Poland's citizens are not prevented from attending Mass, baptizing

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their children, and marrying in church (acts that might invoke the death penalty in Albania), yet, if they do so, their chances of participating in public affairs or reaching positions of importance are drastically curtailed. Apart from certain posts reserved for a few loyal Catholics in certain public bodies intended as window dressing, for the overwhelming majority in the population all avenues leading to participation in power are definitively closed. It is certainly possible for a worker or peasant to be a party member and a Catholic at the same time, but he will still remain one of the "proles" like the rest of the believers, for it is not the party members but the salaried apparatchiks who wield power.

In assessing the function of the Church and of Catholic values in the antitotalitarian opposition and in the struggle for human rights, two sides of the question have to be taken into account: the sheer presence of the Church as a non-nationalized crystallization of spiritual life, and the actual content of its teaching and preaching.

The distinction is of importance: the totalitarian state (even when clumsily and inefficiently totalitarian, as in Poland) is propelled along by an unrelenting drive to nationalize everything, including culture and memory, feeling and thought, as well as by the need to destroy all forms of communal life other than those it sets up itself. All forces that withstand this voracity, whether in the economic or in the cultural field, automatically acquire an antitotalitarian significance, irrespective of the degree to which their exponents have themselves adopted libertarian values. In other words, an independent Church, no matter how rigid or intransigent, would still have preserved, by the simple fact of being there, a priceless element of pluralism in an otherwise totalitarian situation.

In fact, the Church in Poland has sustained these elements of pluralism not only by the mere fact of its existence and by winning recognition and tolerance from the state, however grudgingly this was yielded. The Church has also changed— not in its doctrine, or fundamental moral teaching, but in becoming open, sensitive in its general attitude, tolerant, and intellectually fertile. These changes have come about as a result of a number of cultural factors. With the destruction of the propertied classes, all the threads and commitments that in former years tied the Catholic culture to the traditional social hierarchies were broken, and the Church found itself in a position of poverty among the poor. (Boorish party propaganda to the effect that the Church was a servant of the landlords and capitalists soon became meaningless.) On the other hand, throughout the postwar years, Christianity was not only subjected to harassment and repression (which often acted as a double-edged weapon, both enfeebling and strengthening); it was also being corroded by the "secularist" spirit, usually—but not always—associated with the process of urbanization, the rapid increase of social and spatial mobility, and the expansion of general schooling. Once it was no longer able to rely on its highly privileged (though not institutionally established) cultural position of the prewar period, Christianity made a great effort to survive under duress by using only its moral and intellectual resources.

And it succeeded as nowhere else, almost miraculously. It produced a new generation of intellectuals—open-minded, intelligent, and tolerant, yet profoundly Christian in a real, not tactical or political, sense. The Church became active in all areas of cultural life. The independent Catholic press (leaving aside the spurious, government-sponsored variety), though incessantly in the grip of censorship and police restrictions, has been free of falsehood and has enjoyed general trust for this reason. It cannot print what it would wish to, but it does not lie. In the atmosphere of all-pervading mendacity, which poisons and distorts the public language of the entire Communist world, the language of Christianity has remained honest. We all know that the Catholic press is muzzled but when we read it, we get the feeling of a breath of fresh air.

Transformation

THE EVOLUTION of Catholicism in Poland has also been aided by various factors in the international, as well as the internal, situation. For one thing, the Church was actively involved in the process of change that affected Catholic life all over the world, both before and after the Second Vatican Council. Above all, it was helped by the inexorable corruption and degradation, both moral and intellectual, of Communism.

Christianity, as embodied in the Catholic Church, thus emerged not only as Poland's main bulwark of pluralism but also served as a haven for the truth. Out of all this, it became a powerful agent in the struggle for human rights, carrying the fight well beyond its own particular cause.

For years this entire process was hardly noticed by the antitotalitarian movement that developed within Communism in the mid-'50s and used to be known under the somewhat misleading label of "revisionism." The point has been admirably

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argued* that those critics who attacked the Communist despotism from their leftist or socialist tradition failed to perceive both the antitotalitarian potential of Christianity and the profound transformation of Catholicism itself. This lack of perception was to impair the effectiveness of the democratic resistance until the mid-'60s.

The "revisionists" (here I might have used the first person plural, as I was actively involved in the disputes), for all their attacks on the Communist tyranny and the Leninist doctrine, remained the prisoners of various conceptual distinctions that had become utterly anachronistic. Even though they might occasionally laud the "progressive" trends in the Roman Church, they more frequently attacked it on grounds that might have been valid decades before but had since then lost all significance.

Of course, my point is not that the Church is immune to criticism or that its policy is infallible, but that the leftist clichés and categories—including in particular the left/right, progressive/reactionary, humanist/religious distinctions—were becoming increasingly and glaringly inadequate to deal with our crucial problems, and that all analyses that employed these distinctions as a basic system of reference were bound to lead to false conclusions.

Revisionism, effective though it might have been in wreaking havoc on Communist ideology, was a transient phenomenon, and its role naturally decreased with the collapse of Communism as a viable ideological force. By the '60s, it became clear that there was nothing to "revise" any longer. Once Communism had been reduced to a matter of sheer power, and its doctrinal aspirations were no longer being taken seriously even by its own ruling parvenu class, attempts to wear it out from within became pointless.

Cooperation

THIS PROCESS reached its culmination in 1968, the year of a major cultural pogrom in Poland. After a period of inevitable disruption, the altered situation released new forms of democratic opposition, and the secular/Christian distinction finally, and deservedly, lost meaning. The current antitotalitarian movement does not operate in perfect unison, and the various groups tend to stress different aspects of their struggle against the dictatorial order. At times, they feud among themselves. But the division into Catholics and non-Catholics, believers and sceptics, is nonexistent in political terms. Both in the legal Catholic press and in the numerous illegal (albeit not clandestine) journals, priests and former party members appear side by side. Many ex-Marxists, who are only rarely allowed to appear in print, find refuge there.

Thus in Poland Christianity has become the most unyielding repository of traditional libertarian values. If the authorities view the Church as a kind of rival party that they failed to destroy, this is because they are unable to imagine human actions other than those motivated by greed for power and privilege. Although the Church, due to its independent position, acts as an outlet for a variety of feelings and needs within the opposition, it only does so because the source of its strength lies ultimately in its faith and not in any political doctrine. It must be stressed that many of the young and old who are attracted to the Christian tradition were brought up in an intellectual milieu that was either irreligious or indifferent to the Church. Some find in it an irreplaceable vehicle of cultural continuity, the expression, *par excellence*, of historical national identity, and the only reliable source of moral guidance. Others return to Christianity in full response to its religious message.

By a cruel irony of destiny—or of Providence—the official, ruling ideology, once rooted in the ideas of the Enlightenment, has become host to all the vices formerly attributed to the Roman Church. It was the Church that used to be accused of hampering independent thought, of stifling learning, of upholding indefensible social privilege, of employing massive untruths in order to promote its worldly interests, of persecuting heretics and Jews, of combating democracy. At various periods in history some of these charges were well-founded, some might have been exaggerated, but still they contained a sufficient basis of truth. None of them can justifiably be raised against the contemporary Church in Poland today, all of them are true when applied to the ruling party. It is Communism that has become the incarnation of obscurantism, fear of enlightenment and truth, the persecutor of free cultural expression, the seedbed of falsehood and anti-Semitism. Furthermore, even when the Church was rightly blamed for its intolerance and backwardness, it never had guns at its disposal (as Stalin aptly observed).

The Church in Poland has strenuously maintained its right to perform its evangelical mission,

* Adam Michnik, *The Church, the Left, the Dialogue*, published in Polish in Paris by *Kultura*, 1977.

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and has asserted man's universal right to spiritual liberty, but has been equally emphatic in its insistence that it does not issue prescriptions on political matters. No doubt it is difficult to clearly divorce the cause of human rights from constitutional questions. In fact, the latter is not an issue in Poland where the Declaration and Covenants of Human Rights are in principle legally binding (much as they may be made void by a number of specific laws or by the deliberate vagueness of other legislation). The concept of human rights suffices both for the democratic opposition to phrase all its claims, and for the Church to struggle for its place in public life and for freedom of expression. Thus the moral foundation of both is essentially the same. Having taken up the cause of human rights as its own, and having given it universal meaning—by no means confining it to Communist countries—the Church does not need to desist from its condemnation of violence even for just ends.

In Poland, both as a matter of principle and for obvious circumstantial reasons, the Church has never endorsed, let alone incited, violent opposition to the regime. In critical moments, when violence was likely or indeed had erupted, the Church used its influence to promote calm. Neither the democratic opposition nor the Church are interested in violent clashes that could have disastrous consequences, including a Soviet invasion; and this is an interest they share with the ruling party. This common interest is strong enough to allow room for a limited agreement between church and state, although it is insufficient to bring about the removal of various restrictions imposed on religious life, let alone to loosen the intolerable fetters of censorship. But the government, having lost all credibility among the population (even the qualified and shaky legitimacy it achieved by the economic improvements of the early '70s), is compelled to canvas for the support of the Church to avoid an uncontrollable explosion of popular wrath that could bring Soviet tanks onto the streets of Warsaw.

It is common knowledge that the government has lost the battle for what Poles refer to as "the government of the souls," and that the Church has remained the greatest, unquestioned authority in the country. This well-known fact was mentioned in a Vatican broadcast to Yugoslavia, and this was described in an editorial in the London *Observer* as the "Vatican's criminal folly" since the "vital interests" of the U.S.S.R. were at stake and thus the entire stability of Europe might be upset; it looked as though the Vatican had called the Poles to an armed uprising. I cannot remember similar strictures after the Pope in person had directly appealed to the poor Mexican peasants to organize themselves to fight for their rights; and indeed no "vital interests" of the U.S.S.R. were at stake on that occasion.

Cardinal Wojtyla's election to the Holy See and his recent trip to his native land enormously fortified both the Church's moral authority and the steadfastness of Polish Catholicism. By thus increasing the chances of antitotalitarian resistance, dangers as well as hopes may breed, especially when the economic failures of the government provoke more and more fury. May we hope that the ruling party, under its self-imposed duress and just to avoid the worst, will seek a minimal consensus by letting the population voice its grievances and by enlarging, even slightly, the extent to which people can influence the way they are ruled? Thus far, experience has not been encouraging, but nothing is absolutely precluded.

Whatever happens, it is clear that the vicissitudes of Christian life in Poland have led to a situation whose significance goes far beyond the confines of its own borders. This kind of coalescence of Christianity, in its worldly aspects, with the human rights movement and democratic values has never before been achieved. It might herald dramatic changes throughout the entire Christian world. □

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2. Jan Gross

It took three decades for the secular intelligentsia of Poland to discover the Catholic Church as its ally in the quest for political freedom and social justice. The intelligentsia had to shed its illusions in order to understand that its customary distinctions between secular and religious, progressive and reactionary were meaningless in the face of totalitarianism. For the new rulers of "the People's Poland" were not against "religious superstition," but against moral values *tout court*; they wanted to destroy not "reactionaries" but all tradition, in order to render men rootless and atomized; they did not want to promote the common good over egoistic self-interest but, instead, the interest of a ruthless organization lusting for the exclusive control over all aspects of life.

Hence all opposition to these totalitarian aspirations introduced a measure of plurality, and therefore rescued some degree of freedom from the Communist state. The persecuted Church now acted as a champion of human rights and of the freedom of conscience.

An important book on this subject was written three years ago by Adam Michnik, a social democratic leader of Poland's opposition. His argument was truly refreshing in advancing the principles on which this new political coalition could be established. But the key point is that Michnik's analysis was strictly historical in that it applied to a *persecuted* Church. When denied freedom to preach its doctrine, the Church becomes a champion of democratization by demanding that freedom of conscience be restored. But in a free Poland, where it would have the virtual monopoly for organizing religious worship, would the Church continue to be a pillar of democracy?

There is no theoretically unambiguous answer to this question. The historical record does not inspire great confidence—in the past, when Catholicism was Poland's dominant state religion, it was usually intolerant and politically obscurantist.

THE CHURCH IS THE ONLY component of the present democratic opposition recognized by the government as an independent institution. In the ethnically homogeneous country that Poland has become after the Second World War, the Church has embraced the great majority of the people. It has been defined by the regime for over 30 years as an ideological enemy; it has been fought with a variety of strategies, but also had to be placated—persecuted but also tolerated. Recently, during the Pope's visit, priests and church-delegated representatives, together with militiamen and security personnel, supervised for eight memorable days law and order in the People's Republic of Poland.

This mutual recognition and the practice of confrontations, negotiations, and occasional cooperation are of tremendous importance to the Polish government—there are no damaging symbolic thresholds it has to cross in order to sit at the negotiating table with the Church. The government knows both the demands of the Church and the sanctions it is likely to bring if a *modus vivendi* is not agreed upon. The Church and the government, though in opposition to each other, feel certain that an agreement, when reached, can be enforced by each side. What remains is to forge a compromise—difficult but not impossible. If there is "gulash communism" in Hungary, can't there be an "altar communism" in Poland?

Notice that while the ideological décor is still maintained faithfully in Poland, no importance is attributed any longer to Marxist doctrine. Milosz's and Koestler's diagnoses are only of historical interest to the students of the Soviet imperium. Even the watered-down version of ideological infatuation—revisionism, which lasted roughly from the XXth Congress of the CPSU to the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968—came to an end over a decade ago. Today the cadres of these regimes are formed by power-hungry and subservient, cynical yet obedient, faceless and at the same time faithless careerists. Since no one takes seriously the official ideology anyway, it is not clear why the regime could not agree to let the population have better access to the religious preachings of the Catholic Church. This is precisely what the Church wants and it could offer, if it got satisfaction on this point, something in exchange.

During the last, the 170th, Conference of the Polish Episcopate, the bishops complained about the inadequate number of churches, low circulation of Catholic newspapers, lack of access to radio and television, and heavy censorship of Catholic publications. Suppose permission to build some 50 new churches was granted—it would syphon off antigovernment tensions from communities that for years have been trying to secure such permission. Say that the circulation of *Tygodnik Powszechny* was doubled, from its present 40,000 to 80,000 copies—it would, most of all, undercut the black market, and fewer people would have to borrow their copy. Suppose a Mass was broadcast

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once a week—the number of Radio Free Europe listeners would drop in those hours and perhaps church attendance as well.

No matter what concessions the government made, the Church could always demand more. But even though the government could not or would not want to completely satisfy the Church's ambitions, it could still offer many concessions without, it seems to me, jeopardizing its grip on political power. And it could acquire what it most conspicuously lacks at the present time—a degree of legitimacy through respecting the national heritage.

What could the Church offer in exchange for such government concessions? Well, when the agreement between the Church and the Polish government was signed on April 14, 1950, the bishops promised that the clergy would preach respect for state authority, would not oppose the collectivization of the countryside, and canonic sanctions would be applied against all priests involved in antigovernment activities.

True; the times were different then, and in those darkest years of Stalinism the pressures brought against the Episcopate were enormous. Gierek's regime could not blackmail the Church now into such a sweeping statement of submission, but it could certainly lure it into some concessions—for instance, *a promise that the Church suspend the tacit support it provides for the movement for democratization.*

It is inconceivable that all Catholic intellectuals would withdraw from the movement—too many hopes were aroused during the last three years, too many friendships formed. What is happening is too important for politically and socially minded intellectuals to stay away from. But the Church could help to insulate the movement in subtle ways: by ordering parish priests to be silent about it; by letting it be known, by word of mouth, that the opposition, though perhaps well intentioned, is irresponsible since it puts in jeopardy the Polish *raison d'état* (the proverbial specter of Soviet tanks) and the new gains of the Catholic faith. Without the cloak of the Church wrapped gently around it, the opposition would face greater dangers. Perhaps the government could no longer repress it, but it would certainly try.

In a strange way, the Church is both the strongest and weakest link in the coalition of liberalizing forces. It is really the only partner able to enter into a separate peace with the regime and could not be blamed for doing so, for its mission is not of this world, and political transformations of a "People's democracy" are of secondary interest compared with its chief mission—to proselytize for the Catholic faith on earth.

The democratic movement may be headed for a confrontation with the Church. Such a confrontation is very likely, I believe, if the movement's calling—the revival of the sovereignty of Poland's society as body politic—is ever to be fulfilled. For freedom in modern society encompasses religious freedom as merely one of many domains in which people strive to practice the dictates of their conscience. Religious organization is merely one, and a rather marginal one at that, among institutional vehicles through which the collective life of a modern community must be mediated to allow for peaceful expression of preferences and ambitions. Freedom in modern times, whether we like it or not, means secularization.

The separation of church and state was a dearly paid-for victory without which the idea of sovereignty of the people could never be translated into the political institutions of a representative democracy. True, it opened the way for demagoguery and populism and, in its extreme consequence, "totalitarian democracy" as well. But the fact that we were unable to make prudent use of the freedom won in the 19th century does not justify remedies that would eliminate it now in principle from political life. The task of democratic oppositions in totalitarian countries is not to destroy the regimes presently in power but to restore, or install, political freedom. To be more precise, their task is to do both—unless this point is firmly established in the consciousness of all concerned we will once again be bored (when looking from afar) or horrified (when thinking of friends and relatives) by the spectacle of a new zealous intolerance replacing an old decrepit autocracy.

Sadly, there is no need today to bring up the Bolshevik Revolution in order to illustrate the point—in the last 30 years, under the banners of decolonization, or war against foreign aggressors, or against domestic tyrants, the populations of Asian and African countries have been decimated by their own movements of liberation. Khomeini's inspiring liberation of his people, mainly by sermons and chanting crowds against a well-trained army, turned into a brutal restoration of intolerance. Probably genocide in Europe is inconceivable today, certainly Catholic intolerance is less militant than Islam's, and Polish nationalism less xenophobic than black nationalism in Africa; but we must also remember that it takes less than a Pol Pot, a Khomeini, or an Idi Amin to bury democracy. □

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Robert Amdur

Rawls and His Radical Critics: The Problem of Equality

Few books in the history of political theory have made so strong an impression as *A Theory of Justice*, by John Rawls. Rawls's book, published in 1971, is an effort to deal with a question of enormous importance: how will a just society distribute wealth and income, liberties, opportunities, and positions of authority? In trying to answer this question, Rawls draws upon several disciplines and a variety of philosophical traditions. The final product is a rich, difficult, and complicated book that has rightly been described as the most important contribution to Anglo-American political philosophy since World War II. And it is arguably the most radical: at any rate, conservatives have treated *A Theory of Justice* as a revolutionary document, dangerously egalitarian in its implications. Writing in *Commentary* in 1972, Irving Kristol summarized Rawls's position: "a social order is just and legitimate only to the degree that it is directed to the redress of inequality." "To the best of my knowledge," Kristol added, "no serious political philosopher has even offered such a proposition before."[1] John Cobbs, in an essay in *Business Week*, described Rawls as one of the principal "gurus" of the new movement for equality. According to Cobbs, Rawls had committed himself not just to equal rights of equal opportunity, but also to equality of condition: "Equal opportunity is a delusion unless it produces equality of results."[2] Robert Nisbet offered a similar interpretation in a long, vitriolic review essay in the *Public Interest*. Summing up, he suggested that Rawls's book "is consecrated to as radical a form of egalitarianism as may be found anywhere outside the pages of the *Social Contract*."[3]

After reading these comments, one might expect to discover that Rawls's book was received enthusiastically on the left. To some extent it was: a few socialists had high praise for *A Theory of Justice*. In general, however, radical writers were highly critical—expecting no favors from the philosophical establishment to which Rawls obviously belongs. Hence the view put forward by the philosopher Norman Daniels in his introduction to *Reading Rawls*, a collection of critical essays. While denying that Rawls was "merely a polemicist for the *status quo*," Daniels insisted that *A Theory of Justice* was essentially an ideological work—a defense of liberal political and economic institutions, written "on the heels of a period many thought proved the ideological bankruptcy of liberalism." Daniels went on to argue that "the need for a systematic Marxist response is especially great, since Rawls's work . . . has such ideological importance."[4]

Over the years, leftist writers have advanced a wide variety of criticisms of Rawls's theory, on a number of different levels. Most often, however, they have focused on a single issue: what level of inequality would be permitted by Rawls's principles? According to Daniels, liberal political theorists have always "accepted and justified significant inequalities in income, wealth, powers, and authority between both individuals and classes." Daniels believes that Rawls fits squarely into the liberal tradition: he may hope that the inequalities permitted by his theory will not be large, but "he offers no argument . . . capable of demonstrating, or even designed to

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demonstrate, the impossibility or improbability that large or significant inequalities will always fail to satisfy [the principles of justice]."[5]

Other left critics have agreed. Brian Barry insists that once we accept Rawls's assumptions concerning psychology and economics, "we must be prepared for large differentials in post-tax income."[6] According to Scott Gordon, Rawls "recognizes that nothing in his theory guarantees that his optimum degree of inequality would not be unacceptably large when viewed by the 'considered judgment' of common ethical sentiment." In Gordon's view, this "is in no sense a 'strongly egalitarian' theory of justice."[7]

In this essay I want to consider these criticisms and the issues they raise. In the first section I argue that, as usually presented, the radical criticism overlooks crucial features of Rawls's theory. When these features are understood, it will be difficult to deny what conservative writers have asserted: that the theory is highly egalitarian in its implications. In section II, I examine some of the egalitarian assumptions on which the theory rests, for Rawls's critics have gone wrong in part because they have either ignored these assumptions or minimized their importance. In section III, I ask whether it is still possible to criticize Rawls from an egalitarian direction, and I discuss several ways in which this might be done. Finally, in section IV, I ask whether Rawls's principles can be satisfied under capitalism.

I

Let me begin with a brief outline of the theory. Rawls wants to derive principles of justice from the hypothetical agreement of rational men and women, each concerned to further his or her own interests. These men and women are deprived of certain "morally irrelevant" information: they know nothing about their particular abilities, wants, or positions in society. However, they do know some very general laws and facts about human psychology and the way societies work. They also know that there are certain "primary goods" it is rational for every person to want, because these goods help us advance our ends, whatever those ends may be. The major primary goods are liberties, opportunities, wealth, income, and self-respect.

Rawls attempts to reconstruct the deliberations of his hypothetical contractees; he argues that they would necessarily choose two basic principles:

> First, each person is to have a right to the most extensive total system of basic equal liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.
>
> Second, social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged and (b) attached to positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.

In case of conflicts, the first principle is given "lexical priority" over the second. This means that inequalities of wealth, income, and authority must be arranged so as not to interfere with the equal liberties required by the first principle.

For our purposes the most important part of the theory is part (a) of the second principle, which Rawls calls "the difference principle." This holds that inequalities are to be permitted only when they improve the prospects of the worst off. They might do so by providing "incentives which succeed in eliciting more productive efforts," or by covering the costs of training (Rawls presumably has in mind doctors, managers, technicians, and the like), or by otherwise inducing people with scarce natural talents to use these "in ways that help the less fortunate as well."[8] Rawls assumes some sort of market economy, but he objects to "the competitive determination of total income, since this ignores the claims of need and an appropriate standard of life. . . ." Under the difference principle the state will be required to provide transfer payments designed to ensure that "the total income of the least advantaged (wages plus transfers) will be such as to maximize their long-run expectations."[9]

The problem, according to leftist critics, is that we still have no guarantee that disparities

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in wealth will remain small. Consider the following exotic but useful example:

> We have a community in which there are no significant social divisions. Income, wealth, and other advantages are equal to within a few percentages. There is only one way to modify the society to produce a different distribution. On the new distribution, five percent of the people would have ten times their previous incomes, and everyone else would have one percent more than his previous income.[10]

According to the difference principle, the new distribution is clearly superior to the old. When a society faces a choice like this one, Rawls's theory will demand a highly inegalitarian distribution of wealth and income. Or, as Stephan Thernstrom puts it, given "certain assumptions about the distribution of skills and incentives" the difference principle "could be used to justify drastic economic inequality." This would be true even if (as Thernstrom suspects) Rawls himself sees his principle as "an equalizing device."[11]

There are two ways of responding to this sort of argument. First, it is necessary to ask whether there is reason to think that a society with a roughly egalitarian distribution of wealth would ever need to institute vast inequalities in order to achieve economic growth. Will there really be situations in which tiny increases for the worst off can be achieved only by granting huge increases to the best off? Suppose, after doing that, the society in question instituted progressive taxation and a system of transfer payments. Is it plausible to think that such a policy would have so destructive an effect on incentives as to lead to a return to the *status quo ante?* I suspect the answer is no. I see no reason for thinking that maximizing the wealth of the poor would require "drastic" inequalities, though Rawls clearly believes that it would require inequalities of some sort: else there would be no reason for proposing the difference principle.

THERE IS A MORE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM here. The difference principle fixes one limit on inequalities of wealth and income, but not the only one. At several points in *A Theory of Justice*, Rawls introduces additional considerations designed to eliminate inequalities otherwise compatible with the difference principle. He does not list these limitations in any one place, nor does he discuss them in detail; they are easily overlooked. But he does state them explicitly and, since they are not inconsistent with other parts of the theory, there is every reason for us to take these statements as definitive.

1. *The fair value of liberty.* Early in the book Rawls notes that "there is a maximum gain permitted to the most favored on the assumption that, even if the difference principle would allow it, there would be unjust effects on the political system. . . . excluded by the priority of liberty."[12] Later on, in his discussion of equal liberty, he elaborates this position. Basic political liberties "lose much of their value whenever those who have greater means are permitted to control the course of public debate" and therefore acquire a "preponderant weight in settling social questions."[13] Even if the constitution guarantees equal political freedom for all, the liberties of the majority would then be significantly devalued. Since the priority of liberty is one of the most important features of Rawls's theory, this is clearly a serious problem.

How can a society guarantee the fair value of liberty? Rawls offers two modest proposals: first, elections should be publicly financed; second, public monies should be provided to encourage free discussion. But he also makes a third proposal that is far less modest: "property and wealth must be kept widely distributed."[14] The branch of government in charge of distribution should limit inequalities that threaten the value of liberty. It can do this by taxation of inheritance and income at progressive rates, and also by adjustments in "the legal definition of property rights."[15] The final goal of these adjustments is to maximize "the worth to the least advantaged of the complete scheme of equal liberty shared by all."[16]

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2. *Fair equality of opportunity.* Rawls's second principle demands that social and economic inequalities be arranged so that they are "attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity."[17] This does not mean simply that positions are open in a formal sense, but rather that—

> those with similar abilities and skills should have similar life chances. More specifically, assuming that there is a distribution of natural assets, those who are at the same level of talent and ability, and have the same willingness to use them, should have the same prospects of success regardless of their initial place in the social system, that is, irrespective of the income class into which they are born. In all sectors of society there should be roughly equal prospects of culture and achievement for everyone similarly motivated and endowed. The expectations of those with the same abilities and aspirations should not be affected by their social class.[18]

How can fair equality of opportunity be achieved? Here, as in the case of the value of liberty, Rawls makes some (modest) suggestions. He believes that society must devote resources to compensatory education for those from disadvantaged backgrounds. But again he recognizes that this may not be sufficient. For it is likely that fair equality of opportunity is "put in jeopardy when inequalities of wealth exceed a certain limit."[19] A just society will take measures to "prevent this limit from being exceeded," even if that entails eliminating inequalities otherwise compatible with the difference principle.

3. *Self-respect.* Rawls has been widely criticized for suggesting that relative levels of wealth and income are of no moral significance.[20] Throughout much of the book he does indeed adopt this view as a "simplifying device"—he assumes that when we maximize a person's wealth and income, we are maximizing that person's "expectations." Ultimately, however, he concedes that relative levels may be crucial to self-respect. "A person's lesser position as measured by the index of objective primary goods may be so great as to wound his self-respect"; men's sense of their own worth may depend, in part, "upon their institutional position *and their income share.*"[21] [Emphasis added.]

Beyond a certain point, inequalities that appear acceptable under the difference principle are likely to generate a loss of self-respect. Even as their wealth and income continue to increase, members of the worst off class will suffer from relative deprivation, or what Rawls calls "excusable envy." "Since self-respect is the main primary good," Rawls argues, the parties to the original contract "would not agree . . . to count this subjective loss as irrelevant."[22] Inequalities become impermissable, then, as soon as they reach the level at which the self-respect of the worst off begins to decline. In a just society, levels of inequality will depend on how sensitive those near the bottom are to the existence of large disparities. If it could be shown that all inequalities of wealth and income have grave consequences for the self-respect of the least advantaged, then Rawls's theory would require complete economic equality.

If we considered only the distribution of skills and incentives, we might conclude that Rawls's theory justifies considerable if not "drastic" economic inequality. When we take account of self-respect, fair equality of opportunity, and the need to preserve the value of liberty, such a conclusion seems less plausible. Of course, Rawls does not say exactly how much inequality is compatible with these three requirements, nor does he explain how we should go about answering this question. (He suggests that such matters be left to political sociologists.) Nevertheless, it does seem possible to talk, roughly, about the level of inequality the theory would permit. It is virtually inconceivable that a society as inegalitarian as our own could be just or nearly just by Rawlsian standards, once all of his limits on inequality are taken into account.

II

To understand why Rawls has reached such strongly egalitarian conclusions, it is useful to examine some of his major assumptions. While it may be true (as radical critics often

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assert) that Rawls's methodology is in some sense liberal or individualistic, it is also true that he builds his argument on strongly egalitarian assumptions. Like his explicit limits on inequality these assumptions are easily overlooked, in part because they are scattered throughout the book, and in part because Rawls does not discuss them in detail. I want to look at five particularly important assumptions. Three of these influence the argument for the principles; the other two affect the way in which these principles will be interpreted.

1. *All human beings share a basic equality insofar as they are "moral persons."* In his section on "The Basis of Equality," Rawls suggests that all human beings are entitled to treatment in accordance with the principles of justice. To be entitled to equal justice one need only display "the capacity for moral personality."[23] One must be capable of having a conception of the good (as expressed in a rational understanding of one's own goals and purposes) and a sense of justice—a normally effective desire to apply and act upon the principles of justice, at least to a minimal degree. Rawls assumes that virtually everyone possesses the necessary capacities, though in actual societies these capacities may not be realized, due to "unjust or impoverished social circumstances or fortuitous contingencies." Thus, all human beings are moral persons and all are equally entitled to treatment according to the principles of justice.

By itself, this assumption is not very controversial. Many liberal theorists have assumed a basic human equality: they have agreed that the rules of justice should apply to everyone. But Rawls goes further, for he assumes that those individuals who are entitled to treatment according to the principles of justice are also entitled to be represented when the principles of justice are chosen. This in turn means that each of Rawls's hypothetical contractees can demand rules likely to maximize his own index of primary goods. Each has an equal claim to demand protection of his own interests, whatever those interests turn out to be. Each, whatever his talents or accomplishments, may hold out for arrangements that will buttress his self-esteem. By guaranteeing every person representation at the meeting where the principles of justice are to be chosen, Rawls establishes a strong initial presumption in favor of substantive equality.

2. *Inequalities in wealth and income cannot be justified in terms of personal desert.* When we say that a person deserves something we generally mean either that he is entitled to it under a system of rules, or that he has a right to it, or that he simply ought to have it, for whatever reason. Philosophers, however, use the term in a more restrictive sense. According to Joel Feinberg, a person can deserve some sort of treatment only "in virtue of some possessed characteristic or prior activity." To deserve something "one must satisfy certain conditions of worthiness." The reason for deserving something must be seen as "appropriate" to the thing deserved.[24] Rawls goes further than this. He assumes that only actions can serve as legitimate reasons for deserving something, and that these actions must be performed voluntarily. Judgments of desert apply only to acts over which the agent had some control. Desert implies responsibility.Those who have appealed to desert to justify differential rewards have proposed various distributive criteria: effort, conscientious effort, success in providing goods and services desired by others, contribution to social welfare (however defined). Some writers have supported free-market capitalism because they believed that the market comes as close as possible to rewarding people in accordance with one or more of these criteria. Others, while denying that the market can achieve this happy result, still believe that people deserve to be rewarded according to their effort, or their contribution to the social product.

Rawls assumes from the outset that all such arguments must fail. They fail because we are never justified in saying that the actions that serve as criteria for desert have been performed "responsibly." Rawls makes a radical

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claim concerning individual responsibility. After asserting that no one is responsible for his natural capacities (and hence that "no one deserves his place in the distribution of native endowments"), he goes on to insist that what can be said about natural capacities can also be said about the way in which people develop or use those capacities:

> The extent to which natural capacities develop and reach fruition is affected by all kinds of social conditions and class attitudes. Even the willingness to make an effort, to try, and so to be deserving in the ordinary sense is itself dependent on happy family and social circumstances.[25]
>
> . . . The assertion that a man deserves the superior character that enables him to make the effort to cultivate his abilities is equally problematic; for his character depends in large part upon fortunate family and social circumstances for which he can claim no credit.[26]
>
> . . . Once again. . . , it seems clear that the effort a person is willing to make is influenced by his natural abilities and skills and the alternatives open to him. The better endowed are more likely, other things equal, to strive conscientiously, and there seems to be no way to discount for their greater good fortune.[27]

People are responsible neither for their natural assets nor for their development of those assets, neither for their efforts nor for their contributions. And if this is so, it is no longer possible to make a case for differential rewards according to desert.

This is not to say that Rawls's hypothetical contractees make a decision against desert. Rawls never gives them a chance to make that decision. Rather, he simply declares all information about possible reasons for desert to be "morally irrelevant" and excludes it from the knowledge available to the original contractees. Strict meritocracy—the notion of merit as moral worth—is ruled out from the beginning. While one might question the argument with which Rawls justifies the exclusion, it would be odd to call that argument an example of "liberal ideology."

3. *If inequalities are permitted in a society, they will inevitably be transmitted from one generation to the next.* According to Rawls the major institutions of society —

> define men's rights and duties and influence their life-prospects, what they can expect to be and how well they can hope to do. The basic structure is the primary subject of justice because its effects are so profound and present from the start. The intuitive notion here is that this structure contains various social positions and that men born into different positions have different expectations of life. . . . In this way the institutions of society favor certain starting places over others. These are especially deep inequalities. Not only are they pervasive, but they affect men's initial chances in life. . . .[28]

If society permits inequalities in rewards, rights, or social position, then those who are most advantaged will pass their advantages on to their children. A strong commitment to equality of opportunity may limit the advantage of being born into a privileged family. But Rawls assumes that equal opportunity is at best a partial solution, for "it is impossible in practice to secure equal chances of achievement and culture for those similarly endowed."[29] Even abolition of the family would probably not be sufficient to prevent transmission of benefits from one generation to the next.

By assuming that inequalities are transmitted to future generations, Rawls creates an additional presumption against present inequalities of wealth. This is particularly important if we have doubts about the validity of Rawls's view concerning desert. Suppose we could be sure that every member of a particular generation began with the same advantages (like men in Locke's state of nature, immediately after the invention of money). In such a situation we might be willing to concede that success is related to merit, that people who produced more goods really did deserve to keep the fruits of their labor. Avoiding the highly deterministic view implied in Rawls's remarks on desert, we might agree that people who start out with the same advantages should be held responsible for their own successes and failures. But arguments of this sort become far more

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difficult when people are born at different starting points. For clearly no one deserves to be born into a wealthy, cultured, or well-connected family. And no one deserves to be rewarded for achievements that can be explained, in large part, in terms of family background.

4. *Political liberties, the liberties of citizenship, are more basic than other liberties.* In the earlier versions of the theory, the first principle simply protected "liberty"; in the final version, only basic liberties are guaranteed. When Rawls lists what he takes to be basic liberties, he includes the right to vote and to be eligible for public office, freedom of speech and assembly, liberty of conscience, freedom of thought, along with freedom of the person and the right to hold personal property, and finally freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure.[30] He quite pointedly does not include what might be called economic freedoms: freedom to own productive property, freedom of contract, freedom to appropriate what one has produced, freedom to inherit or to leave one's possessions to persons of one's choice. Rawls never explains how we determine which liberties deserve to be called "basic"; he simply assumes that the liberties of citizenship are in some sense more fundamental than the so-called economic freedoms. The assumption is extremely important. Only by placing a high value on political freedom and a low value on economic freedom can he argue for greater material equality by appealing to the need to preserve the fair value of liberty.

5. *Self-respect has a special place among the primary goods.* Not only is it the most important; it is, in a sense, lexically prior to all the others. Rawls assumes that when we lack self-respect the other primary goods will have very little value. For this reason, the original contractees "would wish to avoid at almost any cost the conditions that undermine self-respect."[31] Because of its privileged position, it is never rational to exchange self-respect for an increase in other goods. This assumption will not lead to egalitarian conclusions unless self-respect depends, in part, on one's income share. But if we concede that self-respect does in fact depend on relative position and not just on absolute income, then egalitarian consequences will necessarily follow.

III

I have argued that Rawls's theory is unlikely to permit the kinds of material inequalities with which we are familiar. Nevertheless, the two principles clearly would permit some disparities in wealth and income. Is it still possible, then, to criticize the theory from an egalitarian direction?

There is an obvious answer: one could simply demand that all primary goods be distributed equally. For Rawls, such a demand is irrational. He imagines his hypothetical contractees making a provisional choice in favor of equal distribution. But this choice is not final for, on reflection, the contractees will ask: "If there are inequalities . . . that work to make everyone better off in comparison with the benchmark of initial equality, why not permit them?"[32] In Rawls's view no reasonable person will refuse to accept inequalities that improve everyone's prospects. (This is subject, of course, to the qualifications discussed in section I.) If we accept this response, if we are not willing to endorse a principle demanding absolute equality no matter what the consequences, is there any way to develop an egalitarian critique of the theory?

- One possibility would be to introduce an additional consideration designed to limit the permissible level of inequality. This is essentially what Lawrence Crocker does in his article published in *Philosophy and Public Affairs* in 1977. According to Crocker, inequalities otherwise compatible with the difference principle ought to be eliminated if they undermine social solidarity.[33]

Crocker's main contention does not seem unreasonable. Most of us would probably agree that solidarity (shared sentiments, cooperative activity, a willingness to make sacrifices for the common good) is a desirable feature of social life; it is certainly arguable, though Crocker does not in fact argue it, that

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society ought to be organized, so far as possible, to encourage the development (or prevent the erosion) of "solidary dispositions." And efforts to generate solidarity would probably place some limits on the sorts of material inequalities that can be tolerated. Ultimately, however, this criticism is less radical and less damaging than Crocker thinks. He assumes that substantial inequalities are necessarily incompatible with a high level of social solidarity; but he does not cite any evidence for this belief, and I suspect that very little exists. The experience of Western democracies during World War II and of various Third World nations in the more recent past strongly suggests that high levels of solidarity are possible in inegalitarian societies. (Perhaps Crocker would dismiss this as "false solidarity," an analogue of false consciousness. But if he wants to insist that the only "genuine" solidarity is solidarity based on equality of wealth, his argument has become circular.)

Perhaps there are some limits to the level of inequality compatible with social solidarity. But based on the sorts of evidence available, it hardly seems that they are likely to be more stringent than the limits imposed by self-respect, equal opportunity, and the need to preserve the fair value of liberty. Crocker can argue that Rawls reaches, roughly, the right conclusions, though not for all the right reasons. He cannot claim to have shown "that just principles of distribution are more egalitarian" than the principles put forward in *A Theory of Justice*.

- Another way to criticize Rawls's position would be to argue that liberty can and should be sacrificed to achieve greater economic equality. I have already suggested that basic liberties are of limited value, unless accompanied by a fairly egalitarian distribution of wealth. But it may also be true that greater equality is attainable if we are willing to give up a certain amount of basic liberty. In *Class Inequality and Political Order*, Frank Parkin puts forward one version of the theory underlying this view:

> Egalitarianism seems to require a political system in which the state is able continually to hold in check those social and occupational groups which, by virtue of their skills or education or personal attributes, might otherwise attempt to stake claims to a disproportionate share of society's rewards. The most effective way of holding such groups in check is by denying them the right to organize politically, or in other ways, to undermine social equality.
>
> This presumably is the reasoning underlying the Marxist-Leninist case for a political order based on the "dictatorship of the proletariat." In the absence of strict institutional controls implied in such a formula it seems unlikely—on all present evidence—that differences in social endowment would not make themselves felt in the form of pressure for differential reward.[34]

If one accepts this theory and still hopes to achieve greater equality, then one will have to argue in favor of radical curtailment of freedom of thought, discussion, and association. This would, of course, entail a direct attack on Rawls's views concerning the priority of liberty. It would then be necessary to insist that the liberties of citizenship are simply not as important as Rawls suggests they are.

Perhaps an argument of this sort can be made persuasively. As far as I am aware, however, none of Rawls's radical critics has attempted to construct such an argument. None of them has suggested that the liberties Rawls calls basic ought to be sacrificed for the sake of greater material equality. Many of these writers seem to believe that liberties may be curtailed during a transition period of some sort. But none seems prepared to argue that a just society, once established, should permanently suppress the basic liberties of its members. Perhaps they reject Parkin's argument; perhaps they fear to engage it; or perhaps they are willing, as they should be, to accept some degree of inequality if the only alternative is a permanent dictatorship.

- Finally, one might be tempted to make an argument based on Rawls's discussion of the purpose of inequalities in a just society. As noted earlier, he suggests that inequalities may be necessary to "cover the costs of

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training and to encourage the efforts of learning, as well as to direct ability where it best furthers the common interest." Unequal shares may provide "various incentives which succeed in eliciting more productive efforts." They may induce the naturally advantaged, those with scarce talents, to use their endowments "in ways that help the less fortunate as well." But, the critic can argue, these remarks suggest a remarkably narrow (bourgeois) view of the world. Why assume that people will require special premiums to "cover the costs of training and to encourage the efforts of learning"? Rawls is clearly thinking of professions such as medicine, but is it really inconceivable that people might become doctors simply out of a desire to serve their fellows, or because of the respect accorded doctors in the community? Similarly, why assume that incentives are necessary to elicit more productive efforts? Perhaps altruism could do the job as well. And why assume that those with scarce natural talents will require special compensation to induce them to use their talents in ways that help the less fortunate? Whatever sorts of talents Rawls has in mind here—managerial or entrepreneurial abilities, a talent for inventing new productive processes, the skill of a surgeon—why not assume that a desire to help others (or a desire to be recognized as one who helps others) will be an adequate incentive? This is, as I've said, a tempting line of argument. But it is important to make clear that Rawls has structured his theory to ensure that it cannot succeed. Nothing in Rawls's theory commits him to the view that large incentives will be necessary to induce people to undertake those activities that improve the prospects of the worst off. This is an empirical question. Rawls himself may believe that high salaries will be needed to get talented people to put up with the headaches that accompany managerial positions, but he may simply be wrong. It may turn out that people are motivated to use their talents to help the less fortunate simply by feelings of altruism. If this is so, Rawls can say, all the better! If people are sufficiently altruistic, unequal rewards will never be necessary.

There is, I believe, only one way in which the radical critic can undercut Rawls's response. He can attempt to demonstrate that some feature of a Rawlsian society would necessarily encourage self-interested behavior. A number of leftist critics have indicated an interest in a critique of this sort, though no one has worked it out. How might it go? Consider the following elaboration of the argument put forward by Richard Titmuss in his remarkable book, *The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy*.[35]

Titmuss begins by noting that societies obtain blood for transfusion in two ways. In some countries, including the United States, blood is obtained primarily by means of the commercial market. Elsewhere, in Britain for example, the sale of blood is prohibited by law, and blood for transfusions is secured entirely through voluntary donations. Since they cannot hope for any direct or indirect benefits, it would seem that British donors must be motivated entirely by feelings of altruism or social responsibility. This conclusion is supported by the results of interviews with a sample of donors.

It is especially interesting that the British system of blood acquisition seems to be at least as efficient as its American counterpart. The British system produces enough blood to meet medical needs, and the proportion of blood contaminated by disease is far smaller than in the United States. This is clearly something of a surprise. Surely, someone who had looked only at the United States would deny that a purely voluntary system could work. It's hard enough to get blood with material rewards, he would say; without those rewards it would be impossible! But from Titmuss's perspective, matters are more complicated. For it appears that there are people who will not give voluntarily in a society where it is legitimate to sell blood, but will donate voluntarily when payment for blood is not seen as legitimate. Where there is no possibility of material gain from blood donation, altruism will lead substantial numbers of people to give freely in order to help their fellow men and women. When the

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opportunity for gain is introduced, these altruistic impulses are thwarted; few people will just give blood away, no matter how badly it is needed. People who under different circumstances would have given voluntarily now expect to be paid for their donations—or, in many cases, decide not to donate blood at all. Titmuss ends his study with the stark conclusion that "the commercialization of blood donor relationships represses the expression of altruism."[36]

Generalizing Titmuss's argument, we might suggest the following propositions: when material rewards are available to those willing to engage in socially useful behavior, and when those rewards are seen as morally legitimate, people will demand them. When material rewards are unavailable, or when they are regarded as morally illegitimate, people will undertake socially useful activities out of altruism or desire to serve the common good. In at least some cases, the availability and moral legitimacy of material rewards will generate a desire for those rewards.

This, the radical critic might argue, is precisely what will happen in a Rawlsian society. Adoption of the difference principle amounts to a public acknowledgment that it is legitimate to expect rewards for activities that improve the prospects of the worst off. Educational institutions may attempt to encourage altruistic behavior, and to some extent they may succeed. But ultimately, those with scarce talents are bound to conclude that there is nothing wrong with receiving special rewards, as long as they are in fact engaged in activities that help the worst off. The legitimacy of payment as incentive to engage in useful activities will in itself raise the level of incentives needed to generate those activities. Public acknowledgment of the difference principle will encourage a "market mentality" among people who might otherwise perform useful services out of altruism or a sense of duty.

According to this view, Rawls's motivational assumptions are transformed into a self-fulfilling prophecy. An assumption of limited altruism, chosen by Rawls because it is weak, or widely accepted,[37] leads to the adoption of the difference principle by the original contractees. This necessitates public acknowledgment of the difference principle in real societies, and this in turn encourages nonaltruistic behavior. Viewed from the inside, a Rawlsian society will *appear* to be permitting only those inequalities truly necessary to maximize the expectations of the worst off. But from our perspective, matters are more complicated. We are likely to conclude that the same society might function with fewer inequalities if it were organized differently.

Is this critique of Rawls's theory convincing? At the least, an argument such as the one just outlined would face several difficulties. First, it is not clear that Titmuss's argument succeeds, even on its own fairly narrow grounds. Altruistic impulses do not seem to be as widespread in Britain as Titmuss's discussion would suggest. Only about 6 percent of the eligible population donates blood at all. (Couldn't one point to the other 94 percent as evidence that the British are not very altruistic despite the obvious need for blood?) Even if we ignore this issue, Titmuss does not begin to demonstrate that the availability of material rewards for blood donation *causes* a decline in altruism. As Kenneth Arrow points out in his review of *The Gift Relationship*, Titmuss's data can be explained in a variety of ways.[38] Perhaps commercial blood banks arose in the United States precisely because Americans were not sufficiently altruistic to give blood without compensation.

Second, and more serious, even if Titmuss's argument works for blood donation, it does not follow that it can be generalized. The crucial fact about blood donation is that it costs almost nothing in terms of time, energy, or inconvenience. This is not true of any of the other socially useful activities for which material rewards are usually offered. Even if we agree that large numbers of people (free from the stifling influence of material incentives) will spontaneously visit their local Red Cross when blood supplies are low, it does not follow that they will voluntarily make sacrifices of a much greater magnitude, just because a need exists.

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Taken together, these considerations provide gounds for skepticism about the possibilities of using an argument like Titmuss's in order to criticize Rawls. This does not mean that we should dismiss such an argument out of hand: I suspect that if a plausible egalitarian critique of Rawls can be developed it will be a critique of this sort. But it seems reasonable to say that the burden of proof should rest with those who would make such an argument. It is up to them to provide some evidence for the assertions (a) that Rawlsian institutions would thwart altruistic impulses, and (b) that other institutions would be more likely to promote altruism. So far, none of Rawls's critics has attempted it.

IV

Finally, based on the considerations discussed in this essay, can we say that Rawls's theory requires socialism? Rawls himself suggests at one point that "the choice between a private-property economy and socialism is left open; from the standpoint of the theory of justice alone, various structures would appear to satisfy its principles."[39] Radical critics have seized upon this sentence as additional evidence of the ideological nature of the theory. Benjamin Barber provides a typical example:

> This, to me, is like developing a geometry in which the question of whether parallel lines meet is left open, or generating an aesthetic that refuses to take sides on questions of taste. Given the intimate interdependence of political and economic institutions in the West, and given the undeniable culpability of capitalism in the history of Western injustice, a theory of justice that sees nothing to choose between capitalism and socialism is either extravagantly formalistic to the point of utter irrelevance, or is a badly disguised rationalization for one particular socio-economic system, namely "property-owning democracy."[40]

But what does it mean to say that the question is "left open"? It may mean, as Barber suggests, that Rawls "sees nothing to choose between capitalism and socialism." Or it may mean that he thinks we lack sufficient information to make a choice. In his essay "Fairness to Goodness," Rawls suggests that the question need not remain open indefinitely: there are arguments that (if true) would lead to the conclusion that capitalism and justice are incompatible. He provides one example of such an argument: the principles of justice would require some sort of socialism "if the stability of a well ordered society could be achieved in no other way."[41] Based on the considerations discussed above, I should like to suggest several additional possibilities:

> *The principles of justice would require some sort of socialism if the self-respect of the worst off could be maintained in no other way, or if the fair value of liberty could be protected in no other way, or if fair equality of opportunity could be achieved in no other way.*

And finally:

> *Assuming that capitalism and socialism are equally acceptable in terms of their effects on self-respect, liberty, and equal opportunity, then the principles of justice would require socialism if a socialist economy were capable of providing the worst off with a higher level of wealth and income than could be provided under any other system.*

These propositions do not appear in *A Theory of Justice*, but they do follow logically from Rawls's theory. They suggest that it is possible to turn the theory into an argument for socialism. Surely that is what Rawls's radical critics should attempt to do. Instead of criticizing Rawls as a "bourgeois ideologist," they should seek to demonstrate that the deep principles of justice that he has formulated can be satisfied only in a socialist society. □

NOTES

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14. *Ibid., pp. 225-26.*
45. Ibid., pp. 277-79.
16. Ibid., p. 205.
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40. Benjamin R. Barber, "Justifying Justice: Problems of Psychology, Politics, and Measurement in Rawls," *Reading Rawls*, ed. Daniels, pp. 312-13.
41. John Rawls, "Fairness to Goodness," *Philosophical Review*, (84) October 1975, p. 546.

Portions of this essay have appeared in a somewhat different form in "Rawls' Theory of Justice: Domestic and International Perspectives," *World Politics*, April 1977, pp. 438-61. □

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

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Lewis Coser

In Praise of Marx

At the 1979 meeting of the American Sociological Association in Boston, one session was devoted to a debate between Lewis Coser and Lewis Feuer on the subject, "Should We Bury Karl Marx?" Feuer said yes, Coser no. We print here the paper by Lewis Coser.

— EDS.

I shall argue here that Karl Marx bequeathed us a set of theories that continue to be indispensable for the pursuit of a number of important sociological inquiries. In order to assess the value of Marx's theories, I have chosen to follow the lead of Sir Karl Popper. He has laid down three essential requirements that a theory must fulfill if it is to contribute to the growth of knowledge. I shall then argue that many of Marx's theories meet Sir Karl's requirement. Paradoxically, even though Popper has consistently denied the scientific status of Marx's contributions, it turns out that this status can be established on the basis of Popper's own criteria.

- The first requirement for a new theory, according to Popper, is that it "should proceed from some *simple*, *new*, and *powerful, unifying idea* about some connection or relation . . . between hitherto unconnected things . . . or facts . . . or new theoretical entities."
- The second requirement postulates that "apart from explaining all the *explicanda* which the new theory was designed to explain, it must have new and testable consequences . . .; it must lead to prediction of phenomena . . . which have not so far been observed." This second requirement ensures that a new theory will be fruitful as an instrument of exploration. It will suggest new inquiries, "and even if" in his words, "these should at once lead to the refutation of the theory, our factual knowledge will have grown through the unexpected results of new experiments."
- Popper's third requirement, which he considers not quite as indispensable as the first two, is that a theory must pass some new and severe empirical tests. This requirement is not as essential as the other two, because, he says, "even a theory which fails to meet it can make an important contribution to science." Popper's third criterion, as distinct from the first two, which are concerned with the formal requirements of a theory, involves a material requirement, i.e., empirical success. The testing of a theory, according to Popper, involves attempts to refute it. But even if a theory has been successfully refuted, its originator cannot be judged to have failed. On the contrary, "every refutation should be regarded as a great success; not merely a success of the scientist who refuted the theory but also of the scientist who created the refuted theory and thus in the first instance suggested, if only indirectly, the refuting experiment." Yet it remains true, Popper states, that further progress in science requires "not only successful refutations but also positive successes."[1]

I shall argue that Marx meets all of Popper's two formal criteria and that he satisfies in some of his work, though not in all of it, Popper's third requirement. I shall argue further that even those parts of his work that have been successfully refuted remain of

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major importance in that, to quote Popper again,

> . . . a false theory may be as great an achievement as a true one. Many false theories have been more helpful in our search for truth than some less interesting theories which are still accepted. For false theories . . . may . . . suggest some more or less radical modifications, and they may stimulate criticism."[2]

Marx's overall theoretical scheme is built, as Popper says, on "some simple, new, and powerful unifying ideas about some connection or relation between hitherto unconnected things or facts, or new theoretical entities." Marx directs our view to the systematic consequences of the unequal allocation of scarce resources within social systems, and one of these consequences is the unequal allocation of scarce power. He specifies, moreover, that all historical societies are composed of social classes that have their roots in this unequal allocation of resources and power. Conflicts between these classes, Marx argues, are necessary components of all historical societies. Any historical society in fact presents a moving balance of antithetical class forces that generate change by their tension and struggle.

Marx focuses on the way in which the relationships between people are shaped by their relative positions in regard to the means of production, that is, to repeat, by their differential access to scarce resources and scarce power. He was aware that such unequal access must not always lead to active struggle between classes, as demonstrated in his description of the century-long stasis of Asiatic societies. He stated that the potential for class conflict is inherent in every differentiated society, since any such society systematically generates conflicts of interest between groups differentially located within the social structure.

The notion of the inevitability of class conflicts and of their functions as transformative agents in social change is, to be sure, found among writers long before Marx. Marx's detractors often have been delighted to point to the formulations of such men as Winstanley or Guizot, which seem to resemble those found in Marx. But, as Alfred North Whitehead once put it, "to come very near to a true theory, and to grasp its precise application, are two very different things."[3]

There is a considerable difference between assertions regarding the struggle between the rich and the poor, between inheritors and disinherited, or between powerful and powerless, and to stress, as Marx did, that the struggles between classes take their specific shape and character from the specific modes of production prevailing at a particular moment in historical time. Social living, according to Marx, can only be understood in terms of historical specificity. Such stress on historical specificity is in fact another major hallmark of his approach to the data on human existence. Marx was concerned with the ways in which particular positions in specific social structures that arise from particular modes of production tend to shape the social experience of their incumbents and predispose them to actions oriented to defend or to attack a given allocation of economic and power resources. And this was, I submit, a new powerful and unifying idea in social thought. By focusing analytical attention on the importance of power, conflict, and asymmetrical relations in human affairs, and by thus breaking with the tradition of harmony, integration, and symmetry, Marx broke ground on hitherto unplowed fields.

There are, of course, other more specific theories advanced by Marx that fulfill Popper's first requirement, but I shall directly proceed to his second requirement, which, it will be recalled, demands that a theory must lead to prediction of phenomena not hitherto observed so it can function as an instrument of exploration.

What Popper has in mind here may best be exemplified by the work of Sigmund Freud, even though, paradoxically, Popper denies scientific status to Freud just as he denies it to Marx. When Freud developed his theory of the Oedipus complex and of infantile sexuality, he sensitized researchers to areas of human

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behavior that hitherto had escaped scrutiny. Having previously believed that sexuality only emerged at puberty, investigators had failed to look at infants or young children for evidence of erotic activities and expressions of libidinal urges. And even though literary treatments and philosophical inquiries had for a long time focused on the evidence of strains and tensions in the relations between fathers and sons, it was only after Freud that systematic observation of oedipal tensions was undertaken. The theory is refutable; it may only be partly correct; but what matters here is that it has opened up a new and fertile territory of inquiry, and thus conforms to Popper's second criterion.

Marx's work abounds in similar explorations of new theoretical territory. Take, for example, Marx's theory of class consciousness. The notions of class and of class struggle were, of course, not unknown in Marx's day. The classical economists, for example, did provide a functional classification of classes, distinguishing between proprietors of land, proprietors of stock, and laborers. Some of them, Malthus in particular, pointed to possible sources of conflicts of interest between these classes. But Marx, although he usually made a functional distinction by defining class in terms of people's position in the productive process—a notion that was derived from the classical economists—also explored another dimension of class, namely that of class consciousness.

In particular, and in tune with the other great intellectual tradition to which he was indebted, that of German idealism, in Marx's conceptualization of the functions of class, class awareness became central. Here economic or social factors were supplemented by social-psychological ones. In the German idealistic tradition, human self-awareness or self-consciousness was an essential requirement of individual autonomy enabling people to become effective moral actors in the human drama. Marx transferred these notions from the domain of individuals to that of collectivities.

Though an aggregate of people, Marx argued, may all occupy similar positions in the process of production and hence have objectively similar life chances, they become a class as a self-conscious and history-making body only if they become aware of the similarity of their interests. An objective economic class, a *Klasse an sich* (class in itself), becomes a *Klasse fuer sich* (class for itself) if its members, through repeated conflicts with opposing classes, have acquired an awareness of the communality of their interests. Only such self-conscious classes are capable of changing the course of history; classes lacking such bonds among their members remain impotent.

As distinct from social theories that conceive of classes as the embodiments of factors of production or as a layer cake in which strata are simply superimposed upon one another, it is Marx's view that classes are essentially conflict groups. More important, they gain their identity and the realization of the communality of their interests through confrontations and clashes with other, antagonistic classes. When classes do not develop self-consciousness through struggle they are historically ineffective, since their members cannot become autonomous social actors.

Among the conditions Marx outlined for the growth of self-consciousness of social classes was the ease of communication between members of a class, which, in its turn, depended on the structural location of class members. Marx argued in *The Eighteenth Brumaire* that French small peasants who were dispersed on their individual holdings in the countryside could not develop a common consciousness because of the lack of communication. They hence were "like potatoes in a sack," a collection of individuals without ties to one another, incapable of autonomous social action and easy prey for demagogues such as Napoleon III.[4] In contrast, Marx states in *The Poverty of Philosophy* and elsewhere,[5] class consciousness and class solidarity would develop among workers when labor struggles over economic benefits,

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physical concentration among masses of people in common workplaces, and easy communication among them would lead to solidarity and political organization. The communality of interests among workers, Marx stated, would *ab initio* unite workers as "a class against capital, not yet *for itself*." But during the ensuing class conflicts "this mass becomes united and constitutes itself as a class *for itself*."[6]

Marx's theory of class consciousness provides a handle for investigating a whole series of problems not even recognized before his day. In particular, he made clear that self-conscious classes not simply exist, but that they are products of historical processes, the result of determinant relationships and patterns of communication between structurally interrelated human actors. The attainment of class consciousness is a historical task to be achieved, not a given condition. Some classes may not attain self consciousness and others will do so.

The investigator can now use this Marxian concept to explore the concrete conditions in which such consciousness is likely to arise. When the British historian E. P. Thompson wrote his classical work on the rise of the English working class he entitled it significantly *The Making of the English Working Class*.[7] He took from Marx the notion that classes are not given but create themselves under appropriate conditions, which he then proceeded to illustrate with instructive detail in the English case. This book, and others like it but written in this country, could not have been produced without the exploratory work of Karl Marx. Just as Freud opened up for empirical inquiry the area of infantile sexuality and oedipal conflict, so Marx opened up a whole territory hitherto unexplored.

I now shall consider, although more briefly, one other Marxian notion that fulfills Popper's second requirement in that the theory points to hitherto unobserved phenomena or relationships and provides tools for exploring them: the theory of the social roots of ideas. Granted that many thinkers since Francis Bacon have written about the connections between people's existential conditions and their mode of thought, it was Marx who was the first to explore systematically and in some analytical depth the connections between sets of ideas and the concrete social structure in which they emerged. Ideas, Marx maintained, must be traced to the life conditions and the historical and social situation of those who uphold them. Marx granted that particular individuals might not always have thought in terms of class interests, but he maintained that categories of people are constrained to do so. He often used his uncovering of relations between ideas and the social positions of their proponents as a means of unmasking and debunking his opponents; but his aims were wider than that. As Karl Mannheim put it:

> [Marx's] undertaking . . . could reach its final goal only when the interest-bound nature of ideas, the dependence of "thought" on "existence," was brought to light, not merely as regards certain selected ideas of the ruling class, but in such a way that the entire "ideological superstructure" . . . appeared as dependent upon sociological reality. What was to be done was to demonstrate the existentially determined nature of an entire system of *Weltanschauung*, rather than of this or that individual idea.[8]

That Marx's theory about the interrelations between thought and social existence, between ideas and position in the social structure, "led to the prediction of phenomena that had not so far been observed" is hardly open to doubt. It was a pioneering exploration of a heretofore unexplored field that subsequently led to systematic and fruitful inquiries—and the whole area of sociological inquiry later called the sociology of knowledge is hardly conceivable without the stimulus provided by Marx's pioneering notion.

When we now turn from Popper's two formal requirements for a valid theory to his third (material) requirement, that a theory must pass severe empirical tests if it is to be acceptable, we recognize at once that by no means all of Marx's theories, in as far as they

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have been tested, have met this requirement. Yet we should recall that the third requirement is not as indispensable to Popper as the other two; he is willing to allow that even theories that have been refuted may make positive contributions to knowledge by stimulating inquiry or suggesting more or less radical modifications.

A few examples will suffice. Marx held that the further progress of capitalism would lead to an increasing immiseration of the working class. Many hostile commentators have gleefully found that nothing of the kind actually took place and that the living standards of the working class in all industrial nations are considerably higher today than they were in Marx's time. The theory has not passed the test, to be sure, but it is worthwhile to consider whether the refutation of the theory is not due, at least in part, to what Robert K. Merton called a self-destroying or suicidal prophecy.[9] Responding not merely to his own dire predictions but also to those of a host of other socialist thinkers, from the early part of the 19th century on, that the lot of the workers would deteriorate with the further development of the capitalist mode of production, workers began to organize in self-defense, creating mutual aid societies, trade unions, and labor parties. As these working-class institutions gradually took hold in industrial societies, as the specific weight of these institutions increased and began to affect the balance of power, the ruling classes, whether from fear of revolutionary developments or from other motives, began to make concessions to the working classes, which, among other things, led to the gradual rise of the latters' standard of living. Among the unanticipated consequences of Marx's predictions about continued pauperization of the working class was the falsification of his law of increasing immiseration through the concerted action of the working class.

There are, to be sure, other aspects of Marx's work that simply did not pass any empirical test. The middle classes, which he expected to be slowly ground into sociological insignificance between the two major historical grindstones, capital and labor, have been steadily increasing in all industrial nations in each census decade of the 20th century. The industrial working class, far from increasing its specific numerical weight, as Marx expected, for several decades now has declined as a portion of the total labor force in all industrial nations.

The phenomenal rise of service and administrative white-collar strata, that is, of what Marx called "nonproductive labor," was only dimly foreseen by Marx and Engels. Moreover, the revolutionary consciousness of the proletariat in the West, on which Marx based his predications of the imminence of revolution in industrial countries, has been steadily declining as workers have come to conclude that in the modern welfare state they have considerably more to lose than their chains. The only major revolutionary developments of the 20th century have occured not in industrial societies as Marx expected, but in peripheral peasant societies—in exactly those societies that Marx had characterized as retrograde domains of the idiocy of peasant life. It would be easy to continue in this vein. Yet this seems hardly necessary, since whole catalogues of Marx's failings are easily available from a host of writers who have made the listing of these failures into a thriving industry.

Yet even Marx's failings have had, as Popper suggests, beneficial consequences in that refutation of his findings have led to "more or less radical modifications" that would be inconceivable without his initial impetus. To cite recent examples, two of the most important works in historical sociology of the last decade and a half, Barrington Moore's *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*,[10] and Theda Skocpol's *States and Social Revolutions*,[11] even though they depart in major respects from classical Marxian theory, have brought forward important results by modifying it in order to sort out the falsified chaff from the still usable wheat.

In sum, Popper's third criterion is only imperfectly met by Marx's theories, and in many instances it is not met at all. But, as Popper seems to suggest, that is probably the

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case with most other theories in the natural and even more so in the social sciences. Nevertheless, as I have been trying to show, we can dispense with Marx's contribution only at our peril.

Even though orthodox Marxist true believers still exist, I am convinced that they are condemned to ultimate sterility. To judge from their recent contributions, many of them seem to be involved in the attempt to save all of Marx's findings by, so to speak, adding a few epicycles, as was the wont of the disciples of Ptolemy over many centuries. With their recent "discovery" that the state has in the final analysis relative autonomy, or that the superstructure, after all, does not simply reflect the infrastructure, they are reinventing the wheel. They could have learned all of this from the great non-Marxist sociologists of the past.

Marxist orthodoxy's future lies largely in the past. But instead of the embalmed Marx we are apt to encounter among the writings of the orthodox, living Marxian thought, perpetually put to Popperian tests and requirements will, I am convinced, continue to help invigorate the social sciences. Leszek Kolakowski, perhaps the most sophisticated present-day commentator on Marxian thought, provides the following characterization of the place of Marxism in the social sciences:

> . . . the concept of Marxism as a separate school of thought will in time become blurred and ultimately disappear altogether, just as there is no "Newtonism" in physics, no "Linnaeism" in botany, no "Harveyism" in physiology, and no "Gaussism" in mathematics. What is permanent in Marx's work will be assimilated in the natural course of scientific development.[12]

Yes, as the philistine will have it, Marx is one-sided. But so is every other thinker. As Alfred North Whitehead once put it, "Each mode of consideration is a sort of searchlight elucidating some of the facts and retreating the remainder into an omitted background."[13] What distinguishes Marx from lesser thinkers in the social sciences is not that he is one-sided, but that, just like Freud, to quote Whitehead again, "He had the genius to be astonished."[14] There is no need to bury Marx. He lives, and he is our contemporary. □

NOTES

[1] Karl R. Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations; The Growth of Scientific Knowledge* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1968), pp. 240-43.
[2] Op. Cit., p. 241.
[3] Alfred North Whitehead, *The Organization of Thought*, as quoted in Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (New York: Free Press, enlarged edition, 1968), p. 1.
[4] Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire* (New York: International Publishers, n.d.), p. 109.
[5] Karl Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy* (New York: International Publishers, n.d.), pp. 145-46. See also Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset, "Marx's Theory of Social Class," in *Class, Status and Power*, ed. Bendix and Lipset (New York, Free Press, 1966), p. 9.
[6] Ibid.
[7] E.P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (New York: Vintage Books, 1966).
[8] Karl Mannheim, *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge* (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1952), p. 143.
[9] Robert K. Merton, op.cit., pp. 182-83.
[10] Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).
[11] Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions* (London and New York:Cambridge University Press, 1979).
[12] Leszek Kolakowski, *Marxism and Beyond* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1969), p. 204.
[13] Alfred North Whitehead, *Adventures of Ideas* (New York: Macmillan, 1933), p. 54.
[14] Ibid., Mentor edition, p. 153. □

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The New Immigration: An Exchange

Otis L. Graham, Jr.

Illegal Immigration and the Left

Immigration policy is a subject most Americans would rather avoid; it has to do with keeping people out of the country, and in a nation of immigrants that is a thought painful to contemplate.

On any complex issue, one would expect Americans of liberal or radical inclination to take a variety of positions. Yet on the issue of illegal immigration, ever since World War II, there is a remarkable and historically unprecedented unanimity within the American left: immigration is a "social problem" that is not a welcome subject of discussion. If the issue is forced, the predictable stand is to favor porous if not open borders—a position, if not a reflex, with deep roots in our history, though largely unexamined since the days before World War I. We have, of course, not forgotten the old nativist movements that so embittered our politics. History appears to teach us that when it is asserted that immigration is a problem, groups learn to hate. Restrictionist ideas in 19th- and early 20th-century America derived from the selfish, reactionary, and racist side of the national mind. Restriction, then, is assumed to be invariably a disreputable sentiment—let it go away! But when immigration-law reform cannot be avoided, as in 1952 or '65, left-of-center people tend to oppose governmental limitation, favoring a sort of marketplace solution to which they would normally not incline.

We on the left have forgotten that this was not always so: socialists once debated socialists on the limitation of immigration, and took varied principled stands. I argue here that the restrictionist case should now make a much stronger appeal to liberals and radicals than it has over the last half-century, and that a perhaps painful discussion is in order.

We are still faced with the sobering demographic news of a continuing worldwide population problem. Birthrates are dropping faster than anticipated in quite a few countries, holding steady in some, and running at high levels in many others. Demographers now dispute whether the expected global population will crest at 8, at 10, or at 12 billion—and debate whether we face doubling or tripling. Nearly half the people of the earth are under 15 years of age, poised for contribution to the swarming human family. There is no good news on the future size of the world population, only slightly less disheartening bad news. But even more significant than this global population boom is that growth is spatially so uneven. Six nations of northern Europe have reached stabilization, and most of the industrialized world moves closer to that condition. But in the underdeveloped world, demographic momentum is breathtaking. The doubling time of Mexico's 65 million is around 22 years, of Asia's 2.4 billion around 36 years, of Africa's 436 million about 41 years. Poor and overcrowded countries will do the growing, making mass migration inevitable.

The U.S., since 1965, has experienced an influx matching the volume of unrestricted immigration in pre-World War I years, and most of it is outside the 400,000 annually allowed by law. Illegal entry resists measurement, but we know that arrests have mounted from 110,000 in 1965 to 766,000 in '75, and to over 1 million in '78. Probably 800,000 to 1 million illegal immigrants have come to the U.S. annually for a decade now. The influx, according to recent Immigration and Naturalization Service

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reports, continues to mount. Increasing numbers come across the southern border, but there is also an increase in visa jumpers, who arrive at American airports and disperse beyond the puny reach of immigration officials.

A direct way to state the matter is to say that more than half the United States' current population increase comes illegally across our borders. We have lost control of our demographic future—internal increase approaches equilibrium, but immigration restores the momentum. Without immigration, the U.S., given current trends, would enter a period of population stability shortly after the year 2,000. Yet, because of it, we can see no end to our population growth, and this will mean a very different America.

The last time immigration reached such proportions, the American left was torn by internal argument, and could not reach agreement. The right had no such difficulties. The conservatives in the nativist movements of the 1890s and thereafter (excepting some employers) opposed unrestricted immigration, and eventually secured the restrictionist laws of 1921 and '24. In the process, they gave restriction a very bad name with thoughtful people of the modern era, for their arguments were saturated with racism and unexamined prejudice.

Now, with the nation experiencing immigration on a similar scale and with the Immigration and Naturalization Service admittedly unable to control it, we hear restrictionist arguments in rising volume. Yet, on this subject, among liberals and radicals there is mostly silence except for an occasional uninformed essay claiming that immigrants are good for the country, as they have always been. Here the left makes an intellectual error that can be explained, though not justified, by the history we remember. We might begin a reappraisal of the issue by returning to the brief but intense debate that took place among socialists prior to World War I. But, first, we should establish the arguments of today's new restrictionism.

What does it mean to speak of a "new restrictionism"? Assuredly, we now hear many themes familiar from the old exclusionist movements: that illegal immigration causes one-to-one job displacement, accounting for much of the current unemployment; that it imposes heavy welfare costs upon taxpayers; even that illegal immigrants (maybe all immigrants) are not good human material.

The new restrictionism does not base its case on these arguments—and, of course, rejects the last as unworthy. It assumes that there is some actual job displacement of native American workers; but since this is difficult to measure and in any expert view does not exceed a million or so of the currently unemployed, this matter is not central to the discussion. As for heavy social-service costs, studies show that illegals do not make extensive use of welfare services, though in half a dozen cities they incur fairly heavy public educational and medical costs. But working illegals pay taxes, and so the social-service issue is moot. Inevitably, an amnesty will eventually be granted to a large part of our illegal immigrants, and this will surely change matters and will significantly increase these costs. But no valid restrictionism can be based on such narrow objections.

The other old argument, that the nation's assimilative capacities are strained by large-scale immigration, has no discernable adherents among people of progressive inclination. Fears of social division, our history is thought to teach, have always been mere rationalizations for a dislike of particular racial and ethnic groups. One finds no public departure from the established assumption that the nation can stand any amount of cultural pluralism, that diversity is always a source of strength. There is almost no rational discussion or respectable literature arguing that immigration jeopardizes our nation's social unity; but this might change. The example of Scottish, Basque, or Quebecois separatism, in connection with the question of the costs and social implications of growing U.S. efforts in bilingualism, may yet open a debate about America's assimilative capacity. But so far, our culture is not receptive to such arguments.

There are two areas that give the case for stricter limits on immigration a new ethical and intellectual basis.

- **I:** *Impact on Population Growth.* The first is that population growth, which complicates all of our problems, must be curbed through some effective combination of individual and governmental action. This realization is now widely accepted among American whites of all social groups, though it has made little headway in various minority communities. Yet there is still spirited dispute on the urgency of the matter within the U.S., and there are those who continue to believe that the carrying capacity of the U.S. has hardly been approached. There is not the space

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here to argue the matter in detail, only to state the case for population limitation. In a global perspective, growing populations on every continent threaten and undercut economic and social advancement, deplete resources, and work an awful damage upon land, oceanic, and atmospheric ecology. The United States' responsibility in the face of this problem is not met simply by adequate levels of economic and family-planning assistance to developing nations with high population growth rates: the U.S. ought to set the example of stabilizing its own population as a matter of high national priority. There are further reasons for stabilization, and the goal of achieving it was first given cogent official expression in the 1972 report of the National Commission on Population and the American Future.

The conclusion that "the U.S. ought to welcome and plan for a stable population" rested on several counts; (a) each American imposes a vastly disproportionate drain upon world resources and environment because of our way of life; (b) international equity aside, the carrying capacity of the U.S. is not yet known but may easily already have been exceeded—unless we fundamentally alter our habits of energy consumption, disposal of toxic chemicals and solid wastes, agricultural practices, and more;[1] (c) social requirements for space, privacy, and unspoiled wilderness areas are much greater than acknowledged; (d) national security no longer demands masses of manpower for defense.

These points are part of a dynamic argument. I argue that, while there will be refinements and shifts in emphasis regarding the case for limits on population growth, the case is becoming persuasive for a growing number of Americans. The matter surely is urgent and will remain so—unless some fundamental changes are made in the modes of life in industrial societies and in the planetary human demography. Indeed, the real argument regarding population stabilization has shifted from "whether?" to "how?" and "how soon?" Having such a policy in place as a matter of both law and institutions would not automatically tell us how to handle the immigration problem. It would, however, be incompatible with current flows of immigrants into the United States and would reinforce the pressures to revise our immigration law and its administration in order to achieve an effective limit.

Among the goals of immigration policy, stabilization would be included along with family reunification, a haven for refugees, labor-force needs, etc. In time, stabilization might become paramount. Yet the necessity for restriction would not derive from racial or ethnic dislikes, disguised as taxpayers' revolts against heavy welfare costs. Restriction of immigration, like the other components of a population policy—e.g., universal access to family planning, information, and technology—should come in a climate of ethnic and religious pluralism and tolerance, gradualism, and recognition of the international impacts of immigration-policy reforms, as well as the responsibility of Western societies for some part of the transformation of Third World economies.

- **II:** *Impact on the Labor Market.* The second area that influences alignment on the immigration question is the impact the migrant and immigrant labor force has on the labor market. This is brilliantly clarified in the recent study *Manpower and Immigration Policies in the U.S.* (February 1978) by David North and Allen LeBel, conducted for the National Manpower Policy Commission. North and LeBel conclude that "the most significant consequence of illegal immigration appears to be the creation of a two-class society." They argue that some significant job displacement and a general depression of wages and standards are the inevitable results of having large numbers of people without U.S. citizenship working at the bottom of the labor market. Unwittingly these "create and maintain substantial inequities in what is supposed to be an egalitarian society." In the authors' view, the presence of these workers lowers wages at the bottom, prevents change in basic structure of the secondary labor market,[2] skews income distribution in a regressive direction, and perpetuates a two-class labor force. The authors make the unassailable point that such workers represent only a temporary solution, for their aspirations and those of their children will rise; eventually they will resent and in their turn abandon jobs they formerly sought, leaving an unreformed secondary labor

[1]Kingsley Davis and others have estimated that about 100 million Americans would represent our country's full population load, at optimal carrying capacity. The issue deserves intense investigation; prudence suggests early stabilization to preserve options until the issue is better understood.

[2]One of the leading analysts of "the secondary labor market," Michael Piore of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, takes the view that illegal immigration will end when the secondary labor market is destroyed by reforms of wages and working conditions. David North, Vernon Briggs, and others reverse the order, arguing that these reforms cannot work until the pool of exploitable labor is greatly reduced.

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market to attract a fresh round of desperately poor people who will be the next underclass.

North and LeBel are convinced that Americans, white and nonwhite, would take such jobs themselves, coming off income-transfer programs, or rising up from dependency, if wages and standards were raised. Along with such a rise there must be some careful tightening of income-maintenance programs, in order to mesh this push with the pull of higher wages. The authors acknowledge that, consequently, some industries would automate or close, but the majority would survive these new labor costs, passing them on to the rest of us in bearable costs of higher lettuce prices or a dollar more per motel room for the maid. North and LeBel argue that it is time to end the current subsidy to employers, and to consumers, of such things as lettuce and restaurant meals. Taking such measures at the bottom of the labor market would finally allow the U.S. to complete its stalled effort to allow all our poor, especially minorities, to gain at last an initial productive place. Just as the legal phase was completed in the 1950s and 1960s, this would permit the completion of the economic phase of the civil-rights movement.

The policy reforms North and LeBel urge include enforcement of limited admissions, combining this difficult step with recommendations for generous amnesty for many of the illegals, and for flexibility in setting annual quotas to permit officials to respond to economic trends as well as to non-manpower considerations.

Thus this first major research effort to consider immigration from the manpower perspective urges restriction, not simply in the interest of national economic efficiency, but as the only way to extend economic opportunity to our own disadvantaged.[3]

North and LeBel's important and timely study makes us recall the intense World War I debate among socialists on the immigration issue, and it reinforces the argument of thoughtful restrictionists in important ways. Before World War I, the question of immigration deeply divided the American radical community. It was not their finest intellectual hour. Often laced with racism, arguments were simplistic yet touched upon fundamental questions. The pre-World War I socialists discerned some of the basic questions that, I believe, today's radicals will reoccupy when they bring themselves to face the issue squarely.

American socialists, on the one hand, were guided by Karl Marx's vision of an international working class and so were instinctively open-border advocates. On the other, they knew from long and frustrating experience that the continuous arrival of masses of relatively docile, impoverished people from Europe and Asia was a more important factor than any other in delaying the final reckoning of a militant working class with the exploitative features of American industrialism.

The organized labor movement made its choice between these two stands. The AFL condemned unrestricted immigration and added its weight to the movement that culminated in the restrictive laws of 1921 and '24. The Socialist party could not decide. One group welcomed immigrants as brother laborers from abroad, though most of this wing had a tendency to see Asian immigrants as "unassimilable" (racial attitudes, not research, prompted this position). Another wing suspected that the AFL was correct, and that large-scale immigration was inimical to working-class progress in America.

The 1910 party congress came at the end of a decade when immigration had run to about a million annually. Victor Berger led those—drawn mostly from native-American and Southern trade unions—who urged restriction. American workers were to be put first, Berger and his group maintained, not some distant international working class. Daniel DeLeon and Eugene Debs led those who opposed restriction. Debs, calling it "utterly unsocialistic, reactionary, and in truth outrageous," entreated socialists to keep America a home for all the exploited who could make their way here.

Morris Hillquit fashioned a compromise bridging the two positions, and his resolution was adopted by the 1910 convention:

[3]The overall economic impact of immigration, as distinct from the more focused question of the manpower impacts, has produced a large literature. The most influential study may also be the worst: vols. 6 to 28 of the 1911 Dillingham Commission Report. This monument to bias blamed the "new" immigrant for a variety of economic ills, including depressed wages, a high rate of industrial accidents, job displacement, and even depressions. Isaac A. Hourwich's *Immigration and Labor* (1912) exposed the lack of evidence behind all of these (and other) alleged economic impacts (see also Oscar Handlin, "Old Immigrants and New," in *Race and Nationality in American Life*, 1950). Economists and economic historians in recent years generally assume that the Dillingham arguments were not only unproved but wrong. Studies like North and LeBel's thus work against a strong prejudice among labor-market scholars, for they appear to be reviving the job-displacement argument of the discredited Dillingham era. Of course, they do not; they are studying contemporary immigration and the contemporary labor market.

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> The Socialist Party favors all legislative measures tending to prevent the immigration of strikebreakers and contract laborers, and the mass immigration of workers from foreign countries, brought about by the employing classes for the purpose of weakening the organization of American labor, and of lowering the standard of life of American workers.

On the other hand:

> The Party is opposed to the exclusion of any immigrants on account of their race or nationality, and demands that the U.S. be at all times maintained as a free asylum for all men and women persecuted by the governments of their countries on account of their politics, religion, or race.

At the time, the population of the U.S. was approximately 80 million, and of the world less than 2 billion.

The 1910 position of the Socialist party on immigration, while it may seem at first an adroit straddle of incompatible commitments, is not without consistency. Standing upon the conviction that mass immigration was economically and politically harmful to the American working class, the party came out for restriction yet edged away from racial considerations, and endorsed what amounted to an open door for political refugees. Times have changed, and today's awesome millions of refugees make an open door impossible. Otherwise, the 1910 position still seems sound; the left may well return to it. Today's law is still essentially in accord with the socialist compromise of 1910, since the 1965 amendments removed racial quotas (though racial preference has been de facto reversed, as family reunification features give most weight to nonwhites). Current *practice*, however, is almost unlimited immigration. No socialist, to my knowledge, objects.

This situation, in time, will surely be disturbed. History explains the curious unanimity of America's radical community around the open-border position (or the position of silence, which holds to the same course). For since the pre-World War I restrictionism rested substantially upon racist attitudes, post-World War II radicals and liberals have not reopened the discussion. As usual, the rank and file must awaken the intellectuals. The leadership of organized labor has found the ranks pervaded by a rising sentiment against illegal workers, and opposition reaches even to the Mexican-American and Filipino workers in Cesar Chavez's union in the fields. The official labor-movement position is now for restrictionist reform, a position taken forcefully by the Secretary of Labor. Another rank and file also stirs: the leadership of the NAACP and the Urban League—older, sophisticated, enlightened, tolerant—has been surprised and alarmed by the rising antialien sentiment from the grass roots.[4]

Like most socialists, the black leadership chiefly holds to its Debsian position of sympathy for human beings so impoverished that they are willing to uproot from their old home and join the American adventure. But the pressure mounts from below for a different position. Sensitive people of progressive outlook are dismayed that the American poor and the newly arrived poor are increasingly in conflict. The enemy ought to be the exploiter, not ragged immigrant and migrant laborers worse off than our own disadvantaged. But the dilemma is inescapable, and socialists today ought to face and debate it just as the party did in 1910.

The left today certainly has a stronger research base than had the pre-World War I socialists for the view that massive immigration undercuts the American workers and poor. There are the works on labor-market impact by North and LeBel, Vernon Briggs, Robert Birrell, the General Accounting Office, and others, as well as Peter Lindner's arresting argument (in his book *Fertility and Scarcity in America*, 1978) that income inequality is linked causally to high fertility rates, and that "the shutting off of immigration has been a major force in leveling incomes in the U.S." Thus we see that the main victim of illegal immigration is not the taxpayer of Howard Jarvis's concern but rather the unskilled domestic worker. Some of the friends of the latter ought to be moving from silence onto the middle ground of responsible restrictionism, as Hillquit staked it out in 1910.

I anticipate the comment that this essay is tinged with today's "era of limits" mood, since it argues that Americans must choose between an achievable degree of social progress at home and the

[4]The Mexican-American position on illegal immigration is monolithic and unthinking only if one reads the newspaper accounts of "Chicano leaders." Actually, the position is ambivalent and complex. Chicanos understand the truth of George Sanchez's remark in 1966: "Time and time again, just as we [the Chicano population] have been on the verge of cutting our bicultural problems to manageable proportions, uncontrolled mass immigrations from Mexico have erased the gains and accentuated the cultural indigestion." Among Latins generally, the Puerto Rican population in the East is known to harbor strong objections to illegal immigration.

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conflicting interest of a small and mobile portion of the international proletariat. This essay does suggest that we lower our expectations in order to make headway where we can. It draws upon a largely forgotten part of the reform heritage in the U.S., eclipsed because of a suspected kinship with something bad called "isolationism." Many figures on the left in this century—Herbert Croly, Bob LaFollette, Jerome Frank, Rex Tugwell, Charles Beard, and William Appleman Williams—have argued that social reconstruction at home could only be successfully pursued if the nation was adequately protected from disruptive inflows of labor and capital, from military entanglements abroad, from doctrinal commitments to Open Doors, and other devices for postponing internal reorganization. Socialism, or at least reform, in one country! This theme in our social thought now deserves a stronger resonance.

I would suggest another shift in outlook that should prove beneficial. We ought to approach all complex social questions with a steady awareness of the need to view matters holistically, in light of all aspects. This apparently unexceptional advice leads to a perspective on immigration at odds with the open-door leanings of the intelligentsia. Too often those who consider the immigration problem fix their eyes upon the human distress of individuals who encamp just south of the border, or who overstay on visas from India, Jamaica, or Korea. Eventually we know them, hire them, and they become palpable. The social process is not foremost; visible distress informs our conclusions that the sum total of human happiness was enhanced by migration.

But a larger frame must be glimpsed. We must consider more than individuals wishing to solve their problems by change of residence. It is not even enough to consider only America's own minorities to whom the promise of equal opportunity cannot be kept without sealing off the labor market to the unchecked access of Third World manpower. We must also consider the millions who remain in the impoverished countries, unable to solve individual problems by emigration. And there is disquieting evidence that the loss of persons with intelligence, energy, and the seeds of modern aspirations works an impoverishment upon the societies from which these immigrants come.

Immigration, of course, blends diverse human strands, and the "drain" upon the "sending" societies extracts both the trained and the untrained—but usually includes the best, the most restless. All observers concede that the safety valve offered to the Mexican ruling orders by the open border to the North delays a decisive confrontation with that nation's undone revolutionary tasks. More candid thought needs to be given to the extent to which migration in the 20th century has always acted, within and among nations, as a conservative force postponing social reconstruction. Indeed, large-scale immigration may be seen as a system of social control, a sort of well-meaning triage, in which the interests of a few mobile people are protected at the expense of those who cannot or do not leave and stay behind to suffer proverty and oppressive social systems.

It is time that such questions once again trouble and divide the American left. The assumptions of limitless space and resources, of the economic benefits of cheap labor, and of the presumed "elevator effect" of immigration upon the native poor, all beg reconsideration. While we would wish it otherwise, time has invalidated laissez-faire on immigration. We should come to prefer to the endless temporizing with social pathologies that mass immigration reflect the broader good of the poor in both "sending" and "receiving" societies, which can only come about if all are now forced to deal with the causes of poverty directly and immediately. And if others will not, our own example may, with the ending of large-scale immigration, be both ecologically and socially more responsible.

Restrictionism, of course, cannot aim to fully end immigration. But it is pledged to limited admissions out of a recognition that, although immigration is a solution to human problems that worked for our ancestors and ourselves, in this different demographic and ecological time it becomes increasingly a solution only for a very few. It delays devising solutions for the great mass of those whose lives will be spent not in physical escape but in learning—with our sacrificial help and resolute example—to manage what they have. □

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[5]Problems of implementation of a controlled immigration policy present technical and political difficulties going beyond the present scope. The new restrictionism would insist upon *no* mass deportation, a reasonable and firm one-time amnesty, employer sanctions backed by a national work card as in Europe, scrupulous protection for the rights of "foreign-appearing" people, adequate resources for enforcement, and more than lip-service to the U.S. obligation to extend economic and family-planning assistance to nations central to our immigration dilemma. There must also be an effort to change lifestyles in the First World, to accommodate as well as instruct developing societies. As John Tanton writes: "I opt for a society in which individuals at least do some of their own maintenance and accept resultant lower levels of consumption." □

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Michael Piore

Another View on Migrant Workers

It is difficult to do justice in a brief article to the complexities of American immigration policy. Nonetheless, Otis L. Graham's attempt in his argument for restrictive immigration is extremely disturbing. It creates a distorted picture of the nature and magnitude of current immigration; the economic analysis of the phenomenon is weak and, I believe, ultimately wrong: it displays a naive and perverse understanding of the social and political realities of immigration in American life.

The Magnitude of the Immigration

THE UNITED STATES ADMITS about 400,000 immigrants annually: most of these are close relatives of American citizens: a relatively small proportion are members of the labor force. There is also an influx of undocumented immigrants, most of whom come to work here. The size of this flow is by its very nature unknown. Most analysts believe the number of undocumented workers here at any one time to be between 3 and 5 million, a very large number in a labor force of 100 million but nowhere near the estimates presented by Graham. Estimates as high as Graham's 8 to 10 million were frequent in early discussions of the issue, but they basically derived from initial efforts of the Immigration and Naturalization Service to dramatize the problems it faces, and have not stood up under close scrutiny. Graham uses the number of deportable aliens apprehended as the basis of his figures. Such apprehensions have the most tenuous relationship to the flow of undocumented workers. *That* flow is composed of the number of people who were *not* apprehended. An increase in apprehensions can indicate either an increase in the number of attempted entries or an increase in the number of potential entrants who are caught, or both. The same person, moreover, is often apprehended more than once. But even if by coincidence apprehensions were equal to the *flow* of undocumented entrants, this would indicate very little about the *stock* of undocumented workers. A large proportion of the undocumented migration is *temporary* (a fact of great importance for the argument developed below); one study found that the average length of stay of undocumented Mexicans is six months. Studies of comparable migrations in other periods of American history and in other countries point in the same direction. One-third of the European immigrants who came to the U.S. in the pre-World I period went home. Only 50 percent of the foreign workers in France, it is estimated, will stay permanently. Finally, whatever the stock of the undocumented population, you cannot simply cumulate documented immigration and add that number, as Graham would have us do, to obtain the total. Some of the documented migration is also temporary and a lot of it (for Mexicans, some say as much as 70 percent) consists of undocumented entrants who are regularizing their status.

The Forces Governing the Migration

THE PROBLEM with Graham's argument, however, is not the data but the analysis he presents of the forces governing the process. Graham would have us believe that the basic cause of the immigration we have been experiencing in recent years is low income and population pressure in the underdeveloped world. The facts, however, do not support this hypothesis. The income differential between the United States and the countries contributing to the current immigration has always been large. If we were going to be inundated for this reason, we should have been inundated long ago. The per capita income in most of these countries is, both relatively and absolutely, higher today than it was in the past. (The major exception is Haiti.) One might argue that the cost of transportation has fallen, but in terms of hourly earnings in the United States, air transportation today from the Caribbean costs approximately what steamship transportation from Europe cost in the 1880s. The immigrants themselves seem to come not from the poorest segments of the population but from people who already own or control some economic resources (usually land) and who seek, through temporary work in the United States, funds to expand their holdings and advance socially at home. This was also true of the majority of the

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immigrant groups from Southern and Eastern Europe prior to World War I.

Finally, there is absolutely no evidence of spontaneous immigration in response to economic differentials or population pressures. In most cases that have been studied, the immigration has been initiated by explicit recruitment efforts by American employers or their agents. The exceptions are population movements triggered by political upheavals in the country of origin.

At least in its early stages, immigration appears to be governed not by the characteristics of the migrants or the incomes and population pressures at the place of origin but rather by the structure of jobs available in the United States. The migrants are coming to take a very particular set of jobs. I have tried elsewhere to explain the characteristics of these jobs and their role in the productive system. The characteristics most important for understanding the migration process are their menial, often degrading social status, their lack of job security, and their paucity of opportunities for career advancement. These characteristics make the jobs extremely unattractive to U.S. nationals. Migrants, however, tend to be indifferent to many of these job characteristics because they view their stay as temporary. Many migrants return home after a short time and still more plan initially to do so. They think of themselves as coming to accumulate resources that will promote their social advancement at home. Because they view themselves as rooted in the social structure of their home communities, they see the work abroad as purely instrumental and are indifferent to the social status of the job. As one Mexican put it: "If I am going to do that work, I would rather do it there and then come home and be myself." Because their stay is viewed as temporary, the migrants are also indifferent to the insecurity and lack of career advancement to which permanent residents are sensitive.

The difficulty with temporary migration as a way of filling these positions is that the migration almost never remains temporary. Many people stay much longer than intended and either begin to see themselves as permanent residents or, more usually, have children, raised in the States, who do so. These children aspire to much the same kind of jobs as other permanent residents, and begin to resist the work of their parents either by rejecting the jobs outright or by contesting managerial authority in the workplace. Once permanent settlement develops, relatives abroad come to join their families in the States: these latter immigrants often think of the move as permanent and aspire therefore to jobs competitive with those of nationals. The reaction of employers to these developments is almost always to recruit a new wave of temporary migrants.

This pattern is one of very long standing in all capitalist economies. In the United States, it began in the late 19th and the early 20th century with the recruitment of immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe. When those migration streams were cut off by World War I, Northern industry turned for the first time to recruit black migrants from the rural South. The current migration from Latin America and the Caribbean has been produced by the exhaustion of that labor reserve and the resistance that the urban black labor force, increasingly dominated in the 1960s by children born in the North, has shown to their parents' jobs. A similar resistance by second-generation European immigrants in the 1930s sparked the industrial union movement. The industrial union movement was extremely successful in changing many of the job characteristics, raising their social status, and introducing job security and systematic promotion patterns. And these changes in the character of the jobs the older immigrant groups already held were an important part of the story of social advancement for those ethnic communities. Blacks have been much less successful in forcing changes in the workplaces where they are already employed, and their protest therefore has tended to end in the higher unemployment rates we observe among black youth. This high unemployment originally was a result of the changing worker attitudes but is now increasingly attributable to employer preferences for the new migration streams they have succeeded in generating. Nonetheless, it is extremely doubtful that black unemployment could be reduced by reabsorption in these same jobs, *without* major changes in the job characteristics.

One must then ask a question that Graham, with his emphasis on population pressure abroad, never recognizes: why do the jobs have these characteristics and what role do such jobs play in the economy? A full answer cannot be developed here. Simplifying greatly, here are some of the factors:

- First of all, quite a number of such jobs or job characteristics are simply built into established patterns of consumption, work relations, and the like, and embedded in the inertia that surrounds all

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such customary social relations. Thus, we are accustomed in restaurants to eating off china dishes, rather than paper plates, and this generates resistance to the elimination of dishwashers in the backroom. In the backroom, there is a customary pattern of wage relationships that makes it difficult to raise the dishwasher's wage high enough to compensate native workers for the menial character of the job without raising the wages of the waiter and the chef to astronomical levels.

- Second, a great many of the jobs held by migrants appear to complement and sustain the jobs of national workers, and could not be eliminated without compromising these. For example, it is extremely difficult to sustain job-security arrangement in an economy where demand continues to fluctuate if all factors of production are fixed and producers are never able to reduce their costs. One of the ways in which producers sustain the job-security provision obtained by industrial unions in the 1930s is by transferring short-term increases in demand to jobs where the rules are more flexible. Many of these jobs are held by temporary migrants. (One of the reasons, incidently, why second-generation immigrants were more successful in changing job characteristics than second-generation urban blacks was that the unions in the 1930s preempted much of the space within a capitalist economic system for such secure jobs and, hence, the system as a whole is now much more resistant to job reform.)

I personally am very skeptical about our ability to eliminate the second type of jobs, i.e., those complementary to the work of nationals, without changes in the economic system, changes whose nature we do not fully understand and whose dimensions would be difficult to contemplate. I do believe that we could change wages and consumption so as to do without jobs that are simply built into established patterns. The adjustments might be difficult and, in the short run, inflationary. It is not clear that we are willing to pay the price; but it is probably possible to do. New York City has managed to make sanitation work a preferred occupation and there are lists of native workers waiting for jobs that in most of the rest of the industrial world are held by migrants. The only way to limit the number of jobs for which we seem to need migrants is, I am convinced, through a direct attack upon adverse job characteristics, *not* through attempts to curtail the migration. Wages and working conditions in menial jobs are already controlled by federal legislation. If we want to make such jobs more attractive (and/or less prevalent) the way to do so is to raise the minimum wage, expand overtime provisions, augment health and safety regulations, increase protection for union organization, and so on.

The difficulty with the alternative—attempting to limit the labor supply—is that it tends to drive the market underground and results in the end in an expansion of exactly the jobs that we initially tried to eliminate. This occurs because it is apparently possible to put together a political coalition in favor of restricting immigration so long as the electorate does not perceive the implications of such restrictions for the patterns of consumption, job security, wage relationships, and so on to which they are adjusted. Often, in fact, political support is generated by focusing attention on permanent immigrants already firmly rooted in the community and competing with nationals in the labor market, thus drawing it away from less visible temporary workers whose work is complementary.

When, however, new legislation begins to be implemented and the economic impact becomes apparent, the coalition that supported the legislation disintegrates. The supporters connive in efforts to circumvent the law, and as members of the electorate they deny the resources to the enforcement agencies that would be required to prevent them from doing so. The net effect is to push the immigration process beyond the law where the legal restraints upon wages and working conditions, which place a floor on the labor market and limit the expansion of customary patterns, are no longer operative. Gradually, the "customary" consumption begins to expand. One can already see this process at work in New York and Los Angeles, with the reemergence of the sweat shop, industrial homework, and other working conditions of the late 19th century. The process is gradual, but it is hard to see its ultimate limits. Perhaps, one day, every American household will have a foreign maid.

The alternative, as suggested above, is to press for increases in minimum labor standards. These are proposals that people understand in economic terms: indeed, the implications are explicit and calculable; support for the regulations is more genuine and more readily translatable into support for their implementation. It may not, of course, be possible to curtail the immigrant labor market in this way but at least we will avoid the perverse effects that the current pattern of extralegal immigration seems to have.

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Social and Political Factors

IF GRAHAM MISCONSTRUES the nature of the economic forces that underlies the immigration process, he seems completely unaware of the social and political context in which immigration policy in the United States is made. He seems to be under the impression that contemporary immigration is solely a matter of Asians and Latin Americans. It is probably true that the majority of migrants—especially if one includes the undocumented—comes from these areas, but virtually all of the historic ethnic communities in the United States (the exceptions are the English, Scandinavians, and Germans) continue to experience in-migration. Not all of this "traditional" migration is, moreover, documented and some of the groups where undocumented immigration is significant—such as Italians, Poles, and Irish—wield considerable political power. Other groups have a strong interest in open immigration even though the number of people actually coming at this time is not so large: Jews, for example, because of persecution in the Soviet Union and the precarious position of the state of Israel, have an interest of this kind. For many members of these groups, immigration policy controls the terms of access to close relatives living abroad (or clandestinely in the States). Even those of us without family connections have social and psychological ties abroad that commit us to a relatively open policy, at least for members of our own group. These commitments, it is important to emphasize, are not moral abstractions: they are fundamental to individual identity and to the quality and fabric of everyday life, and take priority over clean air, open space, and the like, which seem to animate Graham, however much we may also value those things.

Given these commitments, it is virtually impossible to design a policy of limited immigration meeting the demands of the older ethnic groups that hold significant political power without imposing an elaborate system of racial and national quotas. Although we removed such quotas from the legislation in 1966, they remain the reality of current immigration policy, imposed through administrative practice; it is difficult to see how we could limit immigration further without legislative commitments that would require a renewed national commitment to an ideology of explicit racism. To talk, as Graham does, of a nonracist approach to restricted immigration is, in other words, a pious wish inconsistent with the social and political reality of American life.

And the Larger Moral Issues

WHILE IT IS POSSIBLE to dismiss Graham's arguments on analytical and empirical grounds as simply inconsistent with the realities of economic, social, and political life, I think it is important to say something about the normative values that infuse his writing. Population pressures and low incomes abroad may be largely irrelevant to the size of immigration flows, and in this we who are living in the United States may be lucky. But if it were not true, should we, as Graham suggests, close ourselves off from the rest of the world and create an enclave of open space, ecological balance, and high consumption in our overpopulated, polluted, and starving world? I say, no. Our achievements, such as they are, rest upon an intellectual and technical heritage that we share with all humanity. What we have contributed individually and collectively is trivial compared to the base of knowledge and of past resource accumulation upon which that contribution is built and to which all peoples have contributed over the course of history.

To the extent that what we have is "man-made," it has been made by the collective efforts of all humankind and we have no particular rights to its rewards. To the extent that it is not man-made and derives rather from the fact that we live on an underpopulated continent, what distinguishes us from those who live elsewhere is simply luck. Most of us would not be here at all did our ancestors not happen to live in some village where American employers were recruiting at a particular moment when the American economy was experiencing a labor shortage. Most of us would not be here had our relatives not mistakenly thought they could make enough money in the States to go home quickly: had they not failed in their initial ambition or fallen into hasty marriages and unplanned pregnancies when they got here. We ourselves would not have escaped the population pressures that plague the rest of the world did we not happen to have access to a technology that permits us to control family size and to live in a society where the economic and social constraints reward small families rather than large ones. And here too our position is largely an accident of history that places us on a continent where the peoples who might assert a stronger historical claim have been wiped out, and where we have convenient access to technology that is really a common human heritage.

Graham's normative argument seems to rest

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upon a morality of radical individualism, upon a willingness to judge human actions divorced from any larger social context, upon a refusal to recognize individuals as part of a larger community, and current conditions as a legacy of a shared human history. Ultimately, it is this view that accounts for the analytical weakness of his argument as well: he fails to understand the social and political forces governing American immigration policy because he fails to appreciate the fact that individuals define themselves in relation to social groups. And he fails to recognize the importance of the economic structure because he wants to understand economic outcomes in terms of the characteristics and actions of individuals rather than in terms of the socioeconomic context from which individual characteristics derive their significance and which constrain human behavior. This world view has a long history in the United States as a moral philosophy and an analytical tradition: on that point, at least, Graham is undoubtedly right. I have always thought of it as a basically right-wing position: that, in American politics, the terms liberal or radical meant something else than they do in the European context. But Graham may be right on this too. Beyond that, I am sure he is wrong. Right or left, his is a prescription for suffering, unworthy of the tradition of left-wing politics in the United States. □

In this article Michael J. Piore draws heavily on an argument developed more fully in his book *Birds of Passage, Labor Migration and Industrial Societies* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979). □

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30 Rockefeller Plaza.

EASTERN NEWSSTAND,
350 Fifth Ave.

EASTERN NEWSSTAND,
540 Madison Ave.

EASTERN NEWSSTAND,
200 Park Ave.

ADLO CIGARS,
2758 Broadway.

ANN-FRAN STATIONERY,
238 W. 72nd St.

AURORA GOMEZ,
77th St. & Lexington Ave.

JACK GORDON,
1207 Amsterdam Ave.

R. GORDON & CO.,
12 E. 55th St.

JONIL SMOKE SHOP,
245 Third Ave.

MAXAAN SMOKE SHOP,
444 Madison Ave.

RADICONE BROS.,
2 W. 42nd St.

UNCLE'S SHOP,
2795 Broadway.

WAVERLEY SMOKE SHOP,
31 Waverly Place.

GOTTFRIED BROS.,
600 Madison Ave.

NIKO'S SMOKE SHOP,
462 Sixth Ave.

NEW YORKER BOOK SHOP,
250 W. 89th St.

RIZZOLI INT'L. BOOKSTORE,
712 Fifth Ave.

VENTURE STATIONERS,
1156 Madison Ave.

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H. W. Benson

Divided Soul of Labor Leadership

The following is excerpted from H. W. Benson's book, published last year by the Association for Union Democracy and entitled Democratic Rights for Union Members.

Soon after George Meany became its president, the AFL embarked on a campaign against corruption in unions, a battle that was continued by the newly merged AFL-CIO when it expelled the Teamsters and other unions and adopted Ethical Practices Codes. But, by 1959, the AFL-CIO had abandoned the effort. Benson finds part of the explanation of that failure in the divided soul of U.S. labor leadership. —EDS.

Most labor leaders, if they could choose at leisure, would surely opt for a clean labor movement, just as most automobile owners would prefer clean air. But they find the cleanup requirements too disagreeable.

To root out corruption, it was imperative to invigorate union democracy, encourage members to rise against suspect leaders, and protect those who might be victimized. The sorcerer's apprentice could conjure up the rushing waters but lacked the secret of controlling their power. Those who lead labor are willing, when necessary, to summon their members to battle with employers; but they prefer not to risk unleashing the power of internal union democracy against union officials.

To become an effective leader, with power, secure status, influence, and money, a union leader is compelled to develop a dual personality. He cultivates the qualities of a responsible public statesman but also those of a crafty politician; he remains a workers' leader but simultaneously evolves into a bureaucrat.

As leaders, union officers collectively are spokesmen for millions of wage earners. In private bargaining and public negotiations, often in great strikes, they help lead the way to a better life: pensions, health insurance, better pay, shorter hours, vacations, a measure of security. As leaders, they wield power in national elections, in political lobbying, occasionally in mass demonstrations.

In a hundred years, a majority of America's industrial working class, beginning as a beast of burden, rose to the status of self-respecting and respected citizens of the United States. After assessing various analyses and criticisms—they might have done better, they could have done worse—we can reasonably surmise that this historic transformation was achieved by a labor movement headed by a mixed bag of leaders perhaps not too different from those we know today. The long ordeal of farm workers, extended battles with Farrah and J.P. Stevens, bitter mine strikes are not remnants of a forgotten past, they are a modern reminder that the essential role of unions and union leadership continues.

A self-image—workers' tribune and nation's statesman—is surely implanted in the consciousness of every competent labor leader, bringing justified pride, a sense of fulfillment, the satisfaction of leading a useful life. In this role, history sees union leaders at their most admirable: John L. Lewis carrying the CIO flag, then braving wartime hysteria to defend the miners; Walter Reuther at the battle of the overpass and in the great sit-ins; and, even if on a less heroic scale, George Meany speaking out for low-paid sweatshop workers during Nixon's wage freeze, when labor's liberal friends were silent.

In their identification with a great social movement, in their capacity as workers' leaders, most union officers would surely rejoice to see a labor movement purged of corruption, wholly dedicated to its membership, honored for its democracy and enlightenment. But they continually fall short of their own ideal standards; as union politicians—as distinguished from union leaders—

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they are men of power, driven by the need to hold tight to that power.

As a politician, the union officer develops special talents, sometimes those of a bureaucrat, sometimes of a dictator, but always the ability to maintain and strengthen his own base. He formulates programs and switches them, exchanges enemies and friends, makes and breaks alliances; and through all the permutations and combinations, one thread of consistency remains: he jealously guards his own power in his union against even the remote shadow of threats. To solidify that power he apportions patronage jobs in the union, in industry, in union welfare funds. As a politician he demands personal loyalty from the union staff, which almost everywhere in the labor movement becomes the administration's political machine.

As a leader he often sets out to arouse his members; he organizes, seeks support during tough negotiations and strikes, calls them out to vote in public elections. And for that, he stimulates the worker's self-respect and sense of social justice, sometimes against employers, sometimes against government officials. Stand up for your rights! Solidarity! Don't be intimidated! You are as good as they are!

But as an official, jealous of power and determined to stave off opposition, he ordinarily tries to impose a different mood in the union. Don't make waves! Go along! Don't complain, especially not to outsiders! Sit down, shut up! The leader stirs up passion against bosses; the officials implant acquiescence toward themselves.

The union leader readily slips into the state of mind of the official. As he performs memorable deeds, he can easily imagine that his personal talents alone assured success, not the power of the social movement he represents. Spring comes only because he plants the grass seed. Obsessed with the notion that his union can prosper best under his leadership, he feels in his bones that he and his followers must continue to hold power, come what may. Or even without the dizzying breezes of noble philosophical rationalization, the official may resist surrendering power simply because he has learned to love its perquisites.

Running a union is a rough job, and union leaders enjoy their reputation of being "tough-minded." As tough politicians, it is difficult for them to accept the absurd notion that their role in historic events should depend upon the passing whims of workers who drop pieces of paper into ballot boxes. They take shelter behind a bureaucratic stockade against the savage thrust of democracy. Before legislation gave some federal protection to internal union democracy, many union constitutions buttressed the officialdom by outlawing caucuses, outlawing handbills, suppressing free speech, penalizing members for going to court. Oppositionists were ruled off the ballot, elections were stolen, trusteeships were arbitrarily imposed upon rebel locals. Most of these practices are now illegal, but are often continued by subterfuge. The distrust of democracy remains, nicely illustrated by what David McDonald, when he was Steelworkers secretary, once said to the union's research director: "I never could trust anyone I couldn't buy."

Recognizing common qualities in each other, expecting and admiring them, union leaders come to accept a tacit agreement on noninterference in each other's internal affairs. If there is any single unforgivable offense in the labor movement, it is the mortal sin of supporting internal opposition in some other leader's union.

The opposing forces that tug at labor leadership act upon the whole labor movement, creating that great paradox: seen from one angle, the labor movement is a powerful force for democracy and social progress; but from another, it is often undemocratic and repressive in its own internal life.

As a last-ditch defense against challenge, a union officialdom is protected by the right of most international executive boards to rule on disputes and appeals. With this power, the officers are transformed into a union supreme court that can cut down critics and bolster supporters at every level of union structure.

ONE HONORABLE EXCEPTION is the United Auto Workers' union. Under Walter Reuther, the union established a Public Review Board composed of respected persons outside the labor movement and independent of the union power structure, known for their attachment to democratic principles and their sympathy for unions. The Board serves as an impartial highest court with jurisdiction over complaints and appeals, except those relating to collective-bargaining policy. It is armed with authority to overturn decisions of the union's top bodies including the International Executive Board. By relinquishing some of their own power to the Public Review Board, UAW leaders strengthened their union's democracy.

Public Review has not weakened UAW officers as leaders; in effect, it limits their authority only as union politicians. Nevertheless, not a single major union now emulates the UAW. The leadership of,

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say, the Machinists, the Steelworkers, or the big electrical unions would not crumble if their members gained access to a truly nonpartisan union appeals body. Rejection of the public review principle, in all likelihood, arises out of an ingrained, almost pathological, distrust of the unpredictable consequences of democracy. No danger today? Who knows what tomorrow may bring. Better hold tightly to every ounce of power, especially the right to deal with dissenters.

Since 1958 the official labor record on internal reform has been bleak. Faced with new massive exposures in the building trades, on the waterfront, and elsewhere, Federation leaders took no public notice and remained silent. They had tried reform and had abandoned it as hopeless.

In the 30 years since the end of World War II, not one major union is reported to have taken any significant lasting step to strengthen the rights of members in their unions, except the UAW with its Public Review Board. In two unions, reform leaders were murdered: in 1965, Lloyd Green and Dow Wilson were assassinated when they threatened to uncover the theft of Painters insurance funds in California; in 1970, Jock Yablonski, leader of an insurgent group in the United Mine Workers, was killed. From the AFL-CIO no word of protest or outrage. When votes were stolen in the Painters, in the Miners, and in the Steelworkers, no comment from AFL-CIO leaders.

On the other hand, AFL-CIO union leaders have consistently opposed the interests of union democracy in key court cases. In *Salzhandler vs. Caputo* (1963), the Brotherhood of Painters opposed the basic rights of free speech in unions. In *Calhoon vs. Harvey* (1965), the AFL-CIO joined the Marine Engineers Beneficial Association against the right of union members to go to court in union election cases. In *Brennan vs. Bachowski* (1975), the Steelworkers intervened to argue against allowing unionists recourse in court against arbitrary and irrational decisions of the Secretary of Labor on election complaints.

The wheel has turned full circle. There are unions where members' rights are respected, unions that prove that the labor movement can be strong, *and* clean, *and* democratic. But there is still the unfinished task of rooting out corruption where it is entrenched, of restoring democratic rights where they are suppressed. With no sign and little likelihood of renewed initiative from the nation's influential labor leaders, the prospect for reform from above seems remote. If there is to be hope and help, it must come from somewhere else.

The destiny of union democracy is frequently linked to social ideology or political platform: the program of my opponent inexorably undermines it, while mine will surely protect it. The anti-Communist is convinced that the threat to workers' rights in their own organizations stems principally from Communist totalitarianism and from its fellow-travelers; he is confident that union democracy will be adequately served so long as a general laborite-democratic policy prevails in the nation. The left-wing revolutionary is equally convinced that union democracy is endangered simply because the dominant labor leaders are, in his opinion, agents of the imperialist bourgeoisie in the ranks of the working class; he is certain that the whole problem will vanish as soon as the old *mis*leadership is replaced by a new, genuinely revolutionary, leadership.

But the history of the labor movement and the experience of workers under various social regimes have shown that there is always the need to defend workers' democracy—regardless of who leads or claims to lead the working class, whether that leadership is procapitalist, prosocialist, or pro-Communist. The difficulties of union democracy cut across the lines of social and political programs; they arise not from ideology but from life, from the contrasting, sometimes antagonistic, interests of workers and their own leaders.

There is nothing novel in this thought; it was developed in detail some 60 years ago by Robert Michels in his analysis of workers' leadership in European social democracy. As a classroom abstraction, his ideas percolate through the thinking even of those labor intellectuals and educators who ordinarily refrain from applying such notions to the mainstream of the American labor movement. When we consider the state of union democracy in the United States, however, they begin to have more than classroom implications.

Officers and members share a common outlook on most social and political issues of the day, but when it comes to union democracy there is often a bitter conflict of interest. The officials are amply equipped with power to take care of themselves under almost any conditions; but without internal union democracy, workers have no guarantee that the union will continue to protect their wage standards, pension funds, job security, health, and safety. When workers lose control of their union, and they have nowhere to turn inside the labor movement, they must look outside. Although their

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union may have become dictatorial, they live in a democratic country; and so they turn for support to the government; and they seek allies in the community, allies who share a common interest in democracy and who, unlike most labor leaders, are not inhibited from supporting democracy in unions.

The right of workers to organize won the support of government in the mid-1930s; unionism rose swiftly and spectacularly. The right of workers to democracy in their unions was backed by federal law in 1959; progress has come, but slowly, slowly. □

David Salomon and Jules Bernstein

The Corporate Thrust in American Politics

Since the late '60s American business has consolidated its organizational structure so as to vastly increase its political and economic power. A recent *Fortune* magazine article, entitled "Business is Learning How to Win in Washington," detailing many such changes, opens with a conversation between two lobbyists for the Business Roundtable on how to defeat the Consumer Protection bill:

> Just a few blocks from the White House, in Room 811 of one of Washington's least memorable office buildings, this conversation is going on between two men, one of whom is holding a list of congressmen in his hand:
>
> "Henry Gonzalez of San Antonio . . . should we use Sears? We have problems with Jake Pickle on this, I'm not sure we can get him . . . . OK, let's ask Sears about Gonzalez. . . . Delaney of Long Island . . . well, Delaney's a character still he was helpful as chairman of the Rules Commitee. . . . Bristol-Myers is close to Delaney, let Bill Greif handle that. . . .
>
> "Gaydos of Pennsylvania . . . ask Alcoa if they'll do it, John Harper was very enthusiastic about this one. . . . Hatfield of Continental could do it but I hate to ask him. . . . Marks of Sharon, Pennsylvania . . . ask Ferguson of General Foods to call Kirby of Westinghouse about Marks. . . .
>
> "Gore of Tennessee . . . Carrier Corp. and TRW . . . do we really have a chance with Gore? We really think we do? Ask Lloyd Hand of TRW. . . . Let's be careful . . . but if we haven't done our job by now . . . but we have, we've got the votes and we know it."

The secret weapon of this new corporate campaign is the corporate Political Action Committee (PAC). The 1975 election laws permitted enterprises to solicit management for funds and then to donate up to $5,000 to a political candidate. After the resolution of the *Sun Oil* case, which clarified how executives may be solicited, the use of PACs by corporations has skyrocketed. Today there are more than 1,000 PACs compared to 139 in 1974. The total net worth of corporate, trade association and right-wing PACs is $54 million, in contrast to $13 million for labor.

The ultraright has entered the PAC arena in a major way and now controls more than $6.5 million in PAC funds. These include the nation's three largest PACs: Ronald Reagan's Citizens for the Republic ($2.1 million), National Conservative PAC ($2 million), and the Committee for Survival of a Free Congress ($1.5 million). Experts anticipate huge increases in probusiness PACs.

Fortune also reported a growing trend toward political cooperation among business groups to defeat proconsumer and prolabor legislation. Such coalitions offer two major attractions. First, they permit the business community to share expenses for lobbying efforts. Over 100 organizations lobbied against situs picketing, 400 against consumer protection, and 600 against labor law reform. In the last case, *Business Week* (11/22/78) reported that $5 million was spent by such groups (not to mention the $2 million spent by the National Right to Work Committee). Second, such coalitions establish huge umbrella organizations, which can draw on extensive grass-roots networks, skilled lobbyists, and the clout of prominent corporate Chief Executive Officers (CEO).

Perhaps central to the new business strategy is direct lobbying by businessmen and especially CEOs, who have become the new political power brokers. Unlike older breeds of corporate lobbyists, congressmen know that these individuals often control corporate policy.

In order to exploit this idea, trade associations have established "direct-contact" networks in every state and congressional district. At the push of a Telex button, hundreds of executives are on the phone to their congressmen. The Associated General Contractors organization has 113 "legislative network chapters" around the country, while the Chamber has 2,200 "Congressional

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Action Committees." Its Washington office distributes 100,000 Action bulletins during key legislative battles that, *The Nation* recently reported, reach an estimated 7 million people.

Yet, the *sine qua non* of the direct lobbying approach is the Business Roundtable, which *Business Week* has called "the most powerful lobby in Washington." Indeed, the Roundtable is composed largely of CEOs drawn from and limited to the 500 largest companies. Doors open quickly when such powerful figures come "a-calling" on the hill.

The Roundtable's influence stems from the concentrated economic power of its *Fortune* Five Hundred members. Such corporate giants as AT&T, Exxon, IBM, and General Motors, each could muster huge organizational resources on their own. In concert, they are the overriding force in the American economy. In 1977 the *Fortune* Five Hundred accounted for 55 percent of the American GNP with $1.1 trillion in sales. AT&T alone controlled nearly $100 billion in assets, with Exxon and GM second and third at $38.5 billion and $26.7 billion respectively. Furthermore, the Policy Committee of the Roundtable is drawn largely from *Fortune* One Hundred companies; each with assets well in excess of $1 billion and sales of more than $2.5 billion.

This power position makes Roundtable opinion indispensable to government officials and politicians. The Roundtable, for example, has been pivotal in shaping anti-inflation policy. Roundtable members dominated Nixon's Wage and Price Board, while Carter sought and secured initial compliance with his guidelines from Roundtable Executive Committee members AT&T and GM (the Executive Committee is the inner sanctum of the Policy Committee).

The Roundtable's concern with inflation has also taken the form of direct "economic organizing." Since its founding in 1972 it has actively sought to destroy the American building trades unions, sounding its battle cry against "the inflationary impact" of wages in the construction industry. It has organized 55 local "construction user groups" to "encourage" contractor trade associations to go non-union. As the principal purchasers of industrial construction, Roundtable members have the economic muscle to make this goal seem realizable. In fact, the Construction Users' Anti-Inflation Roundtable, one of three groups from which the Roundtable was formed, has been organizing these chapters since 1969.

As the Roundtable stated in its summary of *Purpose and Challenge*:

> Fiscal and monetary policies of the federal government have been blamed for demand inflation and, undoubtedly, must accept their share of the blame as well as require constructive action. *But the part of the total problem here considered is the cost of labor which is again threatening to rise precipitously. Runaway unit labor costs will make economic stability impossible.* [Emphasis added.]

The organization of the Roundtable and its success demonstrate the reason for our new political climate. Economic power is now so concentrated that it can be converted into unprecedented political power and increased economic control.

II

THE EXPANSION of corporate power presents issues of immediate concern in, at least, two other areas. They are (1) runaway shops, and (2) increased concentration through conglomeration.

(1) RUNAWAY SHOPS: Regional redistribution of capital has not only depleted the industrial base of the northeast but now is a potent political threat in the hands of big business. Recently, Lykes Corporation closed down a 4,200-worker steel plant in Campbell, Ohio, giving only a few days notice. Thus 80 percent of the town's tax base was eroded overnight and hundreds of families were left without income. There now are no legal restrictions on such practices.

Recently, runaway shops have emerged as a union-busting tactic—e.g., the Northeast textile industry. The announcement of GM's Southern strategy has dramatized that no industry, no matter how heavily unionized, is immune from such threats. Only after strong UAW protest did GM discontinue its policy. Other corporate giants, such as GE and Westinghouse, continue to move their operations South and Southwest.

Thus, as an aftermath of this capital relocation, many cities are at the mercy of the large financial institutions. Now the erosion of urban tax bases has led to near-bankruptcy in Newark, Cleveland, and New York. The result, modeled on New York's "Big Mac" (Municipal Assistance Corporation), creates what amounts to a city board of trustees. This board virtually dictates city policy in the name of "fiscal conservation."

(2) CONGLOMERATION: The tendency of companies with large cash reserves to absorb other firms is particularly damaging for two reasons. First, the use of cash reserves to buy existing capital removes investment funds from circulation. The result is a net decrease in employment on the one

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hand and increased concentrations of economic power on the other. Second, increased economic concentration has led to takeovers of tremendous social importance.

Senator Kennedy, chairman of the Senate Committee on Anti-Trust and Monopoly, has been an outspoken critic of this trend. In a recent interview he stated:

> It's very important to look at conglomerate mergers. They've increased steadily since 1972. By 1976, these may include assets valued at more than $5.5 billion, a 300% increase since 1972. . . . The staggering potential for conglomeration is suggested by the fact that Exxon could use just its cash and liquid assets to acquire, for instance, J. C. Penny, DuPont, Goodyear, and Anheuser Busch.

While corporate power has had serious external political effects, it has also undermined internal corporate politics. In a recent book, *Freedom Inside the Organization: Bringing Civil Liberties to the Workplace*, David Ewing comments: "Once a U.S. citizen steps through the plant or office door at 9:00 a.m. he or she is nearly rightless until 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday." Ewing's work dramatizes the total lack of protection for workers who refuse to pollute and spy or who "blow-the-whistle" on illegal practices.

While the rights of lower-level employees are being denied, this same rationale is used to shelter top executives from personal responsibility for corporate misconduct. The bottom line of this ethic has been an epidemic of misconduct and crime by corporate executives. The SEC's chief enforcement officer, Stanley Sporkin, recently declared:

> Whatever else these [illegal] payments may indicate about corporations and their managements, one thing is certainly clear: many corporate leaders have failed in their duties as stewards of public corporations. I am tired of hearing that all of this corporate bribery, foreign and domestic, has been done in recognition of the reality of the business value and in the name of furthering corporate business.

III

AT THE CORE of any effort to shape public opinion is the effort to shape social ideology. Corporate America understands that the prominent scholars of any period shape the ideas of intellectuals, media people, and policy-makers. And while business has always heavily funded the academic world, one recent development demonstrates a new aspect of this trend.

The American Enterprise Institute, founded in the early '70s, has become a predominant focus in American policy study. The AEI has more than 500 centers for Public Policy Research around the country. It maintains a resident faculty of more than 20 scholars, and scores of associated scholars throughout the nation. They produce studies on government regulations, economic, retirement, labor, health, legal, energy, foreign, and defense policy, and they make legislative analyses. With a massive fund-raising drive to gain $60 million, the AEI is planning to endow "Chairs of Free Enterprise" in prestigious universities across the country.

Despite claims that it "does not itself take positions on policy issues," its faculty is top-heavy with conservative analysts—including Paul McCracken, Hubert Stein, Laurence Silberman, Robert Griffin and Milton Friedman. Moreover, an analysis of its board of trustees reveals a 75 percent overlap with Business Roundtable membership.

CORPORATE REFORM: The growth of corporate power has been accompanied by a massive occupation of the political system, and this is undermining the democratic process as we have known it. Yet the truth is that the corporations have no legitimate constituency. They have survived by playing group against group—consumers versus workers, minority-group members versus whites, and women versus men. Inflation has become the new, sophisticated cleaver for promoting such divisions. Labor, government, and consumers have been singled out as the root causes of inflation, and wages, regulation, and social services have been the most visible targets. The poor and the oppressed have been depicted as the cause of society's ills, rather than the victims.

Recently, management theorists have recognized the Achilles heel of corporate America. As the right-wing journalist Irving Kristol has written: "Corporations are highly vulnerable to criticism of their governing structure since there is no political theory to legitimize it." Indeed, the growth of the "corporate-image" business testifies to a growing corporate insecurity, sensing that legitimation cannot keep pace with expansion of power.

We need a broadly based Corporate Reform Movement. Its central focus should be the enactment of a Corporate Reform Act, which subjects corporations to federal regulations similar to those imposed on unions 20 years ago under the Landrum-Griffin Act. Whether such a movement emerges may significantly influence the course of American politics. □

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Ellen Rosen and Ronnie Steinberg Ratner

The Unknown Eleanor Marx

ELEANOR MARX, by Yvonne Kapp. New York: Pantheon. Vol. I, 319 pp. Cloth, $10.00, paper, $4.95. Vol. II, 775 pp. Cloth, $17.95, paper, $6.95.

Yvonne Kapp's two-volume biography of Eleanor Marx chronicles both the personal and public life of a woman who played a distinctive role in the socialist, working-class, and feminist movements of 19th-century Europe. Before the publication of this biography she had stood in the shadow of her father, Karl Marx, while the particulars of her life had been obscured by an aura of romantic tragedy. Yet Eleanor's contributions to these movements, as this book documents, demand recognition in their own right. She was born in London in 1855, the youngest of three daughters. Her sisters, Jenny and Laura, were ten and eleven years older than Eleanor. Her early childhood was shaped by repeated illness, poverty, and ceaseless debt. Despite the financial generosity of Engels, these tribulations were to plague the Marx family well into Eleanor's maturity.

Two things strike the reader about the Marxes' family life: their warmth and tenderness toward one another, and Eleanor's identification with her father. Because Kapp relies heavily on family correspondence,we learn little about the influence of her mother. Eleanor may have had several mother surrogates, given the age gap between her and her sisters, and her close relationship to the family servant, Helene Demuth, who later became her confidante.

The Marx family lived by a completely traditional sexual division of labor. In choosing to devote his life to political and intellectual work, Marx did not meet his responsibilities as a breadwinner, and he appears to have been aware of the consequences. In 1866 he wrote to Paul Lafargue who was then courting Laura,

> You know that I have sacrificed my whole fortune to the revolutionary struggle. I do not regret it. On the contrary, had I my career to start again I should do the same. But I would not marry. As far as lies in my power I intend to save my daughter from the reefs on which her mother's life has been wrecked.

Yet, his good intentions were not to be realized. Two of his daughters, like his wife before them, became hostages to historical inevitability. Writing to Laura after her marriage to Lafargue to request some books, he apologizes for disturbing her wedding trip, adding: "I am a machine, condemned to devour books and then throw them, in a changed form, on the dunghill of history." (Vol. I, p. 88.)

In the Marx family, sacrifices of service and poverty were made by the women in support of the revolutionary enterprise. Marx's wife, and most likely his daughters as well, shared the belief that such sacrifices were legitimate and appropriate for women to make. It is even more surprising, then, that in this Victorian era (and Marx was in many ways himself a "proper Victorian") even *one* of Marx's daughters would choose a more direct and independent role in the political struggles of her time.

At the age of 17, Eleanor became engaged to a

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34-year-old French Communard named Lissagaray, whose history of the Commune Eleanor was later to translate. Her father disapproved of this alliance. The thwarted engagement provoked a crisis of independence in which Eleanor left home to teach briefly in a boarding school north of London. Kapp insists that this episode did not represent a "rebellion." Surely Eleanor did not cross her father but neither did she abandon her "fiancé." They remained "engaged" for ten years. Eleanor only broke with Lissagaray shortly before Marx died. Love and guilt appear to have fought with her need for independence. This same conflict between her need for affiliation and separation were to mark her future.

IN THE FOLLOWING YEARS Eleanor began to take an active role in literary and political affairs, writing political essays, corresponding with Liebknecht, doing research in the British Museum, doing translations, and participating in the Dogberry Club, a private Shakespeare reading group. In her late twenties, Eleanor came to know such notables as George Bernard Shaw, Olive Schreiner, Eduard Bernstein, Havelock Ellis, and Beatrice Potter (later Mrs. Sidney Webb), and to witness the growth of H. M. Hyndman's Social Democratic Federation. She became involved in a variety of political struggles—from raising money for the victims of the anti-Socialist laws in Germany to supporting the Irish Republican struggle.

As Eleanor approached the age of 27 she suffered a second crisis of independence marked by an attack of what is now assumed to have been *anorexia nervosa*. This was the time of her mother's final illness, and of her death in 1881. During these months Eleanor was furiously involved in her work at the British Museum and had started training as an actress. As she wrote to her sister Jenny, "much and hard as I have tried I could not crush out my desire to try something. The chance of independence is very sweet. . . ."

Of her father she wrote, "How I love him no one can know—and yet—we must each of us, after all, live our own life." In 1883, only two years later, first her sister Jenny and then her father died within months of each other.

Yet, it was only after her parents died that her political work began in earnest. And now she formed the liaison with Edward Aveling, which was to continue for the remaining 15 years of her life. Both Eleanor and Aveling became active members in the newly founded Social Democratic Federation, with the hope of moving it toward a British working-class constituency with ideological and political ties to the European socialist movement. Kapp reviews the Avelings' conflicts with both Hyndmanites and Fabians—and finally their split with the Social Democratic Federation, the formation of the Socialist League, and the challenges to this new group launched by the anarchists. Eleanor and Aveling's lecture tour of the United States, at the request of the newly formed Socialist Labor party of America in 1886, is described in detail, as are their efforts on behalf of the Haymarket martyrs whose arrest and imprisonment coincided with their trip.

UPON THEIR RETURN to England Eleanor and Aveling began lecturing on socialism to the Radical Clubs of London's working-class East End. Their involvement focused on the unskilled, sweated workers in "Silvertown"; workers in the chemical, rubber, electrical, iron, gas, and docking industries that were concentrated in the urban slums of London. Kapp gives a blow-by-blow account of Bloody Sunday, the Dockers' and Gas Workers' strikes, and Eleanor's role in forming the first women's branch of the Gasworkers Union. She recounts Aveling's role in the formation of the Legal Eight Hours League, the Independent Labour party, and the Trade Union Congress. During these years Eleanor was a key organizer of the Congress, which was to initiate the Second International in Paris in 1889. This intense activity speaks for her lifelong attempt to build a movement that was class-conscious and revolutionary, firmly centered in the real working-class struggles of her time. She could preach socialism to workers in the East End and, at the same time, engage in the sectarian debates of the internationalist left.

Eleanor's days appear to have been taken up with a constant round of planning demonstrations, giving speeches, writing political essays, and organizing congresses. At the same time, driving herself to the limits of fatigue, she earned her living doing translations and research at the British Museum. Much of Eleanor's activity at the British Museum was "hack work," undertaken primarily for the small income it brought her. Her gift for languages enabled her to play a role as interpreter at several European socialist congresses. More important, it enabled her to prepare the first English translation of Flaubert's *Madame Bovary*, which appeared in 1886. Fascinated with Ibsen, whose Nora had recently caused a scandal in England, Eleanor learned Norwegian in order to

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bring *An Enemy of the People* and *The Lady From the Sea* to the British public in 1888 and 1890. Finally, Eleanor played a tireless role in sorting and editing the massive quantities of Marx's papers, which, under Engels's direction, became Volumes II and III of *Kapital* only after Marx's death. After Engels's death, and a full 12 years after her father's, Eleanor attended to the publication of Marx's other letters and essays. When Engels died, Eleanor was past 40 and had less than two years to live.

IN DOCUMENTING these last years before Eleanor's tragic suicide, Kapp deviates from her preoccupation with public activity to write of Eleanor's personal tragedies: the deaths of valued friends—most important, that of Engels—and her conflicts with the Freybergers (a couple who cared for Engels during his last illness) over her father's letters and manuscripts, which Marx had bequeathed to Eleanor upon Engels's death. Kapp recounts Eleanor's learning of an illegitimate half-brother born to her father and Helene Demuth. Finally, she describes Aveling's long illness and final betrayal in a secret marriage to another woman.

Kapp devotes considerable space to the possible motives underlying Eleanor's suicide. She claims that Eleanor was troubled by what she saw as the failure of both her work and domestic life, and so lapsed into one of her recurring depressions. When the "stresses" in both of these spheres became too intense, Eleanor simply reacted by taking her life. To be sure, such a conjunction of events might be devastating to the strongest of people, even if they had never experienced the emotional breakdowns Eleanor had suffered in her earlier years. Yet, Yvonne Kapp provides no evidence of Eleanor's disillusionment with the socialist movement or with the value of her work.

In 1897, only a year before her death, Eleanor begged off speaking engagements, pointing out that in the past eight months she had given 41 lectures, had spoken or taken the chair at 10 meetings, and had spent a week lecturing in Holland. She also continued to edit and see to the publication of Marx's papers. Moreover, even if Eleanor was disillusioned with political work, Kapp does not explain why this led to taking her life. Disillusionment and loss pursue us all and frequently move individuals to new forms of personal growth and restored effort rather than to suicide.

The absence of a more compelling explanation for Eleanor's death is somewhat distressing, given the vitality of a life so actively spent in political and literary work. Yet, the abundance of material that Kapp presents allows us to speculate on a more complex and intricate web of factors that shaped Eleanor's life—and her death. Even as the daughter of Karl Marx, she was also a 19th-century Victorian English woman, whose typical destiny was expected to lie in marriage, motherhood, and serving the revolutionary cause through her husband. Jenny and Laura, her older sisters, reproduced their mother's life in marrying men whose socialist goals they supported in domestic service. Eleanor did not.

As an adolescent, Eleanor observed closely the early married life of her older sisters. Their weddings were followed by a rapid succession of pregnancies, which were accompanied by the illness of both mother and child. Eleanor saw all three of Laura's children sicken and die before they reached the age of six. Jenny died at the age of 39, most likely of complications of pregnancy. Both had husbands who were not only poor providers but managed to meet their expenses primarily through Engels's continued beneficences to Marx's heirs. Neither Paul Lafargue nor Charles Longuet, the husbands of Eleanor's sisters, appear to have provided much emotional support to wives burdened with sick children and constant financial worries. Indeed, Kapp's portraits of Lafargue and Longuet, impecunious and self-involved, depict them as little more solicitous of their wives than the villain Aveling himself. Thus, when Eleanor during her crisis at the age of 27 decided to become an actress, her sister Jenny, then tending sick children and herself near death, wrote to Eleanor about her younger sister's "prospect of living the only free life a woman can live—the artistic one."

Even when Marx died, Eleanor never legally married. Nor did she bear a child. It may indeed have been difficult to replace her father; on the other hand, a "true" marriage to a more conventional, giving man might have meant for her a life of service—as it had for her mother and sisters. She did manage to avoid such a life and have a sustained, if difficult, long-term relationship with a man who at least shared her literary and political interests, and Kapp acknowledges that.

Such an arrangement in 19th-century England should not be minimized. Her relationship with Aveling permitted, and perhaps even sustained, her independence. Yet, this gain came at the cost of a partner with a limited capacity for intimacy or emotional support, and with a penchant for spending movement money extravagantly. (One

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wishes Kapp had been more sensitive to Eleanor's limited choices.)

ELEANOR'S WORK provided her with the independence she wanted. It also may have been an extension of her family life. As Marx's favored daughter, she grew up among the leading socialists of late 19th-century Europe. As an adult woman, Eleanor's ability to move with confidence among such old family friends as Bebel, Liebknecht, Kautsky, and Bernstein (and to quarrel with them on occasion) guaranteed her a place in a socialist political arena inevitably dominated by men.

If Eleanor played the role of a favored daughter in the socialist movement, Engels's death may provide a key to an understanding of her third and final crisis. Kapp provides extensive documentation that Engels was a surrogate father to all of Marx's daughters. He was especially close to Eleanor, emotionally and politically. If Eleanor's political work was tantamount to affiliation with an internationally extended family, the thwarting of her socialist goals by history may have been represented by the deaths of the "true revolutionaries" of her father's generation.

In her first two crises Eleanor could rely on her circle of family and friends for support and attention. Ironically, the tension between some expression of independence on her part and her strong affiliation to this same tightly knit group helped precipitate these crises. In other words, one of the major ingredients of her breakdowns also helped her in the process of recovery. The emotional support she received from her family surrogates was something her flawed companion, Aveling, could never provide. When this support became unavailable through the death of a generation of older friends and political activists, notably of Engels, her third and final crisis was the result.

The detail provided by Kapp's exhaustive chronicle rescues the material of Eleanor's life from obscurity. Her biography provides the data with which the analyst can both ask and answer questions about the significance of Eleanor Marx's life. She was a woman in Victorian England; she was also the daughter of Karl Marx. Undoubtedly, these two facts shaped some of the contradictions of her life and influenced the choices she made. In a contemporary world where independent political action is only beginning to be an option for women, Eleanor's life speaks directly to today's socialist feminists. At the same time, socialist feminist perceptions illuminate new features of the unknown Eleanor Marx. □

Leonard Kriegel

A First-Rate Political Novel

BURGER'S DAUGHTER, by Nadine Gordimer. New York: Viking Press. 361 pp. $10.95.

One approaches novels that have been as highly praised as Nadine Gordimer's *Burger's Daughter* with a certain caution. About one-fourth of the way into the novel, however, all caution breaks down, and the reader finds himself ready to acknowledge that *Burger's Daughter* is one of those rare novels that stamps its existence on the consciousness of our time. Nothing Nadine Gordimer has written to this point—not even those superb short stories or her earlier novels—quite prepares her readers for the power of *Burger's Daughter*, a power built up layer by layer, scene by scene. At this point in history, few other writers, in the English language at least, could create a revolutionary world that is so human, so intimate in the presence it exerts on the reader, and so beyond the necessity of slogans that it can parody them with affectionate ease. It is her "humanness"—a vague enough word, but the only suitable one that comes to mind—that will ultimately make Rosa Burger a fit companion for Malraux's Kyo Gisors or Pasternak's Zhivago. There is something terribly wearing about the way she struggles with the horrors of contemporary South Africa, but there is something terribly human about it as well.

The novel's power is not that it confronts the sickness that is South Africa nor the paranoia that will ultimately destroy both South Africa and the forces of its liberation. For this, journalism can tell the story adequately. Nadine Gordimer knows that in order to meld politics and fiction, the writer must assume a distance beyond her characters but never above them.

The novel is written from inside, even when it is written from a distance. Rosa's pain is her author's intimate knowledge; that makes the manner with which Nadine Gordimer is willing to accept her characters' views as their own all the more notable. It is not the empathy with which she creates Rosa that is so strikingly in evidence. After all, Rosa is the novel's heroine—and a heroine in a novel that demands heroic action. But just as the power of

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Man's Fate is best seen in the creation of the police chief König, so the strength of *Burger's Daughter* is best seen in the ironic portrait of the Afrikaaner nationalist, Brandt Vermeulen, who spends his life trying to construct an intellectual system that will make *apartheid* respectable. For Brandt Vermeulen is a kind man, as so many contemporary jailers are kind. It is he who helps Rosa take her leave from the country her father had dreamed of changing into an interracial Marxist society. And it is he who proves to be the stimulus to Rosa's recognition that her father has failed, that the revolution that finally levels *apartheid* will not bring with it the classless, unpigmented society of Lionel Burger's dreams. That illusion of South Africa's future lies buried with the black dead at Sharpeville, a moment in which the dimension of color became inviolable for black as well as for white.

In Europe, Rosa seeks to shed the politics of belief. But her frame of reference remains her father and the small Communist party of South Africa, what Rosa thinks of as "our kind." A peculiar division into "us" and "them"—an aristocracy of the politically virtuous pitted against a bourgeoisie that has just begun to doubt itself. In the reader's mind, they blend, as political conviction seeks to define victim and victimizer. And to switch their roles. Lionel Burger's future may very well have been defined for us in Djilas's *New Class*, written almost 30 years ago. "The world has seen few heroes as ready to sacrifice and suffer as the Communists were on the eve of and during the revolution. It has probably never seen such characterless wretches and stupid defenders of arid formulas as they became after attaining power." Inevitably, one wonders about the fate of a Lionel Burger who comes to power. His daughter learns that her "us" has become a "them" for black South African revolutionaries. "Our kind repudiates ethnic partitioning of the country," Rosa insists. But "our kind" has lived to become as great an anachronism in South Africa as the proponents of *apartheid*, with their Calvinist heritage sharpened by a historical "triumph" that the future will deem as ironic as Casimir the Great's invitation to the Jews to settle in Poland. For even as "our kind" bravely insists that men must be responsible for history, it is as finished as the *apartheid* it fought—with greater courage and determination, let it be noted, than any other segment of the population.

BURGER'S DAUGHTER is close in spirit to the Jamesian novel of manners, but it is a novel of manners in which political existence becomes the one true way to define the self. In few other contemporary novels is politics so naturally integrated into the everyday lives and speech of characters. It is almost as if a more politically conscious James had returned to the themes he tried to grapple with in *The Bostonians* and *The Princess Casamassima*. Even the excruciating sense of detail with which Nadine Gordimer endows Rosa is politicized. But only because Rosa's life has been defined politically—by her father, by her fellow Afrikaaners, and, as she discovers in Europe, now by black South African revolutionaries. In her world, politics is destiny. She is what she is because no other choices exist for her. When she tries to escape from South Africa to live with her father's first wife in the South of France, she carries her sense of detail with her. But here, divorced from the realities of *apartheid*, it proves quibbling, even a bit sullen. If there is a weakness in the novel, it is that Rosa away from South Africa is no longer compelling as a presence.

The momentum of her return to the *apartheid* world is provided by her chance meeting in London with the son of a black revolutionary comrade of her father's, Baasie. She has always viewed Baasie as her brother. But Baasie is now a self-righteous black nationalist, a man in whom even the interracial past in Lionel Burger's house must be expunged in order to service his need for vengeance. "I discover I can take from people what I need," Rosa has told us of her relationship to Brandt Vermeulen. But now she discovers that she must provide others with what they need, even when what they need is a whipping boy (or girl) for black rage. For there is, as Rosa senses, a certain inevitable justice in Baasie's excoriation of her father.

> Oh yes I knew him. You'll tell them to ask me for the television show. Tell them how your parents took the little black kid into their home, not the backyard like other whites, right into the house. Eating at the table and sleeping in the bedroom, the same bed, their little black boss. And then the little bastard was pushed off back to his mud huts and tin shanties. His father was too busy to look after him. Always on the run from the police. Too busy with the whites who were going to smash the government and let another lot of whites tell us how to run our country. One of Lionel Burger's best tame blacks sent scuttling like a bloody cockroach everywhere, you can always put your foot on them.

Here, we go finally with Rosa Burger into the terrible inevitability of the political tragedy known

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as South Africa. It is too late for men and women of good will. Rosa Burger finally gets beyond her need for heroes, beyond the need to worship the dead father. "I wanted to know," she has told us earlier, "how to defect from him." At the novel's end, some 14 years after its beginning, she has not managed to defect. She has, rather, simply replaced him in prison, arrested after the Soweto protest of October 19, 1977. She is still bound by Lionel's sense of political purpose. She can defect only from his illusions. The reality of South Africa remains for the radical daughter of a radical father. In the future, one senses, only the identity of Rosa's jailers will have changed. □

Benjamin Ross

Technical Fix

ENERGY FUTURE: REPORT OF THE ENERGY PROJECT AT THE HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL, edited by Robert Stobaugh and Daniel Yergin. New York: Random House. 353 pp. $12.95.

One of the classic pitfalls in setting policies for the social use of technology is the search for a "technical fix"—a resolution of social and political contradictions through the introduction of new technology. The technical fix represents an attempt to ameliorate economic or social problems without touching the power relationships that lie at their roots. The recent history of American policy-making is littered with the wrecks of technical fixes, from factory-built housing to the MacNamara Line. Yet, these illusory solutions will no doubt remain attractive as long as the desire persists to solve problems cleverly without the inconvenience of disturbing anyone's entrenched power.

The evident need for new energy supplies has called forth its share of technical fixes, from gasohol to the solar power satellite. But, essential as technology is to resolving the energy problem, its roots are as much social and political as technical. By the very measures that make our present standard of energy consumption possible, technology has rendered the present organization of energy supply and use obsolete. The growing scale and complexity of energy industries have required such a high degree of worldwide coordination and centralization that the industries are now altogether incapable of functioning in a competitive market.

The obsolescence of present industrial arrangements is seen most clearly in the problems of nuclear power. Even before the advent of atomic energy, the anarchy of price competition was so disruptive to the operations of manufacturers of electric generating equipment that they were driven into illegal price-fixing arrangements. The technological characteristics of nuclear generation—in particular, the large size of individual plants, the complexity of the fuel cycle, and the long lead times needed for new processes—demand advance planning on a scale of decades and highly centralized administrative structures. These requirements mesh poorly with the still somewhat competitive nature of American business and with the concept of government as a quasi-judicial regulator that plays only a passive role of constraining corporate behavior to satisfy fixed rules.

An industry whose survival depends on central planning could only coexist with anarchic decision-making structures while it was supported by a nearly complete social consensus. As soon as the opposition to nuclear power became significant, it was able to paralyze the industry without having to gain the support of either government or corporate power centers. Although nearly all of business as well as both the President and most of Congress have voiced a strong desire for more nuclear electricity, not a single reactor has been ordered in four years. An administrative and judicial system based on the premise that government is always an impartial arbiter has introduced long delays in plant construction, while actually impairing safety by imposing legalistic obstacles to communication between builder and regulator. An archaic financing system has magnified the effects of these delays and added its own bias against large-scale capital investment. The result has been paralysis—a paralysis often duplicated, for these and other reasons, in mass transit, in conversion of oil-fired boilers to coal, in electricity pricing, and in a host of other areas of energy supply and conservation.

The sophisticates of the Harvard Business School could hardly fail to recognize the social component of the energy crunch. *Energy Future*, in surveying the problems in our supply of coal, oil,

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natural gas, and nuclear power, takes the broad view of technology, economics, and politics that its subject requires. It concludes that the interaction of public attitudes, social institutions, and environmental concerns makes it impossible for coal and nuclear power to contribute effectively to increased energy supplies. But recognition of social factors is not the same as criticism of social arrangements. In their prescriptions for the future, the book's authors are unwilling to consider any serious changes in the way our country does business. Social structures are taken as given; society is not to change to reflect the development of economic processes, but rather technologies must be chosen for their compatibility with its present organization.

The Business School group starts from the premise that "reliance on the free market is the best way" to achieve economic growth. This outlook is so little examined that our national unwillingness to make collective decisions is hardly even noticed as a factor to be reckoned with. The possibility that the United States could decide its energy future democratically, *and carry out that plan*, is ruled out by the taboo on any suggestion of institutional change.

As its substitute for structural change, *Energy Future* advocates a modish technical fix. In line with current "unconventional" political thinking, the fix consists of a potpourri of decentralized solar energy and conservation technologies. The elements of the proposed solution are, as usual in such policy studies, for the most part technically feasible. But *Energy Future* does not analyze its favored solution with the same rigor it applies to understanding the problem. The social and political factors that might obstruct the conservation-solar strategy are seen as *objects* to be acted upon by policy-makers. They are never viewed as *determinants* of social action to be evaluated in the same realistic manner as the attitudes and institutions controlling more conventional sources of energy.

Typical of the book's approach is its evaluation of one study of coal. The conclusion that U.S. production can be doubled is forthrightly criticized for being obtained by "assum[ing] away many of the problems that we discuss and regard as most important" by "specifically exclud[ing] a number of environmental, political, and productivity constraints." Yet the authors' own recommendation—that conservation and small-scale solar energy should produce needed supplies—rests on an equally tenuous base. As *Energy Future* argues, "The barriers to conservation are very great, but they are rarely technological. Although some of the barriers are economic, they are in most cases institutional, political, and social. Overcoming them requires a government policy that champions conservation." One need only substitute the word "nuclear" or "coal" for "conservation" to obtain the sort of technological optimism that, as *Energy Future* argues so convincingly, has often obscured the need for unpleasant action.

HERE WE COME to the real choices in energy policy. The evidence marshalled so well by *Energy Future* demonstrates irrefutably that we are in big trouble unless we do something to overcome the obstacles—political, psychological, economic, and technical—to increasing energy supply and reducing demand. This book really shows, unfortunately, that conventional solutions won't work unless something is done to make them work, while unconventional answers might succeed if sufficient effort was made.

The choice, as *Energy Future* realizes, is not really between the new and traditional energy sources at all, for neither is sufficient alone. The real question is whether America's voracious appetite for oil is to be curbed. Despite its thorough exposition of the costs of OPEC oil, *Energy Future* seems destined to contribute more to the problem than to the solution. Its argument that conservation and solar energy *could* be a solution is being translated—even in the blurbs on its jacket—to mean that they *will* be a solution, and we therefore *should* do without coal and nuclear power.

Social conditions determine technological possibilities. *Energy Future*'s great value lies in its sophisticated understanding of this often neglected relationship. But social possibilities are often created by technology. A sensible energy policy requires that we seek the form of social organization we think best, that we choose the technologies we find most beneficent, that we harmonize the two as best we can, and that when conflicts arise, as they must, neither society nor technology be treated as unchangeable.

The present energy situation requires both social and technological changes. There is no easy technical fix—certainly not one based on competitive markets. Difficult choices must be made and unpleasant policies adopted. Democratic decisions must be taken that some people will not like—but if any energy policy is to be successful, government must receive a mandate to plan for changes in the status quo. □

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Louis F. Cooper

Global Distribution

POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, by Charles R. Beitz. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 212 pp. Cloth, $16.50; paper, $3.95.

There are today, in the poor countries of the world, roughly 900 million people who live in absolute poverty—"a condition of life [to quote Robert McNamara] so limited by malnutrition, illiteracy, disease, high infant mortality and low life expectancy as to be below any rational definition of human decency." The continuing existence of mass absolute poverty makes discussion of the moral aspects of international relations (and particularly of North-South relations) a matter of extreme importance.

Charles Beitz believes that "political theorists have paid insufficient attention to a variety of philosophically interesting and practically important normative problems of international relations. . . ." His book is a persuasive, closely argued and lucidly written "attempt to work out a more satisfactory international normative political theory through a critique and revision of orthodox views." The book's main shortcoming (to be discussed later) is that Beitz does not always make sufficiently explicit the broad policy implications of his theoretical arguments.

The book consists of three parts. The first is an effective attack on the view "that moral judgments have no place in discussions of international affairs or foreign policy." This idea, which Beitz calls international moral skepticism, stretches from Machiavelli, Bodin, and Hobbes to the modern "realists."

The second part is an equally effective critique of the traditional alternative to international skepticism, which Beitz terms the morality of states.

> Two basic features [he writes] of the morality of states are especially striking. One is the principle of state autonomy: like persons in domestic society, states in international society are to be treated as autonomous sources or ends, morally immune from external interference, and morally free to arrange their internal affairs as their governments see fit. The other is the absence of any principle of international distributive justice: In the morality of states, each state is assumed to have a right to the wealth of its territory, and there are no moral rules regarding the structure and conduct of economic relations between states.

Beitz proceeds to demonstrate convincingly that this view is morally unacceptable.

The book's third part takes up directly the subject of global distributive justice, a matter on which not only the morality of states but the whole "tradition of international political theory is virtually silent. . . ." Here Beitz extends to the international arena John Rawls's influential theory of justice, which is concerned almost exclusively with domestic society. Beitz argues that Rawls's "difference principle," which states that social and economic inequalities should be arranged so that they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, should apply globally. In an earlier version of his argument, Beitz seemed to imply that the subjects of the global difference principle are states rather than individuals. In the book he wisely revises this position: ". . . an international difference principle applies to persons in the sense that it is the globally least advantaged representative person (or group of persons) whose position is to be maximized."

This view has, Beitz suggests, two practical implications:

> First, in formulating aid programs, donor countries and agencies should take account of the special weight to be placed on improvements in the welfare of the world's worst-off groups, and with respect to particular recipient countries, attempt to direct aid primarily at the satisfaction of minimum human needs. . . . Second, in countries where extreme poverty is partially a result of large domestic income inequalities, pressure should be brought if possible for changes in policy or structural reforms aimed at reducing internal inequalities.

These recommendations make sense. Beitz's persuasive theoretical position has, however, a broader practical implication he does not make explicit. This broader policy recommendation is that the rich countries should deliberately link international redistribution to domestic redistribution in the poor countries (or at least in those countries "where extreme poverty is partially a result of large domestic income inequalities"). In other words, rich countries should agree to meet the economic demands of poor ones (such as those set forth in the New International Economic Order proposals) in return for solid commitments on the part of poor countries to implement development strategies aimed at meeting the basic needs of their populations.

Some might object that this approach involves unjustifiable interference in the internal affairs of poor countries. If, however, one accepts Beitz's theoretical views, then this objection has no moral validity; for Beitz argues that "the principle of state

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autonomy . . . lacks a coherent moral foundation," and that therefore "external interference . . . with unjust [domestic] institutions might be justified when it has a high probability of promoting domestic social justice." □

B. J. Widick

Blacks & Unions

BLACK DETROIT AND THE RISE OF THE UAW, by August Meier and Elliott Rudwick. New York: Oxford University Press. 289 pp. $15.00.

This book has many virtues. It is a well-documented, well-written and lively study of one of the crucial periods in modern labor history: the triumph of the UAW-CIO over that citadel of the open shop, the Ford Motor Company, and the domination this company had over the black community in Detroit. It is an authoritative review of the men and the events that molded the city of Detroit in this period of race and class violence. The authors restore to prominence some of the forgotten black and white militants who undertook the dangerous task of unionizing Ford.

Above all, the authors have succeeded in presenting a balanced appraisal of the relations between blacks and the UAW, which is in marked contrast to the many biased studies that have flooded the market in recent years. Their conclusions, in my opinion unassailable, are worth quoting:

> The entire history of the relations between black Detroit and the UAW have been characterized by a striking amibiguity. On the one hand, the union has protected seniority rights, fostered greater economic security, and aided the blacks' movement into production and assembly line jobs outside the foundry. On the other hand, the constraints placed upon the international leadership by the white rank and file often inhibited implementation of the union's constitutional provisions prohibiting racial discrimination, and blacks from the beginning waged protests against the union's failure to eliminate job bias and the lack of representation in the highest councils of the organization. Although by the 1960's the warm relationship between rank-and-file black auto workers and the UAW international leaders on the one hand and between those leaders and the national black protest organizations on the other hand would deteriorate, the Alliance had endured so long precisely because the UAW had been in the vanguard of the labor movement and indeed of the larger American society in its support for black aspirations. The tensions between the UAW's principles and what the union actually delivered were crucially important. Nevertheless, with the possible exception of the packing house workers, the UAW had done more in the factory and in the larger civil rights struggle than any other trade union. It was thus because the UAW had been in the forefront of the struggle for economic and social change that Detroit blacks had found it to be such an indispensable ally.

The authors do, however, underestimate one factor, in their analysis of why industrial unionism won. They write: "Supported in spirit by a growing band of Negro radicals and liberal New Dealers, black workers in the mass industries became members and officers in the new unions while the NAACP and the Urban League endorsed collective bargaining and also the CIO." The authors should have added, "and white radicals," for it was the radical movements of the 1930s, working largely within the framework of the CIO, that insisted on winning over the black workers and involving them in unionism.

"Black and White, Unite and Fight," was a meaningful slogan. Most of the black radicals came out of the political movements. Any roll call of the black and white heroes who risked life and limb to convert Ford's employees, thousands of whom were blacks, into CIO supporters would illustrate this point. Young men like Horace Sheffield, Hodges Mason, Walter Hardin, Sheldon Tappes, and John Conyers, Sr., to mention a few activists, drew their support and politics from the radical circles. And then there were young white radicals like Emil Mazey, who was far more active and important in the Ford organizing campaign than he has ever been given public credit for. The authors also revive the names of black preachers like Horace A. White and Charles Hill, who took on the essentially Uncle Tom establishment in the black community. A reader also receives a better appreciation of the tough job that R. J. Thomas did as president of the auto workers' union in those critical days.

Somehow, the authors fail to credit A. Philip Randolph and the 1942 conference in Detroit, as well as his threatened "March on Washington," as inspirational factors aiding the black militants and the UAW. But minor cavils aside, Professors Meier and Rudwick have performed a valuable service. Unlike many scholarly studies, this work has readable footnotes that add to the book, a series of notes that make interesting reading, and a good bibliographical essay that reviews previous literature with a critical eye. □

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LETTERS

Community Organizing

Editors:

Michael Walzer's "Pastoral Retreat of the New Left" is sympathetic [*Dissent*, Fall 1979]; but some facts are wrong. The only organizations he mentions specifically in his critique of the trends in community organizing are the Midwest Academy, Massachusetts Fair Share, and my own group, ACORN. Perhaps his comments are true about the first two parties mentioned; I have no familiarity with them except in the most general terms. But having worked with ACORN for four years I can state categorically that Walzer is wrong in the following particulars:

(1) "Except for some union work, the new organizers don't reach into the black community. And theirs is not, by any means, a "poor people's movement." Walzer's opinion would certainly startle the members of the City Council of Pine Bluff, Arkansas, which regularly receives visitations of large numbers of poor, black, and angry ACORN members. I should know, having been there. The same might be said of Philadelphia, Houston, St. Louis, Detroit, or 40 other ACORN cities with large black populations. We organize low- and moderate-income people, without regard to their color or nationality, and we always organize in some of the lowest income neighborhoods.

(2) "This kind of politics, like every other, is routine; its success depends upon one small victory after another—getting a new playground, forcing acceptance of an affirmative action program, stopping a hike in utility rates, winning an NLRB election in a hospital or office." If the politics of obtaining these things is "routine," they will not be obtained. Getting a new playground usually and stopping a hike in utility rates always require the mobilization of large numbers of people. If large numbers are not involved, there is no pressure for change, and "Power yields only to demand," to quote Frederick Douglass. The mobilization of large numbers of people is not routine; it does not happen routinely in the experience of either low- and moderate-income people or the targets of the campaign, and it changes the political environment and political awareness of everyone involved.

(3) "The rules [for tenant fights] are complex, and they require interpretation. Soon the organizer is negotiating with city officials; soon he has to bring in lawyers." I don't know what tenant organizing Walzer is talking about. Any that I've had anything to do with at ACORN had none of this character. An organizer's job does not include negotiation with city officials, landlords, or anybody else. That is the job of the tenants themselves. Any lawyers we use have to understand their accountability to the membership of the organization.

(4) "At some point it is hardly necessary to organize at all"—if one does not much care about winning. Those of us who do care, organize. "One only needs legal standing or the political skills necessary to make city councils, regulatory commissions, and congressional committees listen. Then organizing as an activity passes over into pure advocay, like the work of the Nader groups." Here we have an assertion that most of the things that ACORN sets out to do can be accomplished without a membership, without an active constituency, by (a) legal standing and (b) political skills.

(a) Walzer seems to be under the impression that American courts are not political institutions and can be counted on not to give political decisions. They are and they do. Even to win in the courtroom it is often necessary to win first outside the courtroom, on the streets.

(b) One finds "political skills" nearly useless without political muscle. An organization lacking in money must show its muscle in people active in support of its goals. Nader himself understands this as a result of several years of frustration in Congress and has been advocating grass-roots community organizing to anyone who would listen for some time now.

(5) The organizers "are literally in retreat, waiting for some upsurge of leftist activity, a national movement to which they might deliver their clients and constituents." Speak for thyself, Michael. I'm not in retreat, literal or figurative. At ACORN we do not await a movement to "deliver" our members to. We seek to have our membes BE that movement. These low- and moderate-income people have conceived and ratified a national People's Platform that demands representation in all those areas of life in America that low- and moderate-income people are affected by. Starting this year and next they will be demanding its fulfillment by those who hold power in this country.

There may be organizations in this country that correspond to the picture Walzer has drawn. I simply resent my group being classed with them, and my opinion is that most people familiar with ACORN would not recognize it in Walzer's article.

MARK SHRODER, Reno, Nevada
Head Organizer, Nevada ACORN

MICHAEL WALZER Replies:

I had thought that the great virtue of today's community organizers was their candor, their tough-minded sense of the difficulties of the work they are trying to do and of their own ambiguous role in the communities they enter. Possibly I was wrong. Mark Shroder sounds like any politician on the stump.

1. If large numbers of poor people and black people have been organized in Philadelphia, Houston, St. Louis, Detroit, and 40 other cities, American politics should look very different than it does.

2. The victories that Mr. Schroder and I both value

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require the mobilization of some people, not necessarily large numbers of people (else they would rarely be won). They don't require, and it's not yet clear that they will build, a mass movement. Each mobilization is enormous work—telephoning, mimeographing, canvassing, meeting, arguing, demonstrating. And when one small victory is won, there is nothing to do but the same things again . . . and again. Just to keep going is an impressive achievement, and it requires a commitment to the routines of democratic politics. I assume that Mr. Shroder has made such a commitment. He ought to be proud of it.

3. and 4. I also support grass-roots organizing, but I believe that it is important to recognize and admit that organizing is often only the starting point for a political campaign that culminates in negotiations, litigation, and legislative action. At crucial points in that campaign, skilled professionals have crucial parts to play. It doesn't make the movement more democratic if these people ritually repeat: There's nobody here but us tenants.

5. "We seek to have our members be that movement." Yes, and those two pronouns tell the whole story. □

"The Kennedys . . . "

Editors:

In the Summer 1979 issue, Mr. Joseph Clark stated in his article "The Kennedys—and their Enemies" that Senator Kennedy has formed coalitions that have helped labor, the poor, the deprived, etc. He goes on to conclude that: "More of a welfare state, not less, is the answer to the problems of recession and unemployment." How he arrived at this startling conclusion seems somewhat of a mystery to me. He does not bother to explain the foundations for such a statement. It is obvious that the nature of such a statement requires more than what Mr. Clark simply believes. I do not question his expertise concerning the subject; however, if he does not attempt to clarify the reasons for his "belief," I will be forced to think that laziness has got the best of him.

According to you, *Dissent*, is "a journal devoted to . . . the values of socialism and democracy. "If so, please tell me where the value of Mr. Clark's statement lies.

CHARLES PERRY
Akron, Ohio

JOSEPH CLARK Replies:

Even in such a brief essay I should not have taken for granted that unemployment insurance is better than a dole, that a minimum wage is better than the right to pay starvation wages, that bank-deposit insurance is better than none, that medicare and medicaid are better than charity medicine, and that a complete system of medical insurance would be still better; that social security is better than a poorhouse. All the above played an important part in the half-century since the crash of 1929. The folly of Hooverism was replaced by measures of a welfare state and these helped prevent recurrence of a depression that some of us are old enough to remember rather vividly.

Visiting, in spring '79, the Federal Republic of Germany, I found that still greater expansion of the welfare state had helped them keep unemployment to 4 percent compared with our 6 percent and 7 percent, at the same time that it had kept inflation to about 4 percent compared with the double digits we had reached. I also found that the welfare state there was extended to include worker participation in the management of industry, with salutory results. I agree heartily with Mr. Perry that I should not be lazy and I am, therefore, writing a book on the subject. □

Why is Mark Rudd Mad at Me?

Editors:

I knew, of course, that Life has a way of imitating Art and that picked-up pieces often generate lives of their own, but I was frankly unprepared for the verbal drubbing that followed my article on "Erasing the Sixties—Or, Whatever Happened to Mark Rudd?" (*Dissent*, Winter 1980). My colleagues who write about Chaucer or Milton or even T. S. Eliot have it easier; they are never rousted out of bed at 12:30 A.M. by a long-distance telephone call. I was. Needless to say, the angry voice at the other end of the line belonged to Mr. Rudd himself. It shouted obscenities, accused me of sleazy journalism and self-serving opportunism, ached with a deep sense of betrayal. But most of all, it insisted that I had not asked for "permission." The word became a litany.

Later, over coffee, I wondered: Did Mark Rudd ask Lionel Trilling for *permission* before he publicly berated him as an elitist pig? Indeed, what sort of permission did he have in mind? Since my article was not an interview, "permission" in the usual sense of the word did not apply. I *had* made it clear that I was working on an article about the '60s, but that explanation satisfied neither of us. Something deeper was involved here. Mr. Rudd still imagines he lives in a world where he sets the rules and where History has no consequences. My article apparently hit some sensitive nerves on both counts. There was a time when Mr. Rudd firmly believed that error had no rights and that "tolerance" was a dirty word. In those days he read Marcuse. Now it appears he has become a True Believer of Emily Post, full of insistences about decorum and etiquette. Meanwhile, the careers he ruined at Columbia—without permission, I might add—are conveniently forgotten. "You didn't have *my* permission!" the voice screamed. "How *dare* you!" he insisted. At the other end of the line I imagined him holding his breath until he turned blue, kicking his feet into the carpet. It was a sad image, a synecdoche for sadder time. I hung up the phone.

SANFORD PINSKER □

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

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

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